China's Integration into Global Trading System and its Implications for India by Aswal, Neeraj

China’s Integration into
Global Trading System
and its Implications for India
HCTL Open Thesis and Dissertation Repository
Series in Economics, Business and Management
Doctoral Thesis
Dr. Neeraj Aswal
Faculty Member
The ICFAI University - Dehradun, Uttarakhand (India)
30 May 2014
HCTL Open Thesis and Dissertation Repository
(HCTL Open TDR)
HCTL Open Thesis and Dissertation Repository (HCTL Open TDR)
Year 2014
Title Information
China’s Integration into Global Trading System and its Implications
for India by Dr. Neeraj Aswal
Date of Online Publishing: 30-May-2014
About this e-Book
This e-book is a Doctoral Thesis submitted by Dr. Neeraj Aswal to the
Department of Economics, H.N.B. Garhwal University, S.R.T. Campus, Tehri,
Uttarakhand (India) in the year 2008.
Copyright and License Information
c© Copyright of this e-book retains with author(s) and their respective
organization(s). This e-book is an open-access document distributed under the
terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial
3.0 License. (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/).
Publisher
Published by:
HCTL Open Publications Solutions,
Bhopal, MP, India
Email: director@hctl.org, editor tdr@hctl.org
Website: http://tdr.hctl.org/
Bibliographic Information
ISBN-13 (PDF version): 978-1-63041-308-8
ISBN-10 (PDF version): 1-63041-308-9
Unique Reference No.: TDR DThesis 201405001
e-Version (Online) available at:
www.hctl.org/tdr/2014/TDR_DThesis_201405001.pdf
Cite this e-Book as:
Dr. Neeraj Aswal, China’s Integration into Global Trading System and its
Implications for India, Doctoral Thesis, HCTL Open Thesis and Dissertation
Repository, ISBN (PDF version): 978-1-63041-308-8.
HCTL Open Publications Solutions, India
e-ISBN (PDF version): 978-1-63041-308-8
Page 2
INTRODUCTION
 
 
China's Integration into Global Trading System and Its Implications for India 
3
 
 
 The researcher is highly grateful to Prof. R.K. Srivastava for his 
valuable guidance, encouragement, inspiration and cooperation. He expresses 
his deep indebtedness to him not only for his excellent guidance and 
suggestions but for his profound interest, knowledge, affectionate and 
benevolent attitude which he maintained till the completion of this study. 
 Sino-India relation in global trading has developed over the past 
decades which has been experienced as an emerging phenomenon in world 
market too. The investigator finds himself fortunate enough to avail the 
opportunity of discussions to this fascinating phenomenon among the experts 
and in particular with Prof R. K. Srivastava H.N.B. Garhwal University, 
Campus Badshahithaul who attempted to analyze it within the researchable 
framework in a manner that the researcher feel encouraged to under take it 
for research purpose. 
 The researcher is highly indebted to his Father Dr G.S. Aswal, (Retd) 
Prof Dept of Education, H. N. B. Garhwal University, Srinagar Garhwal.  
 The researcher feels his moral duty to express the feeling of regards 
and respect to all his ‘Gurujan’ and Colleagues, Principals and Teachers 
without whose cooperation this work would have been nowhere in existence. 
 The researcher feels honor to express his reverence to his mother for 
her blessings and induced enthusiasm during the research work. 
 In the end the researcher is obliged to express this thanks to Dev 
Graphic's in correcting the manuscripts. 
 
(NEERAJ ASWAL)  
INTRODUCTION
 
 
China's Integration into Global Trading System and Its Implications for India 
4
CONTENTS 
   Page No. 
Chapter-1 INTRODUCTION 1-44 
1.1 Statement of the problem.  
1.2 Importance of the study.  
1.3 Justification of the study. 
1.4 Review of literature. 
1.5 Objective of the study. 
1.6 Methodology 
1.7 Area of the study 
1.8 Limitation 
Chapter-2 ECONOMIC REFORMS IN CHINA 45-74 
 2.1 Introduction. 
 2.2 The first phase of reform. 
 2.3 The second phase of reform. 
 2.4 Conclusion 
Chapter-3 GROWTH IN CHINA’S TRADE 75-158 
 3.1 Historical perspective. 
 3.2 Trends in China’s foreign trade. 
 3.3 Trade policy 
 3.4 Foreign direct investment. 
 3.5 Foreign exchange reserve. 
 3.6 Exchange rate policy. 
 3.7  Conclusion 
Chapter-4 SINO-INDIA TRADING RELATIONS 159-208 
 4.1  Historical perspectives. 
 4.2  Trends in India and China bilateral trade. 
 4.3  India’s export to China. 
 4.4  India’s import’s from China. 
 4.5 Joint ventures. 
 4.6  Foreign direct investment. 
 4.7  Conclusion. 
Chapter-5 IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA 209-217 
Chapter-6 AN ALTERNATIVE STRATEGY FOR INDIA 218-224 
Chapter-7 CONCLUSION 225-235 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY  236-243 
INTRODUCTION
 
 
China's Integration into Global Trading System and Its Implications for India 
5
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 
No. 
Title Page 
No. 
3.2.1 Growth of China’s Foreign Trade 79 
3.2.2 The Share of China in the World Trade 80 
3.2.3 China’s Export Ratio and Trade Balance, 1980-2002 81 
3.2.4 China’s Merchandise World Trade 1979-2005 82 
3.2.5 China’s trade by partner 84 
3.2.6 China’s top five trading partners : 2005 85 
3.2.7 Exports and imports of foreign capital-invested enterprises 
(FIEs) 1985-2005 
88 
3.2.8 China’s processing trade, 1990-2005 90 
3.4.1 FDI in China. 108 
3.4.2 China’s Outward FDI Flows in relation to the World’s Total 
FDI Stock by Year End. 
109 
3.4.3 China's Outward FDI Stocks in Relation to the World's 
Total FDI Stocks by Year End" 
109 
3.4.4 Major Foreign Investors in China: 1979-2005 118 
3.4.5 Provinical distribution of FDI in China 120 
3.4.6 Values and Shares of China’s FDI flows by Region 122 
3.4.7 Values and Shares of China’s Outward FDI flows by 
Region 
123 
3.4.8 Sectoral distribution of contracted FDI in China 125 
3.4.9 Values and Shares of China’s Outward FDI flows by 
Sector. 
126 
3.4.10 Share of Actually Used in Percentage by Sector (1992-
2001). 
127 
3.5.1 Foreign Exchange Reserve: Quarterly Indicators. 137 
3.6.1 Exchange rate : Quarterly Indicators. 142 
4.2.1 India-China Bilateral Trade Growth (1992-2004) 171 
4.3.1 India’s top 15 exports to China (2003 and Jan-Nov 2004) 174 
4.3.2 Commodity Structure of India Exports to China. 176 
4.4.1 India’s top 15 imports from China (2003 and Jan-Nov 
2004) 
177 
4.4.2 Commodity Structure of India’s imports from China. 179 
4.6.1 Comparative Inward FDI. 194 
4.6.2 A Comparative Analysis of FDI into China and India. 196 
4.6.3 FDI Overview-India and China. 200 
4.6.4 FDI Overview-India and China. 201 
INTRODUCTION
 
 
China's Integration into Global Trading System and Its Implications for India 
6
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 
No. 
Title Page 
No. 
3.2.1 Foreign Trade. 86 
3.2.2 Export, Imports and Trade Balance Share in GDP, 1985-
2006. 
89 
3.4.1 FDI inflows to China:1983-2006. 111 
3.4.2 FDI outflows to China: 1983-2006. 115 
3.4.3 Shares of actually used of FDI in 1997 128 
3.4.4 Shares of actually used of FDI 128 
3.5.1 China’s global current-account balance (as a 
percentage of GDP), 1983-2006 
133 
3.5.2 Real effective exchange rate of the Renminbi. 134 
3.5.3 Change in China’s foreign exchange reserves, USD 
billion and as a share of GDP. 
135 
3.5.4 Chinas’ Foreign Exchange Reserve: 1990-March 2006. 136 
4.2.1 Trends in India China Bilateral Trade. 170 
 
INTRODUCTION
 
 
China's Integration into Global Trading System and Its Implications for India 
7
Chapter - I 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
 Economic globalization has made tremendous strides in recent decades as 
evidenced in the huge expansion in world exports, vast FDI flows and Tran’s 
nationalization of production, among other factors. The first wave of globalization 
was witnessed on a massive scale in the 19th century. However, there are several 
parameters distinctive to the contemporary process of globalization, making it the 
kind of deep integration that was not seen in the previous period. The tendency of the 
market towards relentless expansion so as to bring the entire globe under its reign-in 
other words, economic globalization-has been visible from the time of its birth, 
though undoubtedly marked by severe interruptions. The extensive or widening phase 
of globalization, in the sense of bringing the entire planet under the sway of the 
market, had been completed by the end of the 19th century. 
 China's rise from an isolated giant to one of the world's fastest growing 
economics and a poster-child of globalization is a well-known story. But how China's 
commissar achieved this feat bears retelling. China's total foreign trade in 1978 was 
only US$20 billion, making it an insignificant player in world trade. Only half a 
million tourists visited the country that year, and they found themselves ensconce, not 
in luxury hotels, but in Spartan, Soviet-style guesthouses build during the 1950s. 
Between 1978 and 2002, however, transnational exchanges boomed. By 2002, the 
amount of goods passing though Chinese ports had increased almost ten-fold, while 
the number of tourists had leapt to over 10 million. How did China do it? How did 
this isolated, communist-run country with a command economy develop such intense 
global links in such a short period of time? And, did Communist Party officials and 
bureaucrats help or hinder this process? Many factors lie behind the remarkable 
transition. However, self-interested bureaucrats, mainly at the local level, played the 
key role. The more they opened the economy, the more they gained - "no flow, no 
dough" - and so they facilitated China's opening.  
INTRODUCTION
 
 
China's Integration into Global Trading System and Its Implications for India 
8
 China expert David Zweig tells how local bureaucrats played a big role in 
bringing the country out of its isolation. Through the 1970s, Zweig says, upper-level 
officials in the Communist Party had a right grasp on the Chinese economy. There 
was little tourism, and the country was an insignificant player in global trade. Today, 
tourism and transnational exchanges are booming, largely thanks to self-interested 
bureaucrats in towns and cities across the country. Zweig explains that significant 
differences in prices inside and outside China, created by decades of economic 
autarky and cheap labor, meant that those who controlled international trade could 
earn large profits. Local officials - who gradually became the gate-keepers of global 
commerce - therefore had a strong financial incentive to harbor close relationships 
with foreign investors and with China's businessmen overseas. Ironically, the very 
bureaucrats that made the first round of China's opening a great success now pose the 
greatest obstacle to further internationalization; few are willing to relinquish control, 
and many resist further deregulation. Thus, the WTO and the international community 
must work "to break the stronghold local officials have on trade policies and thus 
continue the opening of China. 
 When the late Deng Xiaoping took his famous "Southern Tour" of the 
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone in January 1992, he called on local officials to 
"move faster and be bolder." His words gave them the green light to open the 
economy to internationalization and market exchanges. Significant differences in the 
value of goods and services inside and outside China, created by decades of economic 
autarky and cheap labor, meant that those who could move goods, services, 
technology or themselves across China's borders could earn large profits in either the 
domestic or international market. 
 Similarly, many foreign products faced limited competition in Chinese 
markets and could earn what economists call "extra-normal profits." Local 
government officials regulated these imports and harbored close relationships with 
China's businessmen overseas. They were therefore able to ensure themselves a piece 
of the profit, which gave them an incentive to be helpful. Hoping to control the 
process, the central government used various administrative units and legal 
institutions to create channels of global transaction", empowering bureaucrats as gate-
keepers of the state's global commerce. All foreign aid donors, for example, had to 
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work through bureaucratic offices and educational exchanges were handled by 
"foreign affairs" offices in universities. Government policy created incentives for 
local organization and governments to link globally. These factors consistently 
conspired to advance internationalization throughout China. However, the way the 
manifested varied depending on the distinct characteristics of the region and, 
specifically, on whether the area was rural or urban.  
 China’s economy has shown cyclical fluctuations. These cycles of change 
appear in obvious statistical patterns-faster growth and then slower growth, higher 
price inflation, stronger investment flows and then weaker investment-and all are 
accompanied by other cyclical fluctuations in a range of variables and policy 
initiatives. Most of these fluctuations influence others and, by extension, which 
policies might make a difference in managing China’s economy. Throughout the 
reform era, the priority of economic policy has been to maintain an overall growth 
rate high enough. There has been considerable debate about this rate of growth. A 
consensus emerged in the late 1990s that an average rate of real GDP growth of 
around 7-8 % per year was sustainable and necessary for China. In the 1980s and until 
the late 1990s a major part of the impetus behind rapid growth was the incremental 
role of economic reforms. 
 The opening of China’s economy was an integral part of its economic reforms 
and a central element in its growth. Between 1978 and 1995 the value of exports and 
imports as a share of GDP tripled and China became the world’s second-largest 
recipient of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) after the United States. The links 
between trade, FDI and China’s high saving rates have been a key factor in its rapid 
growth. 
 These links will also be crucial for future growth. Deepening integration with 
the world trading system will bring further benefits of China’s comparative 
advantages and provide clearer domestic signals on where to allocate resources. 
Increasing integration with international financial system will help lower the cost of 
capital and deepen domestic financial markets. Sustaining FDI will bring new 
management know-how, the latest technologies embodied in capital equipment, and 
the most recent techniques in international marketing. 
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 After a long period of isolation, China's visibility with the international trading 
system has increased dramatically over the past two decades. Its share of 
world trade has risen from less then 1 percent in 1979 to 5.50 percent in 2003. This 
dramatic (more then five fold) increase in its share of world experts over 
relatively short period has sparked a number of questions and concerns about 
the China’s trade particles. Particularly shrill concerns about the impact of Chinese 
export have been raised in India based on perception the Chinese goods are 
flooding in Indian market and are posing stiff competition in global market too. 
 China's foreign trade has expanded steadily since the opening of the 
economy in I979. This process began relatively slowly in the 1980's after the 
relaxation of pervasive and complex import and export controls. The expansion 
of China's trade gathered steam in. the 1990's with a range of trade reforms 
including broad tariff reduction, and was further boosted by China's accession to 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. Average tariff levels declined born 
.
more 
.
then 40 percent in the early 190 to 12 percent by 2002 with .further 
reductions to l0 percent scheduled to be implementation in the near future. In 
2002 China's exports and impost both grew by about 21 percent - faster than in 
any other major economy-at a time when total global trade was essentially 
flat. This already remarkable base of trade growth has strengthened further in 
and imports growing even more rapidly, by over 40 percentage. 
 China's output growth has been remarkable. Over the past decade, 
GDP has grown at an average annual rate of 8-9 percent. Investment levels 
have been very high, averaging close to 37 percent 7 GDP over the past decade and 
42 percent in 2003. Put in a global perspective, China's investment rates are twice 
that of the United States or the euro area and higher even than the average of 
the newly industrialized Asian economies. In absolute terms China has the world's 
third highest level of investment, after the U.S. and Japan. Its investment is supported 
by very large domestic saving. In fact, China has one of the highest saving rates 
the world, estimated at 43 percent of GDP in 2002. 
 Chinas’ promises to the WTO became the new blueprint for restructuring its 
more mature economy and enabling further market opening. The accession documents 
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are available to foreign companies and governments to use in their lobbying and 
negotiations with Chinese officials and enterprises. 
 Chinese authorities’ compulsion to regulate will remain strong. In 
fact, as the by-products of rapid growth become more troublesome (e.g., pollution of 
all shorts-traffic congestion, waste disposal and contaminated water), the Chinese 
government is likely to flex its lawmaking muscles even more. Within the next two 
or three years, foreign companies growth will be dampened by anti-monopoly 
legislation. The shape of China in the next 30 years will be a fully capitalist economy 
but with continuing reluctance to call it that and greatly improved infrastructure, 
especially the road system, which will allow the diffusion of wealth –and foreign 
investors-deep into China’s interior. In light of the dazzling reversal in its economic 
fortunes, the notion that China’s global influence will also quickly grow through 
“soft power”-a term coined by Joseph Nye of Harvard University-is gaining currency 
among Chinese and foreigners alike. 
In conjunction with in high output growth and investment, China has assumed a 
greater role in world trade. While the dollar value of world exports grew at an average 
rate of 6 percent over the past decade, China's annual export growth averaged 17 
percent. At same time, China gained greater share in foreign markets. It exports 
now account for 11 percent of U.S., import-t  19 percent of  Japan’s and 7 percent of the 
European Union's. Its exports are also becoming more diversified. While labor 
intensive light manufacturing goods still account for large share of total exports the 
shares of electronics -(for example, the office machines and telecommunications and 
sound equipment ) furniture, travel goods and industrial supplies have been 
growing rapidly. Import, too have been growing rapidly. Annual import growth averaged 
16 percent over the past decade increasing demand for imported materials for China's 
export is only part the story. Domestic demand leas increased markedly, and accession 
to World Trade Organization (W.T.O) in 2001 and the associated further opening 
of domestic markets have also contributed to rising imports. The sustained 
growth of Chinese imports has also had knock on effect: helping to fuel the 
strong export performance in, Asian region and contributing to recent strength in world 
prices for several commodities. 
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 It is imperative to mention here that the non-resident Chinese are 
mainly businessmen, with a strong representation of billionaire tycoons in Hong 
Kong, Macao and other south-east Asian countries [Howard and Banik 2001 a, 
Howard and Banik 2001 b, Banik 2003]. The point in this context is to negotiate 
between the national and global, as well as the historical and the contemporary 
diasporas [Banik and Bhaumik 2004]. The distribution of actual foreign direct 
investment in China according to industrial sector during the period 1079-2000. It 
reveals that FDI in manufacturing sector in China contributes about 61 percent of the 
total actual investment. The bulk of FDI in this sector appears to be dominated b 
intermediate technologies. FDI in the service sector on the other extreme contributes 
about 23 percent of the total investment. On the whole, the inflows of FDI in China 
appear to be highly export-intensive. Technology transfers in China have led to an 
important transfer of ‘software’ –managerial and export marketing technology. 
 “China on the other hand has the considerably harder task of having to grow 
in the future by building its economic and political institutions and having to cope 
with the shocks that process will entail. Its property regime needs to be improved and 
its legal system made more transparent. China’s economic performance has been 
running way ahead of its underlying institutional realities, and is therefore arguably 
more fragile than India’s on that account. China’s rapid growth in trade has been 
accompanied by big increase in capital inflows. A World Bank index shows that 
China’s financial integration with the world economy has grown sharply since the 
mid-1980s. By 1995 net flows had reached $ 38 billion, accounting for 13 percent of 
domestic investment, 13 percent of industrial output, 12 percent of tax revenues, and 
16 million jobs. Much FDI has been in special economic zones, under-pinning the 
rapid growth of trade. In 1995 one-third of China’s exports and half of its imports 
involved joint ventures between Chinese and foreign partners. FDI goes largely to 
costal regions-the nine coastal provinces and three municipalities have consistently 
attracted more than 85 percent of the total-and have been concentrated mainly on 
tradable manufactures. Recently, however, the range of investing countries has 
widened, and some FDI has been going into import-substituting activities. Over the 
long term sustaining FDI and improving its efficiency the number of FDI transactions 
in infrastructure is increasing. Foreign investors are involved in a dozen power 
generation projects, each with a capacity of over 100 megawatts, as well as in ports, 
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highways, and railways. Several provinces are packaging publicly financed assets into 
ventures, selling shares to foreign investors, and using the proceeds to finance new 
projects. In China, this is known as “cascading finance”. 
 Foreign commercial ending has expanded as market perceptions of China’s 
creditworthiness have improved. By the end of 1996 external debt totaled about 4 130 
billion, with both the debt to exports ratio (85 percent) and the debt to GNP ratio 
(20percent) standing at less than half the developing country average and among the 
lowest in Asia. Even the currency composition of China’s debt has been diversified. 
 To ensure that its external liabilities remain manageable and that it maintains 
easy access it international capital markets, China needs to continue displaying 
prudence in its foreign borrowing program. In the past, foreign borrowing bolstered 
foreign exchange reserves. But these reserves now cover more than eight months of 
imports. In the near future, China does not need to borrow much. The potential for 
portfolio investment is huge. So far, inflows into China have been equivalent to less 
than 0.5 percent of GDP; the sixteen developing countries that attracted most 
developing country portfolio lows in 1995 averaged about 2 percent of GDP. 
 Portfolio flows into China are limited to buying those equities that can only be 
subscribed by and traded among foreigners (including Hong Kong residents). These 
are the designated B share on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges; shares are 
reserved for Chinese residents. B share, introduced in 1992, have attracted about $ 2 
billion of portfolio investment in sixty stocks so far. In addition, some Chinese 
companies are listed on the Hong Kong and New York stock exchanges. By 1995 
about $ 4 billion in equities had been issued in overseas markets by Chinese 
companies. Financial integration with the rest of the world is still unfolding in China. 
At the same time, technological progress, financial innovations, and deregulation have 
spurred considerable private inflows. So integration China financially with the world 
economy is not a choice for policymakers to make. Markets are making it for them. 
 Moreover, international private capital flows have grown explosively in recent 
years, responding to cross-border opportunities and driven by deregulation in many 
countries. Although FDI is still the biggest component of private capital flows, cross-
border sales of bonds and equities have increased more sharply in recent years, and 
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are now 30 percent of the total. This world wide expansion presents great 
opportunities for China. For example, competition from foreign banks could promote 
the efficiency of domestic banks. Similarly, portfolio inflows could increase liquidity 
in domestic capital markets and encourage improvements in market infrastructure and 
the regulatory framework. On balance, the benefits and risks of financial integration 
suggest a cautious approach to liberalizing capital flows. 
 While China's annual trade surplus has remained moderate at around $30-40 
billion in past several years, with strong export growth to the industrial countries and 
imports growth from Asian economies, bilateral trade patterns have shifted 
considerably, surpluses with the U.S. (and to a lesser extent, with the 
European Union) have grown large, so have trade deficits with Japan, Korea, Taiwan 
province of China and Southeast Asian economies. During this period China's 
external current account surplus has fluctuated around 2 percent of GDP. China's 
ability to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) is taken as a sign of its 
economic strength. Since launching market reforms in 1978, Inflows have 
recently averaged more than $40 billion a year; China attracted more FDI than 
the U.S., making it the largest FDI recipient in the world. The increasingly outward 
orientation of the economy, along with the surge in inward flews of FDI, shows 
how rapidly China is integrating into the world economy in terms of increased tirade 
and financial links. 
 India and China two Asian giants and neighbors-have a history of ups and 
down in their relations. In 1976 India and China reestablished their political relations 
after gap of 14 years i.e. after 1962 Sino- Indian war. India, on gaining independence, 
chose a path of import substitution (“self-sufficiency”), moderately-centralized state 
direction (“planning”), and a mix of private and public enterprise, with the latter 
having a monopoly over “the commanding heights of the economy.” An inward-
looking economic orientation allowed Indian policy makers to shape external 
economic links in ways complementary to India’s perceived international political 
interests. At independence, India’s trade links had been concentrated in the British 
Commonwealth. Subsequently, during the cold war, particularly under the 
premiership of Indira Gandhi, India enjoyed a special economic relationship with the 
USSR, and selectively cultivated trade with the nonaligned countries. These factors—
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combined with galloping population growth, the constraints of an active democracy, 
and an undeveloped post-colonial infrastructure—produced a low annual gross 
domestic product (GDP) growth rate hovering around 3 percent. Domestic economic 
deregulation began in the mid-1980s under Rajiv Gandhi. 
 China has moved from ‘security of existence’ to security of ‘sustainable 
development’. The foreign policy of China is based on a perception that mutual 
interest and economic prosperity are achieved by international solution to existing 
disputes and conflicts. The Indian foreign policy has also witnessed an increasing 
focus on economic development which has led to shift as the ‘look east’ policy, 
improvement of relations with countries like the US to get more foreign direct 
investment and more crucially, break out of the nuclear straitjacket. Despite a trust a 
lot more needs to be done and bilateral relations must be taken to higher plane 
Political leadership on both sides should develop a farsighted view beyond the 
horizon and keeping in mind the shadow of the future’. This will give both the side 
new and more important reason to cooperate. As China and India grow, they will 
inevitably loom larger on each other’s radar screens, economic growth will give 
Beijing and Delhi the resources to pursue wider strategic interests across the Asian 
continent. 
 In the early 1990s, the collapse of socialist economies worldwide 
coupled with a foreign exchange crisis at home allowed the Indian government to 
push through pioneering reforms. There were five major components to the reforms: 
export promotion, domestic deregulation (including ending state monopolies in 
several sectors), privatization of loss-making state enterprises, and permission for 
foreign capital to enter the economy, and reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers 
on imports. Incremental but significant globalization—integration with the 
international economy—has gone hand in hand with domestic economic 
liberalization. Indian policy makers also reoriented foreign economic policy along 
more commercial lines. Officials from the ministry of commerce, as well as 
representatives of industry groups, think tanks and foundations, and even private 
business interests, gradually began to play a larger role in foreign economic policy. 
These reforms facilitated a period of high growth, which shows no signs of 
slackening. From 2000 to 2006, India’s mean growth was nearly 7 percent, and in 
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April 2007, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicted that GDP growth for 
the next two years would be around 8 percent. The agricultural sector’s share of the 
trillion-dollar economy (in purchasing power parity terms) has fallen from 38 
percent in 1980 to only 22 percent in 2006. The highest growth rates in recent years 
have been in services, such as software, accountancy, financial and legal services, 
health, tourism, and air transport, which contributed 54 percent of the GDP in 2003. 
International economic links also have multiplied. For example, from 1990 to 2005, 
India’s merchandise trade to GDP ratio more than doubled, rising from1990 to 2005, 
India’s merchandise trade to GDP ratio more than doubled, rising from 13 to 29 
percent, while annual net foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows exploded from 
$0.2 to $6.6 billion. Portfolio inflows in the form of foreign institutional investment 
(FII) have recently averaged $1.5 billion annually. 
The growth of Sino- Indian trade has been phenomenal in recent years. 
The total two way trade crossed U.S. $7 billion in 2003. China from no where 
now ranks sixth in terms of its total import which is accounted to 4 percent 
of India's total imports. Whereas China is its fifth biggest export partner. India's 
exports to China are accounted 2.12 per cent of its total export. 
Since 1991 India has been exercising the both liberalization and 
globalization. A lot of policy decisions have been/wi11 are taken to remove 
restrictions in the Indian economy. As it has already been discussed in detail 
that China began to open up-its economy in the late 1970s. In short a comparison of 
two economy show that: 
• China's F.D.I. in flows of $ 45 billion is 10 times higher-than what India is 
able to attract. 
• Their market for most products is 3-4 time the size of the Indian market. 
• Its annual export of $ 280 billion is five times that of India. 
• lt's forex reserves of $ 285 billion are three times India's reserves. 
• It's GDP ($ 1.2 trillion) and per-capita incomes ($ 1100) are more than 
double of India's. 
• China's spectacular urban infrastructure is at least a generation a head of 
India's. 
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 These are facts and figures that provide insights that China is miles 
ahead of India. Therefore, it is obvious question whether China's rapidly 
economic drive towards globalization fan adversely elect India's move in 
this direction. An effort will be made to try to answer this question in details. 
1.2 IMPORTANCE OF STUDY: 
 Globalization means different things to different things to different people. 
Some interpret it to mean the global reach of new technologies (particularly in 
information and communication); some refer to the tentacles of corporate capitalism 
or US hegemony in military, economic and cultural matters. In the present context 
globalization in the rather limited sense of openness is to foreign trade and (long-
term) investment. Over the last two decades both China and India have made major 
strides in these aspects of globalization (China dramatically so, with the merchandise 
trade ratio to GDP in 2005 exceeding 60 percent, more than double that for India, and 
Direct foreign investment of $ 79 billion a year, about 13 times that for India). 
 The standard argument by-globalizes has been that the opening up of the 
economy leads to dynamic benefits, which improve the growth rate, The static 
allocation effect may also be pro-poor as it expands job opportunities for unskilled 
labour, which is plentiful in poor countries. China has captured the world market in 
may labour-intensive manufactures, and this economy, improving the rate of growth 
and of poverty reduction. Total factor productivity in Chinese industry grew at an 
annual average of 3.1 percent in 1978-93 and at double that rate in 1993-04 
(Bosworth and Collins 2007). If one takes the admittedly crude World Bank poverty 
line of $ 1 a day per capita (at 1993 purchasing power parity), the proportion of 
people below that poverty line in China fell from 63.8 percent in 1981 to 9.9 percent 
in 2004 (Ravallion and Chen 2007b). If instead one takes a national poverty lie (of 
850 Yuan per year for rural China and 1,200yuan per Yuan for urban ay 2002 prices), 
the National Bureau of Statistics data suggest that the poverty proportion declined 
from 53 percent to 8 percent between 1981 and 2001 (Ravallion and Chen 2007a). 
Since all this happened while the country had a phenomenal opening up of the 
economy, China has become a poster boy for the international financial press and 
free-trade economists. Much of the extreme poverty was concentrated in rural areas, 
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ad its large decline in the first –half of the 1980s is perhaps mainly a result of : (a) the 
spurt in agricultural growth following de-collectivization (agricultural output grew at 
7.1 percent per year on an average during 1979-84 compared to 2.7 percent during 
1970-78) [Lin 1992]; (b) land reform, which by an egalitarian redistribution, subject 
only to differences in regional average and demographic size, provided a floor to rural 
income; and (c) readjustment of farm procurement prices. These are mostly internal 
factors that had very little to do with global integration. 
 Some trade economists have pointed out that even in the 1980s; China had a 
trade expansion in labour-intensive products. There was some expansion in the trade 
ratio to GDP in the 1980s, and the special economic zone (SEZ) of Shenzen was in 
operation by the mid 1980s. But in much of the 1980s the most important exports of 
China were natural resources-intensive products; as late as 1985 the largest single 
export item was petroleum. Since export/import ratios are endogenous, one may look 
at the decline in (weighted) average tariff rates over the 1980s: the mean tariff rates 
went down only slightly, from 31.9 percent in 1980-83 to 29.2 percent in 1988-90. 
 In India, the reduction of trade barriers since the 1990s seems to have been 
associated with an expansion of exports of mostly capital-and skill-intensive products 
(software and business services, pharmaceuticals, vehicles, auto parts steel, etc), and a 
more vigorous and competitive corporate sector but most of the economy and workers 
are outside the corporate sector. Bosworth and Collins (2007) note a rise in the total 
factor productivity in industry, from 0.3 percent in 1978-93 to 1.1 percent i.e. in 1993-
2004. The more significant rise in India is of course, in the service sector grew from 
an annual average of 1.4 percent in 1978-93 to 3.9 percent in 1993-2004. The Indian 
growth process has been described as services-sector-led growth, whereas in China it 
has been more manufacturing-centered. One immediately thinks of the widely 
acclaimed performance of Indians software and other information technology-enabled 
services sector growth in the period 1993-2004 not all of the growth can be explained 
by finance, business services or telecommunication where global integration may 
have made a difference. 
 A large part of the growth in the service sector, at a rate higher than that in 
manufacturing, has been in the traditional or “unorganized sector” services, which 
even in the last decade formed nearly two-third of the service sector output. These are 
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provided by tiny enterprises, often below the policy radar, unlikely to have been 
directly affected substantially by foreign trade policy reforms. Official poverty 
estimates show that the poverty percentage declined from 44.5 percent in 1983 to 27.5 
percent in 2004-05. Again the international financial press often attributes this 
significant (though not dramatic) decline to globalization National Sample Survey 
(NSS) data actually suggest that the rate of decline in poverty has somewhat slowed 
down in 1993-2005, the period of intense opening of the economy, compared to the 
1970s and 1980s.There has also been a decline in the rate of growth of real wages in 
the period 1993-2005 compared to the previous decade 1983-93. India’s exports 
expansion in recent years has largely been in capital and skill-intensive industries, 
unlike in China or Vietnam, and as such may not have helped large numbers of 
unskilled workers. 
 Global integration does not seem to have helped some of the non-income 
indicators like those of health. The Gini coefficient of land distribution in rural India 
was 0.74 in 2003; the corresponding figure in China was 0.49 in 2002. India’s 
educational inequality is one of the worst in the world: according to a table in the 
World Development Report 2006, published by the World Bank, the Gini coefficient 
of the distribution of adult schooling years in the population, a crude measure of 
educational inequality, was 0.56 in India in 1998-2000, which is not just higher than 
0.37 in China in 2000 but even higher than almost all Latin American countries 
(Brazil: 0.39). 
 Comparing across states in India, as Dutt and Ravallion (2002) point out, the 
growth elasticity of poverty reduction depends on initial distribution of land and 
human capital. Purifield (2006) indicates that in the period 1977-2001, this elasticity 
was quite low in high growth states like Kerela and West Bengal. Similarly, 
comparing across states in China, Ravallion and Chen (2007a) find that growth had 
more poverty-reducing impact in initially less unequal provinces. 
 While a decade’s hectic pace of economic growth in China has provided the 
engine for growth to global trade. The Central Bank of China raised cash reserve ratio 
three times in years 2003 and 2004 forcing banks to keep more cash on hand instead 
of lending it out. Economists and policy makers have been worried that the huge 
investment boom in China would lead to excess capacity and massive recession 
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worldwide. The only way to ward off this danger was to ensure cool down the 
economic activities by raising interest rates and making some key changes to the 
manner in which Chinese banks lend to industry. Chinese government has explained 
that the surprise announcement was aimed at slowing growth of investments in fixed 
assets. Analysts believe that the latest move sends a strong signal that the government 
is not yet loosening its grip on the pace of economic growth, and indicates the 
determination to cap speculation and runaway growth in order to lead the economy 
towards a more sustainable path of development for the medium term. Indo-Chinese 
trade is growing at a rapid pace. The price tags on items will go up, leading to 
changes in profit margins. However, a 2 % appreciation does not make a major impact 
currently. But in the long run, sourcing from China will only get more costly (The 
Economic Times, July 25, 2005). It has also made possible to imports from other 
destinations at a cheap rate in comparison to China. This is primarily because of a 
gradual weakening of the US dollar against other major currencies including rupee. In 
order to see its impact on Indian business in world market, the present study is of 
much importance. Major Western countries have been blaming China for its 
undervalued Yuan as a basic reason for their economic fall out. American has always 
blamed the undervalued Yuan for its huge trade deficit with the Chinese running a $ 
165 billion trade surplus with the US. The US, members of the senate and Congress 
have introduce several pieces of legislation which are aimed at authorizing the 
administration to take retaliatory action against China for what was denial of benefits 
of trade concessions arising from misalignments in currency. 
 China’s (The People’s Bank of China) announced that Chinese currency 
would be henceforth be determined by a managed floating exchange rate regime with 
reference to a basket of currencies. China scrapped 11 year old link to the US dollar 
raised the Yuan value by 2.1 % 8.11 up from the virtually fixed rate near 8.28. Rob 
Subbaraman a leading analyst said China had left many aspects of the new currency 
regime internationally ambiguous. In fact, the scale of change was nothing but 
moderate and merely done to please the American’s who were calling for a Yuan 
revaluation ever since the fall in dollar value caused by American’s burgeoning twin 
trade and fiscal deficits. Moreover, it can affect cost benefit analysis of India’s 
external economic sector. Therefore, the main objective of the research is to find out 
what are implications of Yuan revaluation on India’s external economic sector. 
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 Robert Mundell predicated in April 2005 that a revaluation would just be a 
“drop in the bucket”. It could yield even the opposite of what the US wants, by 
cooling-off prices in the recently inflating economy; that will make Chinese exports 
not only more price-competitive, but will also divert investments away from real 
estate into tradable or imports-competing sectors. It is also estimated that even a 10 % 
revaluation of the Yuan would improve the US trade balance by $ 3.6 billion, a mere 
0.02 % change in the current account as a percentage of GDP. Therefore, just a 2 % 
revaluation would hardly be of significance Kumar, 2005. 
 China’s economy is three times large than India’s and contributes significantly 
more to global economic growth. India has also grown rapidly following reforms in 
the early 1990s and more recently, has become a global economy as so far been more 
limited. Though both the economies are fast becoming global economic power 
houses, a lot of lessons they can learn from each other’s experiences of success 
(Burton et al 2006). In this quest the Chinese successful experiences into attracting 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) may prove very useful to other countries especially 
to India which has aimed to become global economic power by 2020. Therefore in 
this study an attempt was made to find out as what India can learn from Chinese 
success into attracting FDI at a large scale. China whose growth has been moved by 
manufacturing has tapped into domestic savings and foreign investment to build an 
impressive infrastructure. India’s progress, by and large owes to private businesses. 
As India being to capitalize on the improving skills of its workforce and advantages in 
age distribution (35 % of population is under the age of 15), the gap will probably 
narrow (Lim 2006). A considerable part from considerable inflows of FDI. China’s 
policy of opening up its economy aimed at promoting export on one hand protecting 
the domestic market on the other hand. It has achieved remarkable growth in 
manufacturing sector, and turning the country into a global for MNC. Around 50 % of 
China’s exporters are either foreigners or partly foreign $ owned (Sharma, 2002)   
China received $ 72.41 billion FDI in 2005, while India received $ 6.59 billion FDI in 
the same year. MNCs enter china to take the advantage of cheap lab our resources 
especially in manufacturing sector. At the same time, the Chinese Government 
provides huge incentives to foreign companies and MNC s in the form of tax 
concession (Chinniah, 2006). 
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 On other hand India has received $ 50.1 billion since 1991 of which $ 16 
billion-or 32 % has come since April 2004, reflecting the rising interest of the 
country. FDI inflows were the highest during 2006 and Mauritius was the top 
contributor of greenbacks to the country. Of the $ 5 billion-odd FDI inflows, $ 1.3 
billion was from Mauritius. US and UK are a distant second and third with inflows, 
amounting to $ 346 million and $ 261 million respectively. India received more than 
two-thirds of the total FDI coming to South Asia. The sectors that have attracted large 
amount of FDI include electronic equipment, telecom, transport, fuel, food 
processing, drugs and pharmacy and metallurgy. The top 10 investing countries 
continue to remain Mauritius, the US, Japan, Netherlands, U.K, Germany, Singapore, 
France, South Korea and Switzerland. In terms of outward FDI flows, it is estimated 
that Indian firms had, till 2003, invested $ 5.1 billion abroad putting India at number 
14 in the developing country sweepstakes. Despite opening up at roughly the same 
time in the late nineties, the insurance sector in China has-raced ahead of India 
insurance companies in China, have better underwriting and capitization than India. 
 Most Indian manufacturers believe that even through China is cheaper than 
India; the US companies would want to de-risk themselves by reducing exposure to 
China. However, initially benefits would accrue to the large and experienced players 
and to be followed by smaller business houses, which have deep pockets to increase 
capacities, step up quality and upgrade their system to align with the needs of the 
global payers. The lowering of imports duties on capital goods and the intermediates 
would further help industry. India should follow China, which had the foresight to 
encourage the scaling up of manufacturing in textiles quite early on. Thus, we must 
jettison restrictive land, labour laws and stop protecting certain textiles despite SII-de-
reservation of apparel (The Economic Times, New Delhi, and Oct. 22, 2004). 
 China, which has been consuming a loin’s share of world production of 
copper, steel, iron ore and crude oil, may soon slow down of their imports. China is a 
major importer of steel and iron ore from India. On the other hand in the past years 
due to Chinese demand of these products, domestic prices of steel hiked in India. In 
addition, declined of Chinese demand of crude oil has been considered as a major 
factor to stabilize world crude oil prices. This may impact India’s trade deficit 
positively because India fulfils 70 % of oil demand through its imports. 
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 China’s low labour costs, supported by a large pool of unskilled as well as 
skilled labour, have been the primary determinant of China’s external 
competitiveness. However, a number of hidden and explicit subsidies like artificially 
low interest rate, cheap electricity etc has provided impetus to its competitiveness. 
The recent hike of interest rate will make funds more expensive for Chinese 
businesses. This may affect competitiveness of Chinese products in world markets. It 
is matter of time that China has to appreciate the Yuan against US dollar. Moreover, 
China has joined the WTO and there is pressure on China to peg Yuan to a basket of 
currencies so that market-oriented exchange rate comes into existence. This will 
create much more breathing space to Indian business, which compete with their 
Chinese counterparts in the world markets. Market speculation has been rife that 
China may soon loosen its grip on the Yuan by win dining its thin trading band near 
8.28 per dollar or re-pegging it to a currency basket or some combination of these 
options. 
India and China economic cooperation: 
 Going forward, from a global perspective, everybody knows that China has 
been the fastest growing economy, averaging 9.5 percent for the past 25 years, but not 
many people know that India has been the eighth or ninth fastest growing economy 
over the past 25 years. This is because many people think that India’s reforms started 
in 1992 and that India has been lagging by about a decade. The fact is that India’s 
reforms started around the same time as China’s (1980), but its average growth rate 
has been slower (Virmani, 2005). The East and Southeast Asian economies that have 
grown faster than India during the past 25 years are likely to slow during the next 
decade. India, in contrast, has been on a rising growth rate trend since the reforms of 
the 1990s. It is therefore likely to be among the five fastest growing economies (if not 
among the top three) along with China. It will become one of the primary global 
growth drivers by the end of the decade along with China. By 2010, it is likely to be 
the fourth-highest contributor to world GDP growth after the United States, China and 
Japan. The possibilities for trade and economic cooperation between China and India 
will therefore continue to expand. 
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 Once the identified barriers are removed (hopefully in a year or two), we 
should be in a position to start discussing a comprehensive economic cooperation 
agreement. Given the high reinvestment, “vent for surplus” approach of the socialist-
owned part of China’s economy, a free trade agreement is likely to benefit China 
more than India. So there has to be a trade-off. Researcher thinks both sides need to 
recognize that one cannot have these special agreements unless both sides cab balance 
the gain and losses. There are already some special losses to certain manufacturing 
sector such as toys. However, India expects some gains in service sector. The 
agreement has to be a comprehensive one that includes trade in both goods and 
services. Another area of economic cooperation that is very important for the future of 
Asia is that Indian and Chinese economic cooperation to be embedded in an Asian 
context. India and China have either framework agreement or ongoing discussions for 
a free trade agreement/Common Economic Partner Agreement with the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Japan, and Korea. This needs to harmonies these 
by developing an East Asian commodity in which ASEAN, China, Japan, and India 
are equal partners. In December 2005, there was a meeting of the East Asian 
Economic Commodity, in which both India and China were involved. China’s attitude 
toward India inclusion will be closely watched by people in India and Asia as an 
example of its general approach to hegemonic competition versus mutually beneficial 
cooperation.  It is too early to deem India a global power, although “Its stable 
democratic political system, huge middle-class population, immense military clout in 
South Asia, rising economic fortunes and global ambitions make it a potential power 
that could (if things go well) play a very important role in world affairs.” In their view 
 To become an economic powerhouse and catch up with its bigger rival 
[China], India will have to sustain at least 8% growth, over a long period of time. Its 
first challenge will be to address some structural issues in the economy. These include 
reining in the runaway fiscal deficit, freeing its manufacturing sector from antiquated 
labour laws, selling state-owned assets and using the freed-up cash for investments in 
physical infrastructure. It is also the case that international trade theory is often 
preoccupied with cost of production, while a large part of success in exports depends 
on marketing and distribution, which often require large initial investment, managerial 
skills and development of networks. The international retail chains that provide the 
latter often charge monopoly margins, which absorb much of the gains of trade 
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liberalization, and very little may trickle down to the poor producers in small farms 
and firms. 
 Empirically, there are very few reliable studies for China or India that test a 
casual model linking globalization with inequality at the appropriate disaggregate 
level. At least two major problems beset the empirical analyst in this matter. One is 
that so many other changes have taken place in the last quarter century in these two 
countries; it is difficult to disentangle the effect of globalization from that of other 
ongoing changes (like technological progress-often skill-based-demographic changes 
or regulatory and macroeconomic policies). Secondly, in both countries there are 
reasons to suspect t that economic inequality (or its rise) is underestimated. There is 
very little analysis as yet to show that this rise is primarily due to globalization. Even 
if global integration were to be causally linked with higher growth, the link between 
growth and inequality is not always clear. In China, as Chaudhuri and Ravallion 
(2006) shows, the periods of rapid growth did not necessarily bring more rapid 
increases in income inequality; the periods of falling in equality (1981-85 and 1995-
98) had among the highest growth rates in average household income. In China, 
provinces with more global exposure and higher growth did not have larger rise in 
inequality. As Benjamin, Brandt, Giles and Wang (2005) show, while the Gini 
coefficient of income in coastal China went up from 0.35 in 1991 to 0.39 in 2000, the 
corresponding rise in the interior provinces was from 0.39 to 0.48. In the coastal 
provinces a more rapid job growth in the non-state sector helped reduce the urban-
rural income differential there. In India, the relative income divergence between states 
is increasing (more than in China) but it s hard to separate the effects of globalization 
from those of differential conditions of infrastructure and business-friendly policies in 
different states. 
 In both China and India, it is again difficult to separate the effect of the 
ongoing skill-based technological progress from that of globalization. But compared 
to China, the backwardness of India in the education sector (for example, even among 
new entrants in the labour force among the 15-24 age-group nearly a quarter in India 
are illiterate, almost none in China) and in the status of women (for example, female 
labour force participation in urban China is above 70 percent, only 24 percent in 
urban India) imply that the forces that penetrate wages inequality are stronger in 
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India, and these forces are largely domestic in origin. The contentious debates on 
globalization in the media as well as in academia often lead to a volley of sweeping 
and unthinking generalizations, in particular about China and India the two awakening 
giants in the global economy. It is time for a great deal of caution and reasoned and 
rigorous empirical analysis before we pronounce judgments on the effects of 
globalization on trading and inequality in these two countries. 
1.3 JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY: 
 Trade talks and tie- ups between the two ‘Asian tigers’ will surely cause many 
sleepless nights for the rest of the world. Statistics reveal that almost two out of every 
five people on the planet are either Indian or Chinese. The two most populous 
countries of the world constitute about 2.5 billion of the total world population. Thus, 
trade ties between these two have the potential to disturb the world trade balance. The 
huge population of both the countries has also played to their advantage by adding to 
their workforce. Bilateral trade between the two countries (including Hong Kong) was 
as high as $ 13.6 bn last year. The growth surprised the countries themselves as the 
figure was a mere $ 1 bn a decade ago. Expert feels that if this rate of growth 
continues, China may overtake US as India largest trading partner in a couple of 
years. Indo –US trade stood at about $ 20 bn in 2004. India and China have set a 
bilateral trade target of $ 20 bn by 2008 and are strongly positive about achieving it. 
But China still feels that the Indian economy is not opening up to Chinese investment, 
which Indian investment in China crossed $ 100 million last year. 
 As China assume a central plane ill the world economy, its growth and 
stability will become increasingly important to the world trade system at large. 
For example China now accounts for 11 percent of U.S. imports compared with. l0 percent 
of Japan, and 3 percent of Korea. Chinas increasing access to advanced country 
markets since its accession to the W.T.O. has meant that more of its export now go 
directly to those markets rather than being routed through third world trade has risen from 
less than 1 percent in 1979 to 5.5 percent in 2003. This dramatic increase in its share of 
world exports over a relatively short period on the other hand India industrialists 
are terrified of competing with China. Chinese export drive has affected 
adversely our presence in the global markets. 
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 In 1978, at the inception of its reforms, China’s per capita GDP (in constant 
1995 US $) was $ 148, whereas that of India in the same years was $ 236. Seven years 
after it began its reforms, in 1986, China caught up with India in per capita GDP 
terms (4278 VS $ 273) and a decade after reforms in 1988 was comfortably ahead of 
India with a per capita GDP of $ 342 compared with India’s $ 312. In the first post-
reform decade the Chinese economy grew at 10.1 percent while the Indian economy 
grew at 5.7 percent in the corresponding decade. Quite clearly that was India’s lost 
decade. But what did we achieve in the first decade of our reforms? In 1992, the first 
year of its reforms, India’s percapita GDP was $ 331. This grew to $ 477 in 2001. In 
the same period the Chinese percapita GDP surged from $ 426 to 878 in 2001. 
 In the 1990s China grew at the rate of 9.7 percent while India grew at 5.9 
percent. Quite clearly far from beginning to catch up, we fell well behind. China’s 
GDP (1995 constant US $) has grown eightfold since 1979 and stood at $ 1.1 trillion 
in 2001. Chinese GDP was lower than that of India in absolute terms in 1978 but 
caught up with India in the very next year. Size of the Chinese economy now is twice 
that of India. In 2001 India’s GDP stood at a mere $ 492 billion. We seem to be 
catching up with China’s GDP still remains a distant and difficult target. It’s true both 
countries have transformed themselves after they embarked on the path of economic 
reforms. But the transformations were entirely different. In 1980 the sect oral break-
up of China economy was as follows: agriculture 30 percent, industry 49 percent and 
services 21 percent. In 1990 that changed to agriculture 27 percent, industry 42 
percent and services 31 percent. In 2000 that picture transformed further. Agriculture 
fell to 16 percent; industry grew further to 51 percent; while services studied at 33 
percent. Note the growth in the share of industry now. This was primarily made 
possible by overseas investment, which amounted to $ 290 billion (source: Ministry 
of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation) during the decade, which also created 
millions of new jobs. Nothing manifests this better than the surge in China’s R and D 
expenditure. The latest OECD science technology and industry scoreboard has ranked 
China as the third largest Rand D spender in the world. China‘s total R and D 
spending in 2001 stood at $ 60 billion (PPP). Through India ranked among the top 10 
spenders world wide it spend only a third ($ 19 billion) of what China invested in 
Rand D in 2001. Such huge Chinese investments in furthering knowledge only fall 
back further in terms of industrial growth rates and competitiveness. Much has been 
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made of the contrasts and similarities between the recent economic performance of 
India and China. Some of the motivation for this is plain silly, rooted in a marital 
conception of economics, and portraying India and China as in some zero-sum game 
rivalry. Economic growth in China and India and increasing trade by and between 
them will, of course, be mutually beneficial and positively reinforcing. But there is 
one interesting contrast that is relevant (and one that has not been made so far) for 
their future economic trajectories. 
 Industrial countries will benefit unequivocally from China’s rising demand for 
capital and knowledge-intensive manufactures and primary products and from 
significant terms of trade gains. 
 Among developing countries the effects of China’s integration will depend on 
how much they trade directly with China and how closely they compete in third 
markets. Countries that trade heavily with China but are not close competitors (such 
as Korea) will likely gain substantially. Low-and middle-income countries that are 
close competitors (India, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand) will experience 
some terms of trade losses on their exports of lab our-intensive manufactures. But 
their total trade will keep growing, and perhaps their world market shares as well. 
Regions with fewer trade ties to China (Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern 
Europe, and Central Asia) will neither make significant gains nor suffer major losses. 
 Many observers argue that global integration damages the jobs and incomes of 
unskilled workers in industrial countries. From this some conclude that China’s vast 
size and the rapid growth of its trade will exacerbate the damage. Historical evidence 
suggests otherwise, however. In industrial countries most of the decline in 
employment in lab our-intensive industries such as clothing occurred well before 
Chinese exports had significantly penetrated these markets. Looking at indexes of 
revealed comparative advantage across 129 industries for a set of large developing 
countries, China’s pattern most closely resembles that of India, Indonesia, and 
Thailand. Moreover, their trading structure has grown more like China’s over the past 
decade. 
 In the future China’s comparative advantage is expected to shift toward 
intermediate technology manufactures and away from low-technology clothing. By 
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2020 China is projected to gain 10 percent market share in light manufactures 
(leather, fabricated metal products, and miscellaneous manufactures) and 8 percent in 
transport equipment and other machinery. Its fast-growing Asian neighbors-Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Thailand, for example- are also accepted to gain market share. In 
highly capital-intensive heavy manufactures (chemical, rubber, plastics, paper, iron 
and steel, nonferrous metal) China is projected to increase its market share by 4 
percent, but industrial countries will maintain their dominance. 
 While some difference between the performances of India and China can be 
attributed to the Chinese entrepreneurs in Hong Kong and Taiwan, who have been 
eager to escape rising wages in their respective home economies by moving to China, 
a more central explanation lies in the two countries. Among developing countries, 
India is unique in having a very large share of its GDP in the mostly informal part of 
the services sector. Whereas in there countries, a decline in the share of agriculture in 
GDP has been accompanied by a substantial expansion of the industry in the early 
stages of development, in India this has not happened. For example, in 1980, the 
proportion of GDP originating in the industry was already 48.5 percent in China, in 
India it was only 24.2. Services, on the other hand, contributed only 21.4 percent to 
GDP in China but as much as 37.2 percent in India. 
 In the following 20 years, despite considerable growth, the share of industry 
did not rise in India. Instead, the entire decline in the share of agriculture was 
absorbed by services. Through a similar process was observed in China, the share of 
industry in GDP was already quite high there. As a result, even in 2000, the share of 
services in GDP was 33.2 percent in China compared with 48.2 percent in India. 
India’s growth follows a sluggish 4 percent rate recorded in 2002-03 coming after a 
Ninth Plan (1997-2002) averaged growth of 5.5 percent, which, in turn, reflected a 
marked slowdown from the reform-driven growth surge of 6.7 percent experienced in 
1992-97. Much of the economic dynamism of 2003-04 simply reflects an exceptional 
rebound in agriculture from a drought-affected 5 percent drop in 2002-03 to a strong 9 
percent recovery thanks to the best monsoon in over 20 years. Services also grew 
strongly and industry did moderately well. If the last two years are averaged, then 
agriculture reverts to the recent trend of 2 percent growth and overall GDP shows a 
healthy but unremarkable 6 percent increase. Quite clearly, there is no compelling 
INTRODUCTION
 
 
China's Integration into Global Trading System and Its Implications for India 
30
evidence here supporting medium-term growth exceptions of 8 percent aspired to in 
the tenth plan. 
 The Indian sartorial picture makes for a study in contrasts. The share of 
agriculture fell somewhat from 31 percent in 1990 to 28 percent in 2000. The share of 
industry to fell from 28 percent to 26 percent. Services grew from 41 percent to 46 
percent. Software apart, the biggest contributing factor to the growth of India’s 
services sector  has been the growth of public administration, which has been 
bounding at an average rate of 32.5 percent each year from 1993-94 onwards. In 2001 
alone, central, state and local governmental salaries together topped Rs 1, 67,715 
crores. This kind of spending was not what Keynes had in mind when he advocated 
public spending to stimulate the economy. 
 Poddar K Saroj (Senior Vice President, FICCI) summarized Indo-China 
relationship and import-export opportunities as under: Together India and China could 
reshape the world order. Economic partnership between them can unleash forces to 
realize the goal of a larger Asian economic community. Both have become not only 
the world’s fastest growing economies, but are also destined to become the world’s 
largest. If they do manage to work together, they will surely create the new world. 
The transformation in recent years in India-China economic cooperation is to be seen 
in the light of deeper economic association of our two countries with South East Asia, 
together with emerging RTAs and FTAs and participation of India in the same. 
Pushing the trade frontier greater economic engagement would be beneficial for both 
the countries. Based on recent growth trends, it is estimated that bilateral trade would 
touch US $ 30 billion by 2009. However, if India focuses on China’s top global 
imports and diversifies its exports the 2009 target could be beaten with trade possibly 
touching US $ 50 billion. China is the world’s third largest importer well on its way to 
take first position phenomenal growth seen in China’s global imports in recent years 
so where lies the opportunity for India. To bring it all together China is India’s 3rd 
largest trading partner; for China India is the 13th largest trade partner. Exports from 
India’s to China in recent years have shown strong growth. However, India’s exports 
to China are concentrated and skewed towards primary products. India’s presence in 
China’s vast and growing market is negligible-In China’s top 10 imports valuing US $ 
447 billion India’s share is just about US$ 2.3 billion. 
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 The Board of Trade has set a target of raising India’s merchandise exports 
from the present US $ 80 billion to US $ 150 billion in the next four years. China, in 
terms of its global imports, is a giant by focusing on China; India can achieve and 
surpass the target set for its merchandise exports. 81 % companies perceive China as 
an important export market. Key attractions-sheer size of the market and its proximity 
to India. 53 5 currently exporting to China, 47 5 are not. Companies exporting to 
China say exports restricted to select few commodities and are of recent origin. Of 
companies presently not exporting to China, 75 % intend to export to China in near 
future. Companies already exporting want to export more. China can be a window for 
3 rd country exports with greater value addition-a view shared by companies from the 
engineering goods, auto and auto components and IT sector. Products that can be 
exported auto and auto components, electronic components, drugs and 
pharmaceuticals , metals and metal based products, electrical machinery, textile yarns 
and fabrics , agri products (grain, tobacco, oilseeds), mineral products, fruits and 
vegetable, seafood, medical equipment and construction material. 
 The BRICs countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) have shared a common 
experience of rapid and substantive economic change over the last decade. While 
economic growth has had varied consequences for India’s foreign policy, we focus on 
India-China relations, asking whether economic interdependent could lead to more 
wide-ranging political cooperation between the two largest BRICs. This dyadic 
interaction is of great geopolitical significance: The two countries are home to over a 
third of the world’s population, have nuclear arsenals, and have been involved in an 
actual shooting war with each other. Moreover, the India-China case study can help us 
understand how the rising economic power of the BRICs may affect global stability. 
In the last decade, India and China have enjoyed the best bilateral relations since the 
early 1950s. Could new economic ties be impelling this improvement in their 
relationship? In this article, we examine the impact of a number of economic factors 
on the strategic relationship between India and China. In the article’s first section, we 
briefly summarize the troubled history of Sino-Indian relations. 
 In this context it has provided evidence refuting the basic claim of the skeptics 
that the response of the economy to liberalization has been an order of magnitude 
weaker in India than China. Exports of goods and services grew at annual rates of 
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12.9 and 15.2 percent during 1980s and 1990s respectively in China’s total trade to 
GDP ratio from 18.9 percent in 1980 to 34 percent in 1990 and to 49.3 percent in 
2000. 
 On the foreign investment front, differences are even starker. FDI into China 
has risen from $ 0.6 billion in 1980 to $ 3.49 billion in 1990 and then to a whopping $ 
42.10 billion in 2000. China has slower to open its market to portfolio investment but 
once it did, inflows quickly surpassed those into India reaching $ 7.8 billion in 2000. 
Even if we allow for an upward bias in the figures for India, there is little doubt that 
foreign investment flows into China are several times those into India. 
 Goldman Sachs reports puts Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRICs) as fastest 
growing economies over the next four decades. This will lead to a possible shift 
in the economic power axis from the US-Euro-Japan grouping to these emerging market 
economies by 2040. It is said that co-operating an economic, social and 
political matters may actually enable China and India to dominate the globe a 
hundred years from now rather than considering each other's rivals. "Today, 
yesterday’s adversaries’ China and India are all set to be tomorrow’s allies. And 
together they can make for a literally world. Therefore the present study has much 
relevance in India's long-term economic interest. 
1.4   OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY: 
 Specifically, the objectives of the study are: 
(i) To identify the factor that can help to explain the sustained growth in 
China’s exports. 
(ii) To determine the factor that have changed trade patterns.  
(iii) To examine the expansion of China's trade in future too.  
(iv) To measure its effects on Indian trade. 
(v) To find out whether India and China are moving towards 
becoming close economic allies. 
(vi) To identify lessons which can learn from the experiences of China. 
(vii) To suggest an-alternative strategy for India's competitiveness vis-à-vis 
China. 
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1.5     REVIEW OF LITERATURE: 
 Sino-Indian trade relations have attracted the attention of many investigators. 
But a little research is available on Chinas integration into the global trading 
system and its implication for India. However, Anandalingam (2002, 2003), Sharma 
(2002, 2004), Srivastava (1992, 2004) have done some work in this direction. Our 
analyses reveal interesting insights that explain foreign investment inflows to 
countries, both developed and developing. The approach in the form of neighborhood 
and extended neighborhood is deepening and widening our understanding of FDI 
flows. Although there are some apparent similarities between the concept of ‘psychic 
distance’ as proposed by some Swedish economist [Johansson and Wiedersheim-Paul 
1975; Johansson and Vahlne 1977; Vahlne and Wiedersheim-Paul 1977], later 
elaborate and extended by other authors [Child et al 2000], and the neighborhood 
model proposed, there are significant differences in concepts, explanations and 
consequences of models. ‘Psychic distance’ presents a static concept, wherein 
investments and their sequence is attempted to be explained through the ‘psychic 
distance’ between the home country and the host country. In neighborhood model, the 
role and importance of ‘psychic’ or ‘culture’ distance itself changes decimally as 
investments move from the original o the intermediate and the extended 
neighborhoods should be equally applicable in explaining the FDI flows of other FDI 
sources. 
 Similarly, the eclectic paradigm of Dunning (2001) hypothesis that firms make 
their international production decisions based on perceived ownership (Oadvantages), 
locating (L advantages) and internationalization (I advantages) related factors. When 
stretched from the micro to the macro, this leads to the concept of the investment 
development path (IDP). As a country develops the attractiveness of its OLI 
advantages change for potential investor (both inward and outward) and the country is 
likely to go through five relatively well-defined stages. The IDP is a useful heuristic 
model and attempting to find the position of a country on its IDP can lead to 
meaningful policy debates. In a way, the O advantages are related to the push factors 
of the home country, the L advantages to the pull factors of the host and the I 
advantages to how of the involvement insofar as an international production decision 
is concerned. Although the basic structure of the model is attractive, its details have 
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been evolving over time [Dunning and Narula 1996] and may contain too many 
explanatory variable-many with limited predictive value. On one side’ this may be too 
general a theory and on the other it ignores the possibility of any special advantage for 
a pair of countries. Countries in the neighborhood have a role in the reduction of 
perceived risk and Dunning (1988) also argues that firms from developing countries 
are likely to perform activities in neighboring countries that are politically and 
economically stable. 
 As noted by Arndt (2001), one of the innovative features of the current phase 
of globalization is the fragmentation of production into production network based on 
component specialization and intra-product trade. It offers groups of small countries 
the opportunities to make open regionalism work by enhancing their productivity and 
competitiveness as well as welfare of their nationals. This concept is equally 
applicable to the Caribbean, although Arndt (2001) justifies it for the ASEAN. As 
production networks grow in the ASEAN region, this provides an opportunity for 
both China and India to participate in these networks in their extended neighborhood, 
with their respective component specializations. With the objective of deepening its 
political and economic relations with ASEAN countries, India launched its Look-East 
policy in 1991 [Asher et-al 2003]. India graduated from being a sect oral dialogue 
partner in 1992 to a full dialogue partner in 1995, and went on to become a member of 
the Asia Regional Forum where regional security issues are discussed. India’s 
evolving co-operation is reflected in the annual ASEAN-India summit being held 
since 2002. In October 2003, India signed a framework agreement on comprehensive 
economic co-operation, which will lead to an ASEAN-India free trade area in 10 
years [ASEAN 2003]. Earlier, during the ASEAN summit in November 2002, China 
signed a framework agreement on comprehensive economic co-operation, which 
included elements of the establishment of ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) 
[Srivastava and Rajan 2003]. The strengthening of the neighborhoods may have some 
impact on the future FDI flows of both India and China. 
 It is now open to question as to why some economies have attracted large FDI 
flows and grown fast (for example east Asia and now China) over the last 40 years 
and others have not. The Latin America and Caribbean economies are geographically 
closer to the highly developed economies. Yet, these regions could not take advantage 
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of this physical proximity. Their economies could not become part of the original, 
intermediate or even extension of the intermediate neighborhoods, perhaps due to the 
fact that most people came from cultures where neighborhood was too weak. 
 The impact of reforms can also be seen in terms of higher industrial growth. 
Discussing the changes in the domestic industrial policy, Desai (1999:21) notes. “The 
changes were complex and arbitrary, but they led to an acceleration of industrial 
growth from 4.5 percent in 1985-86 to peak of 10.5 percent in 1989-90”. Industrial 
growth during 1998-91 at 9.2 percent was particularly high when compared with 
earlier periods. 
 According to Goldar and Renganathan (1990), the import penetration ratio in 
the capital goods sector rose from 11 percent in1976-77 to 18 per cent in 1985-86. 
This trend appears too continued substantially. Malhotra (1992) notes that the 
incremental capital-output ratio, which had reached as high six at times, fell to 
approximately 4.5 during 1980s. These observations are consistent with the finding by 
Joshi and Little (1994) that the productivity of investment increased during 1980s, 
especially in private manufacturing. 
 But more systematically, Chand and Sen (2000) have recently studied the 
relationship between trade liberalization and productivity in manufacturing using 3-
digit industry data spanning 1973-88 econometrically. They take 30 industries, which 
accounted for 53 per cent of gross value added and 45 percent of employment in 
manufacturing over this period. These industries divide approximately equally among 
consumer, intermediate and capital goods. They measure protection by the 
proportionate wedge between the Indian and US price and estimate total factor 
productivity growth (TFPG) in the three industry group averaged over three non-
overlapping periods: 1974-78, 1979-83 and 1984-88. They then relate this 
productivity growth to liberalization. 
 Chand and Sen (2002) According to their measure also, protection declines 
over the sample period in intermediate and capital goods sectors but not consumer 
goods sector. Moreover, there is a significant improvement in TFPG in all three 
sectors in 1984-88 compared with the two earlier periods. Thus, the jump in TFPG 
coincides with the liberalization in capital and intermediate goods. 
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 Chand and Sen (2000) do some further tests by pooling their sample and 
employing fixed-effects estimator to allow for intrinsic differences across industries 
with respect to the rate of technological progress. Their estimates show that on 
average 1 percentage point reduction in the price wedge leads to 0.1 percent rise in the 
total factor productivity. For the intermediate goods sector, the effect is twice as large. 
The impact of the liberalization of the intermediate goods sector on productivity turns 
out to be statistically significant in all of their regressions. 
 Joshi and Little (1994: Ch 13) also address the issue of the shift in the growth 
rate. They analyze the years 1960-61 to 1989-90 dividing them into a low-growth 
period from 1960-61 to 1975-76 and a high growth period from 1976-77 to 1989-90. 
Average annual growth rates during these periods were 3.4 and 4.7 percent, 
respectively, and statistically significance. A key finding of Joshi and Little is that 
increase investment cannot be credited with the increase in the growth rate during 
1976-90 over that during 160-76. To quote them [Joshi and little 1994:327]: Public 
real investment averaged 7.7 percent of GDP in the first period and 9.9 percent in the 
second period. Private real investment averaged 12 percent of GDP in the first period 
and 11.7 percent in the second period. Thus the whole of the rise in the investment 
level took place in the public sector (ignoring errors and omissions.) However, the 
rate of growth of public sector GDP decline (from 7. 8 to 7.2 percent a year), while 
that of the private sector rose (from 2.6 to 3.7 percent a year). Joshi and Little find 
increased demand through fiscal expansion, more efficient use of the existing 
resources (due to liberalization) and the rise un the real yield of investment in private 
manufacturing as the principal sources of the shift in the growth rate.  
 Neither Joshi and Little nor Chand and Sen would hold eve more strongly for 
this period 1988-91, which is crucial to obtaining comparable growth rates between 
1980s and 1990s. Prima facie it would seem that the results of Chand and Sen would 
hold even more strongly for this period. The reason is that average annual industrial 
growth of 9.2 percent during 1988-91, was significantly higher than 6.2 percent 
growth achieved during 1984-88. In view of the fact that private investment as a 
proportion of GDP did not rise, the substantially higher growth in industrial output is 
likely to be the result of increased productivity and therefore related to the 1980s 
reforms. 
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 In 1978, after nearly 30 years of largely self-imposed isolation, China finally 
seemed ready to rejoin the world economy. On the domestic front, the need for 
economic adjustment was felt due to a variety of reasons. For example, the per capita 
GNP had grown since 1957 at an average annual rate of 2.5-3.0 percent, well below 
the average for China’s neighboring countries such as Japan and South Korea. 
Likewise, total factor productivity of the Chinese industry had either been stagnant or 
actually declined since 1957 [Kamath 1990]. 
 At the second session of the fifth national people’s congress in July 1979, the 
‘Law of the People’s Republic of China on joint ventures using Chinese and foreign 
investment’ was adopted, granting foreign investment a legal status in China [Kamath 
1994]. By 1980, four special economic zones (SEZs) had been established along the 
south-east-cost-Shenzen, Zhuhai, Xiamen, and Shantou. During the period 1979-
2000, a total FDI of US $ 348300 million was invested in China, about US $ 174099 
million (50 percent) of which was accounted for by Hong Kong and Macao. The share 
Japanese, Taiwanese and America investment in China remains more or less constant 
during the period. The average investment per annum was about US $ 16585 million. 
It seems important to mention that Hong Kong and Taiwan have never been 
recognized as major source of advanced technology. Likewise, these countries have 
been less known for adoption of new technology. Thus, to China has been in the form 
of low or quite standardized technology [Banik and Subbayamma 2000]. 
 Most non-official growth forecast for 2004-05 (as available in September 
2004) cluster around a modest 5.5 to 6 percent. However, the growth optimism of 
recent years also draws strength from asset of analytical papers that have appeared 
over the past year propounding the case for rapid, long-run growth of the Indian 
economy. Three main contributions: the much talked about ‘BRICs report’ by 
Goldman Sachs of October 2003 [Wilson and Purushothaman 2003], Vijay Kelkar’s 
April 2004 Narayanan oration at the Australian National University [Kelkar 2004] 
and Rodrik and Subramanian (2004) in EPW (henceforth referred as RS). While these 
papers vary substantially in their scope and emphasis, they share a very bullish 
outlook on India’s medium and long-run growth prospects. 
 The main factors on which such growth optimism is based are; India’s 
demographic outlook for the next 40 years, past and projected trends in productivity, 
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the country’s institutional strengths and underlying optimism about reforms. Despite 
well known vulnerabilities resulting from fiscal deficits that are as large today as in 
the late 1980s, and slow pace of banking reforms, few pundits are predicting an 
external crisis today. The external-debt-to GDP ratio has been declining and foreign 
exchange reserves at more than $ 100 billion exceed the currency in circulation. 
Indeed, in a recent careful examination of India’s venerability to external crises, 
Ahluwalia (2002) points to several key weaknesses in fiscal and banking areas and 
emphasizes the urgency of tackling them. But he stops well short of predicting a 
crisis. 
 A study of Hugo Restall reveals that India’s approach has been almost exactly 
the opposite of China’s-it nurtured its own entrepreneurs and held multinationals at 
arm’s length. Its largest private firms are about 10 times the size of China’s. India’s 
trade barriers are still high, with peak tariff levels at 20 %, compared to China’s 
10.4% and a developing country averaged of 13.4 %. Nevertheless, it has been 
gradually opening and finding that its companies not only cope with competition, they 
thrive. Success in the IT sector has been the catalyst, showing Indians that they can be 
world-beaters. India has a huge advantage in its financial institutions and capital 
markets. Its bank are largely privately owned, and while their levels of nonperforming 
loans are relatively high at around 15 %, they conduct credit risk analysis on their 
borrowers and are run along commercial lines, in contrast to China. India also has a 
functioning stock market. As a result, Indian companies use capital more efficiently. 
The country’s incremental capital-output ratio is generally lower than China’s and in 
recent years it has actually been falling. As is normal for a developing country, its 
saving rate, currently around 25% of GDP, is not sufficient to finance its investment. 
This reflected in higher interest rates: India’s prime lending rate is consistently over 
12 %, compared to 8 % in China. But now the vast pool of global capital is 
discovering India. The country is set to reap the benefits of higher levels of 
investment as FDI and portfolio investment increase in the coming years. It’s also 
revealing that they are pursuing advanced educating with a zeal that was formerly 
through of as Confucian trait-American universities enroll 80,000 Indian students, 
compared to 62,000 Chinese. 
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 According to economic survey 2007-08 the global trading system in India has 
been visualize in the following categories: 
(i) India’s merchandise trade: 
 India’s merchandise exports (in US dollar terms and on customs basis), which 
have grown continuously at more than 20 percent since 2001-02 and 2006-07. The 
value of merchandise exports reached US $ 111 billion in April-December 2007 with 
a growth of 21.6 percent. For the year 2007-08, an export target of US $ 160 billion 
was set and during the first nine months of the current year, 69.4 percent of the export 
target has been achieved despite the appreciating rupee. 
 During 2006-07, export volume increased by 15.8 percent mainly due to items 
like crude materials, machinery and transport equipment, and mineral fuels and 
lubricants. The unit value of such exports increased by 8.1 percent mainly due to the 
three categories: manufactured goods classified chiefly by materials; food and food 
articles; and mineral fuels and lubricants. 
 Growth of the unit value index of exports, decent rated in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s to reach a negative value of -1 percent in 2001-02. Since then it has 
accelerated smartly to average a growth of 8.6 percent per annum during 2003-04 to 
2006-07. In contrast, the growth rate of the unit value index of imports has 
fluctuations in the global prices of oil and other commodities and partly due to unit 
value changes in machinery and transport equipment and chemicals and related 
products. Though the quantum/volume of imports has shown a rising trend since 
2000-01, the 48.2 percent growth in 2005-06 was way above this trend. The sample 
average growth of India’s exports from 2000 to 2006 was 19.3 percent per annum. 
The growth of 29.8 percent I 205 was above the trend, due to a rise in the export of 
refined petroleum products and textiles and clothing in the year of dismantling of the 
quotas. 
(ii) India’s merchandise imports: 
 Merchandise imports grew by 24.5 percent to US $ 185.7 billion in 2006-07 
due to the high growth of 30 percent of POL and 22.2 percent of non-POL. POL 
import growth was due to both volume growth by 13.8 percent and increase in import 
price of the Indian crude oil import basket by 12.1 percent. 
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 Trade deficit increased to US $ 59.4 billion (as per customs data) in 2006-07 
and US $ 57.8 billion in the first nine months of the current year. However, net POL 
import growth peaked at 41.4 percent in 2005-06 and decelerated sharply to 19 
percent in 2006-07, despite the 30 percent growth in POL imports, as a substantial 
part was input for export production. In the first half of 2007-08, there was a further 
moderation in the growth of net POL imports. 
 
(iii) Trade composition: 
 The composition of exports shows a perceptible shift in this decade from light 
manufactures to heavy manufactures and petroleum crude and products. The share of 
textiles and ready-made garments (RMG) has fallen dramatically by 11.1 percent 
points in 2006-07 over 2000-01 followed by gems and jewelry, leather and leather 
manufactures and handicrafts. Share of engineering goods and petrol products has 
increased by 7.6 percentage points and 10.7 percentage points, respectively. Export 
growth in 2006-07 was driven mainly by petroleum products with 59.3 percent 
growth and engineering goods with 38.1 percent growth. The perceptible increase in 
the share of petroleum products in total exports reflected not only the rise in POL 
prices but also India’s enhanced refining capacity. 
 China has been dominating the market for low-end products such as toys, 
textiles and tree-products. In recent years China has also entered the hi-tech markets. 
It is the world’s fourth largest industrial producer behind U.S, Japan and Germany. It 
makes more than 50 % of the world’s cameras, 30 % of air-conditioners and 
televisions, 25 % of washing machines and 20 % of the refrigerators. It has become 
the world’s largest producer of mobile phones, DVD players, laptop computers and 
CTV sets (Anandlingam, 2002). A number of Chinese products especially hi-tech are 
successfully competing with MNCs in its soil. The main destination of exports of 
India and China shows that India’s exports to developing countries in Asia constitute 
around 24 % of its total exports as compared with a share of about 33% of China. 
Country-wise while share of exports to USA is around 21% both the countries, India’s 
exports to Japan and Hong Kong constitute around 9 % of its total exports as against 
China’s share of around 35% to these parameters suggest that China is very successful 
in its export drive in comparison to India.  
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 The composition of imports showed much less change than that of exports. 
POL continues to be the single major item of import with its share stabilizing at the 
30-31 percent level. The share of capital goods imports shows the sharpest rise of 
about 4.9 percentage points in 2006-07 over 2000-01 due to a 3.7 percentage point 
rise in the share of transport equipment and 1.6 percentage point rise in the share of 
non-electrical machinery (excluding machine tools). It has, however, plateaued at 13 
percent in the first half of 207-08. 
(iv) India’s services exports: 
 With a sustained high growth of export of services, including a growth of 32.1 
percent in 2006-07, export value reached US$ 76.2 billion last year. Growth has been 
particularly rapid in the miscellaneous services category consisting of software 
services, business services, financial services was 70.5 percent in 2004-05, 37.5 
percent in 2005-06 and 36.7 percent in 2006-07. Travel services exports grew by 16.2 
percent and transportation by 27.3 percent in 2006-07. 
(v) Foreign Direct Investment: 
 With reforms in policies, better infrastructure and a more vibrant financial 
sector, FDI inflows into India accelerated in 2006-07. On a gross basis, FDI inflows 
into India, after rising to a level of US $ 6.2 billion in 2001-02, fell to US $ 4.5 billion 
in 2003-04. After a recovery, the proportion has risen to reach US $ 23 billion in 
2006-07. FDI grew appreciably on both gross and net basis. While on a gross basis, 
the growth in 2006-07 was 150.2 percent, on a net basis it was 179.5 percent. Even as 
FDI into India (credit side) grew substantially, a simultaneous pick up in outward 
investment moderated the overall net inflows. Outward investment by India shot up 
from levels less than US $ 14.4 billion in 2006-07. Thus, overall net FDI in 2006-07 
was at US $ 8.5 billion. 
 The bulk of FDI inflows going to China are of exports-oriented type. 
Economists estimate that FDI flows and export growth has accounted for more than 
half of the growth in China’s GDP since 1981. Around 50% of China’s exports are 
either foreigners or partly foreign owned (Sharma, 2002). Since launching market 
reforms in 1978 China has received over $ 500 billion FDI. In 2002 FDI into China 
was $ 52.70 billion, in Hong Kong it was $ 13 .72 billion compared with $ 4.66 
billion in India. In China FDI accounted for 91 % of exports of electronic circuits and 
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96 % of mobiles phones. Thus, FDI had added competitive edge to the Chinese 
exports. In India through just a minute 10 % of manufactured exports is based on FDI. 
However, recent revaluation of Yuan may likely affect China’s relative attractiveness 
for FDI overtime on two counts: the cost of investments will increase for investors 
while price competitiveness products will decline in export markets (Srivastava, 
2005). 
(vi) Foreign Exchange Reserve: 
 Foreign exchange reserves of India, denominated in dollars, rose from a level 
of US $ 151.6 billion in end-March 2006 to reach a level of US $ 199.2 billion, 
implying a reserve increase of the order of US $ 47.6 billion. Though there is no one-
to-one correspondence between sources of capital flows and reverse, the major 
sources of capital inflows (and implicitly of reserve accretion excluding valuation 
gains) were ECBs and foreign investment in 2006-07. The appreciation of other major 
currencies against the S dollar resulted in a valuation gain of the stock of reverse of 
the securities market and net outgo of FII flows in the initial months and later again in 
March 2007 moderated the other rapid pace of accretion to reverses in 2006-07. As 
per the BoP data released by the RBI for the current financial year (April-September), 
reverse rose by US $ 48.6 billion including a valuation gain of US $ 8.2 billion. 
 The sources of reverse were broad-based. Foreign exchange reverse on stock 
basis at the end of February 8, 2008 were US $ 290.9 billion, implying an accretion of 
US $ 91.6 billion in the current financial year so far over end-March 2007. It was 
fully in evidence in 2007-08 with the exchange rate of rupee appreciating sharply in 
tandem with rising capital flows .With the demand for foreign exchange (debt side of 
BoP) not keeping pace with the supply of foreign exchange (credit side of BoP), the 
rupee appreciated against the US $ by 4.5 percent in April 2007 (over March 2007) 
and by 3.4 percent in May 2007 over April 2007. The extent of appreciation or 
depreciation of the rupee varies according to the time horizons as reference period. 
The rupee appreciated by 9.8 percent against the US dollar during the current 
financial year between April 3, 2007 and January 16, 2008. The rupee appreciation 
against the US dollar over the past 12 months on year-on year basis (December 2007 
over December 2006) was a higher 13.2 percent.  
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Tax reforms: 
 One of lesser known aspects of China’s emergence as a global manufacturing 
hub is the manner in which it completely revamped its tax system in the early 1990’s 
to drive growth. Such modernization of the tax system which took place by 1993 was 
an integral part of the Chinese strategy for export driven and manufacturing-driven 
growth. In addition in recent past China’s Central Bank has taken a number of 
monetary measures including hiking lending bank rate; revaluation of its currency 
Yuan and to peg it to a basket of currencies (Srivastava, 2005). 
 Finally, India is attractive to multinationals because it has a commitment to the 
rule of law and protecting intellectual property. This explains why India has home-
grown, innovative companies, and is becoming a base for multinationals to conduct 
research in high-tech fields. Narayan Murty, founder of Infosys, was shocked it took 
months just to conclude a land agreement for a 15,000-employee facility in Hang 
Zhou. Of Chinese officials he complains, “Sometimes you ca get confusing signals” 
Getting money out of Chinese clients is not easy either; Infosys gets paid in 56 days 
on average in India, but in China it must wait 120 day. 
 Andy Xie, Morgan Stanley’s chief Asian economist, recently released a report 
entitled “Time to Change,” which concluded: “Rising internal tension over inequality 
and external friction over China’s trade success suggest that China’s government-led 
and export/investment-driven development model may be reaching its limits”. At or 
above the current level of 8% growth, some believe, India is able to pursue reform 
and use its increased revenues to compensate sectors of the population who are 
temporarily left behind. 
 Therefore a complete picture does not emerge from it. This is the gap, 
which will be filled through the present study. 
1.6 METHODOLOGY: 
 Though there are different methods of collecting data, examining, plotting, 
analyzing the data but here in the present study the secondary data collection method 
has been used. In this process the data which have already been colleted earlier have 
already been passed through the statistical process have the main objectives. 
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 To achieve the above cited research objectives in a systematic manner a 
comprehensive effort has been made to collect secondary data mainly from the 
following sources: 
(i) Director General of commercial intelligence and statistics (D.G.C.I. & S.), 
Calcutta. 
(ii) Reserve Bank of India's Bulletin, Mumbai. 
(iii) Economic Survey, GOI, New Delhi. 
(iv) IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics. 
(v) Technical and trade journals. 
(vi) Reports and publications of various documents connected with economic 
reforms, exports, imports, Foreign Direct Investment, Joint Ventures etc 
and  
(vii) Publications of government of International bodies and their subsidiary 
organizations. 
 To achieve the afore said research objectives some analytical tools such as 
annual growth rate, comparative assessment and interpretation has been made on year 
wise growth pattern. 
 A step-wise procedure of collection of data, examining, plotting, analyzing the 
data and also tools used have been discussed among the subject experts. 
1.7 AREA OF THE STUDY: 
 The present study has been confined mainly with China’s integration into the 
global trading system pertaining to pre and post phase of economic reforms, trends in 
China’s foreign trade, Foreign Direct Investment, Foreign Exchange Reserves and 
Exchange Rate Policy. It has also been limitized in terms of Sino-Indian trading 
relations particularly with exports, imports, joint ventures and Foreign Direct 
Investment only. 
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1.8 LIMITATION OF THE STUDY: 
 In order to achieve the objectives of the present study, the researcher has 
delimited upto secondary data collection technique from various sources. The already 
available data have been used with due precaution if they are readily available from 
authentic sources and are sufficiently reliable, valid, suitable and adequate. In this 
process a minute scrutiny of secondary data have been made in the context of the 
research problem. 
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Chapter - 2 
ECONOMIC REFORMS IN CHINA 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 China’s economic reforms initiated in the early 1980’s, took an observable 
twist only in the late 1990’s. Prior to globalization China’s economic weakness was a 
constraint on its foreign policy. In the initial stage China took one major step of 
shifting from centrally planned economy to marketed economy. When China began to 
open to world market in 1978, the measures in retrospect was less than bold. 
Pragmatically economic success was most urgent for the regime’s long term survival 
then trying to get the “real world”. Subsequently, China’s first phase of economic 
reform mainly concentrated its aim is to promote exports, encourage inward 
investment, development special economic zones, attract investment and open up 
infrastructure for development. 
 The essence was to introduce more market around the plan. The result was 
that Chinese government initiated second form of economic reform from 1990. The 
rapid of China’s economic growth was just achieved by opening the economy but its 
careful and judicious planning towards market liberalization. China with its 
intelligence approach could success in minimizing the negative impact of the 
economy. The sequence of reform plays a vital role in bringing the success. Source of 
the key elements of the China’s reform process mainly aimed at: development of 
private sector price liberalization in the domestic market, shifting of centrally planned 
economy towards market oriented economy, development of legal framework of 
private enterprises and encourage local production for export markets. The reforms 
included export promotion policy, import of foreign capital, the creation of export 
processing zone and importation for foreign technology. 
 Meanwhile foreign investment rate grew consistently until the boom years of 
the late 1990’s when inward investment came to account for up to 13 percent of total 
investment for one year. Trade rediscovered the benefits to be derived from a long 
coast line, market. This exploit the mainland’s near inexhaustible supply of cheap 
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labor and to secure foreign capital. One of the most abundant resources in China is 
the very high rate of saving both domestic and foreign. 
 It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that agricultural reform was initiated by 
the pleasantry. Together with this the mainland attracts 40 percent of foreign direct 
investment flows to developing countries, 10 percent of banking lending, 10 percent 
of portfolio entry flows and 5 percent of bond flows. China’s demand for energy is 
driven by high rates of industrial production, the automobile revolution, the surge in 
air travel and complex pricing control. China has its own peculiarities, the thrust of 
policy to accelerate the pace of modernization, upgrade private property rights and 
more decisively to join the WTO. Infect in case of China, the high growth during the 
last 20 years has indeed been accompanied by substantial productivity gains. 
Economic reforms greatly liberated people’s thinking and other desire to peruse 
economic gain. 
2.2 FIRST PHASE OF REFORM 1970-1993 
 The promulgation of the equity joint venture law (Sino-foreign joint venture) 
in July 1979 formally opened up China’s market to the world. This provided the legal 
framework for foreign investors to form equity joint ventures with Chinese partners. 
China permitted foreign companies, enterprises, other economic entries or individuals 
to incorporate themselves in the territory of China. Some states were granted special 
autonomy in dealing with foreign trade and investment with the central government. 
Later in 1979 four SEZs were established and were granted special autonomy in 
dealing with foreign trade and investment with the objectives as to develop the costal 
area of China’s window to the outside world. After the new policies and incentives 
were promulgated in 1986, investment into China increased dramatically. Between 
1986 and 1991, the total foreign investment actually used was US $ 33.2 billion, an 
average of US $ 6.6 billion per year. This figure increased by 142 percent compared 
with the previous period. The following steps, in the direction of economic reform, 
have been taken. These are: 
2.2.1 STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES 
 From 1978 onwards Chinese State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) embarked on a 
new path of reforming their internal and external operating mechanism. The whole 
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reforming process could be generally divided into three phases: the first phase ranged 
from 1978 to 1984 when the reform aimed at the restructuring of highly centralized 
management system and giving more incentive to SOEs through profit retention 
scheme. During 1984 to 1993, SOEs went through the second phase of reforming 
along the line of “Power division and profit redistribution” (Fanqquan Rangli) to 
individual firms. Despite those reforms major both productivity and profitability of 
SOEs had lucked behind by the non state enterprise resulting in the decline of SOEs 
share in total industrial output 57 percent in 1993 (CSSB, 1999). Since then SOEs 
into some industrial independent producer entered the third stage and shifted his 
employees towards ownership restructuring.  
 During the year between 1949-1985 total capital investment in SOEs was 
about Rmb 100.5 billion but such investment only generate Rmb 81.3 billion profits 
and taxes in return (Loic 1989). The return rate of country administrated SOEs was 
81 percent only half of the average return rate of all SOEs. 
 During the first round of decentralization, 8,100 SOEs amounting to 87 
percent of  all SOEs and producing 25.9 percent of national industrial output had been 
developed to state government with only 1,200 SOEs still affiliated with central 
authorities by 1958 (Zhon 1984). Approximately 10,000 SOEs accounting from 46.1 
percent of al SOEs industrial output were decentralized. 
 Economically it was believed that the formulation of regional self reliance 
was to simply the requirements of coordination in the economy by localizing 
allocation decision so that the function of planning could be carried out by articulated 
local bureaucracy without resources of market mechanism (Riskin,1987). As a result 
capital investment into China’s SOEs which has been regarded as key instrument 
industrialization strategies were subject to centralized planning and administration 
before reforms. 
 This process has been made to give greater attention to the types of economic 
incentives for local governments in the forms of fiscal revenue sharing system and 
capital investment funding and project approval. The investment project that required 
approval by the state planning commission and the state council had been raised from 
Rmb 10 and 1, 00 million to 30 million and 200 million respectively since the 1980’s 
(Peng. 1989).As a result China’s reform of fiscal capital investment system have in 
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terms of property rights, several to clarify the ownership right of local government 
over the asset of SOEs within governments over the asset of SOE that they 
administrated. The reforming process was in-effect a level of downsizing reallocation 
of property right over SOEs within government hierarchy (Walder 1995). The growth 
and development of SOEs are scalar differentiated according to their administrative 
affiliation with various levels of government. Such policy of scale shows that the 
SOEs at the lowest level of administrative hierarchy exhibited the lowest performance 
in both productivity and profitability. 
 A review of Chinese government effort to reform SOEs reveals that prior to 
1993 the financial reform is simply an administrative, loans by banking replace the 
previous budgetary allocation of investment and enterprises became responsible for 
the repayment of principle and interest existing studies have concluded that budget 
constraints did not harden but actually softened as a result of government continued 
influence over back leading decision. There is no doubt the government is strongly 
committed to SOEs. Since 1984 the central committee of China Communist Party 
(C.C.P) decided to undertake economic restructuring in China where economy was a 
planned economy based on public ownership. Later on 1987 a theory of primary stage 
socialist in China market forces and even private ownership were permitted and 
harnessed to help develop productive forces (Jiang, 1992). 
 Some leading theorist in China has attempted to rationalize the insistence of 
the dominance of public ownership especially for larger SOEs. Jiang stress that it 
facilitates the ability of the state to maintain control. 
 The main difference between state owned industrial enterprises and reform of 
Chinese agriculture is that privatization was not adopted for SOEs. The lure of 
material supplies wanted to retain its control over the distribution of major materials. 
The entire system for industrial products had to be changed to enable state enterprises 
to produce efficiently once they are allowed to be finally independent. Twelfth central 
committee of CCP adopted a major decision on Oct 20, 1984 on economy reform and 
resolved to give individual state enterprises autonomy in decisions, regarding 
production, supply, marketing price, investment and personal to function as profit 
seeking economic unit. It developed a macro-economic control mechanism through 
the use of taxes, interest rate and monetary policy under an improved banking and 
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financial system the slogan was “invigorate the macro economic units and controlled 
by macro levers”. 
2.2.2 Foreign Direct Investment 
 For China FDI flows had brought about an economic miracle. More than two 
decade experience of rapid growth and increasing openness the kind of policy regime 
that has facilitated the infusion of a massive flow of FDI has been world wide 
acclaimed. The year 1978 marks the beginning of the first reform. The establishment 
of the household responsibility system, the introduction of urban price reform of 1988 
was the two landmark events in the decade. The political crises of 1989 then marked 
new reform strategies in its expression in the official motto, coined by then Prime 
Minister and party Secretary Zhao Ziyang. FDI was to start with accorded a legal 
status superior to that enjoyed by indigenous private firm. The 1982 constitution 
offered protection (Article 18) to the legal status of foreign enterprises and other 
Chinese organizations. The government removed in 1992 a number of sect- oral and 
regional restriction on FDI, shifting simultaneously the investment approval authority 
from the central government to local governments. This had implications for the 
growth scenario. Also a number of agreements with other’s were put in place 
committing the Chinese got to increase market access and strengthen intellectual 
property rights protection (Lardy 1998). 
 Over the two decades of reforms, FDI has emerged as a significant source of 
investment financing. This was the reason that it amounted to 6 percent of GDP in 
early 1990 through the absolute amount increased during that period. FDI provided a 
critical catalytic and dramatic impact on the growth of small and medium sized 
industries in rural and urban areas. This was facilities through extensive 
decentralization of power to regional authorities and utilization of local resources and 
development of local industries and development of local industries. Town and 
Villages Enterprises (TVE’s) actively sponsored assisted by local government 
became especially the major medium for foreign investment (Naughton 1995). Local 
government had a strong incentive to promote (TVE’s), these contributed 
substantially and the local government retained the revenue sharing arrangement. One 
of the most important contributing factors was the major agricultural boom coming in 
the wake of economic reform in agriculture with better prices and land tenure with the 
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farmers acquiring fixed term land use rights. Political regime as deployed FDI as a 
solid supporting mechanism for the modernization of Chinese industries and 
expansion of its trade in first two decade of reforms. The flow of FDI increased in an 
effective growth. 
 China seems to have discovered its own reform model with “Chinese 
characteristics”. A western observer calls it, is the “Beijing consequences” (Ramo 
2004). During many years in 1990’s China claim to be the world’s largest recipient of 
FDI but the fact is that even in some of the most remote provinces in China. FDI 
accounts for surprisingly high proportion of fixed assets investments. Unlike these for 
Guangdong province FDI figure are usually to be contaminated by a statistical 
distortion known as “round trip FDI”. 
 Researchers and business analytics have suggested that China macro 
fundamentals include political stability, rapid market expansion, cheap labor forces 
and its financing requirements thereby China has one of the highest saving rates in the 
world. In 1990’s China has not only one of the world largest recipients of FDI, but it 
been also one of the largest capital exporters its current account surplus, as a 
percentage share of GDP came to 2.7 percent. This dynamic means that FDI has not 
contributed to an increase in China capital formulation. In 1992 Chinese government 
decided to significantly liberties its FDI regime. 
 As FDI rose in 1990’s contractual capital inflows decline substantially. One 
possibility is that in 1990’s many foreign investor took over export production 
facilities previously owned an independently run by Chinese enterpenurers. Lou wells 
(1993) observe “two concepts are rather widely held among research considered with 
FDI. 
(a) To survive abroad a firm needs some kind of advantage over local 
competitions. 
(b) A firm must have some reason to internalize that advantage through 
ownership rather than contracting with another firm”. 
ECONOMIC REFORMS IN CHINA
 
 
China's Integration into Global Trading System and Its Implications for India 
57
 Stephen Lymer (1970) widely argues that FDI is “an instrument which allows 
business firms to transfer capital technology and organizational skills from one 
country to another”. 
 The prevalence of equity arrangements in China suggest that there are putative 
benefits associated with FDI in excess of contract export production. Since FDI 
arrangements in China are pervasive in manufacturing and export of products such as 
garments, furniture, and leather and for products on the surface, the prevalence of FDI 
arrangements must be due to benefits other than transforming ‘R and D’ content and 
propriority intangible assets. It is important to note that like a production contract 
between a foreign and domestic firm FDI is a contract as well. No doubt the 
institutional foundation argument differs from many of the standards prospective of 
FDI in two aspects. 
(i) It focuses on the motivation of constraints on Chinese firms to account for 
some of the FDI pattern. 
(ii) It makes the calm that institutional features of Chinese economy powerfully 
create and save these motivation and constraints. As evidence of the growing 
competitiveness of domestic private firms, the decline of FDI dependency 
was mainly driven by huge increase in investment by domestic private firm 
rather than by an absolute decline of FDI inflows. 
2.2.3 Banking and Finance   
 The major aims of reforms in banking and finance are as follows: 
1. To supply currency in circulation and funds (credits) to state enterprises. It 
includes other government units under the direction of central planning and 
accepts saving deposits from the people with assistance of its branch banks in 
various locations.  
2. To reform the banking system in order to serve a market oriented economy 
progressed. 
3. To strengthened the structure of balance sheet of various banks in operation. 
4. To encourage the finance system in order to achieve the stable regulatory 
reform. 
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 Economic reform that began in 1978, Chinas banking was performed by the 
people bank and its branch bank. The main functions of the people’s bank were to 
supply currencies in circulation under the direction of central planning. With the 
eminent accession of China’s into the world organization the whole landscape of 
Chinese banking and financial system faces a dramatic change : as foreign business 
were allowed to compete on a more level playing field in China’s domestic market, 
the policy makers had steeped up the pace of reform ahead of new challenges. China 
admits banking system remain inherently unstable initially and given a serious SOE 
and nonperforming loans problems. 
 Following economic reforms towards a more market oriented economy, the 
People’s Bank was changed to a Central Bank of China, Agricultural Bank of China, 
Peoples Construction Bank of China were established in addition to Bank of China 
dealing with international transaction. Reforms of banking system to serve a market 
economy progress gradually in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s. 
 Chinese government official and economist were aware of the possible 
weakness of the current banking system and were trying to improve its performance. 
With the reason they had made serious efforts to invite outside expert to train the staff 
of the Central Bank and Commercial Bank. Zhu Rougji (1999) stated in his 
government report China should accelerate the reform of state owned commercial 
bank, insure autonomy in the operation of bank, and continue to make progress in the 
efforts to establish bank branches and sub branches based on the economic division, 
work loads and tightened interval control. Further, China should rectify and 
standardized the insurance market to promote the sound development of the insurance 
industry. Significant achievement has been attained since China adopted its reform 
and open door policy in 1978. During the progress of subsequent years China’s annual 
GDP increased at an average rate of 9.6 percent, far faster than the annual GDP 
growth and at a higher rate than the World’s average 3 percent growth for the same 
period. China soon entered into its tenth five year development plan, therefore, need 
to speed up its pace of financial system reform and improve the competitiveness of 
China’s financial sector in entering the 21st century.  Forming various financial 
institutions and separating their work ahead enhancing cooperation, will adopt the 
system of financial organization under the new policy of reform and openness. In 
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accelerating the reform of China state-owned Commercial Banks, China formed four 
financial asset management companies to purchase, manage and dispose of non 
performing asset so as to separate these from the banking sector, through the 
implementation of debt equity swaps for certain qualified SOEs. The emergence of 
shareholding Commercial Banks employed financial market competition, promoting 
the formation of a competitive environment within the banking sector and in turn, 
supporting the development of small and medium sized enterprises. Although the four 
banks were intended to act as commercial banks they remained in reality the 
government policy tools to achieve its economic and social goals. 
 The decline in household consumption as a share of household disposable 
income in GDP. Part of explanation of this decline may be increasing financial 
repression. China’s financial sector has been undergoing far reaching reform for more 
than a decided suggesting that the degree of repression has ceased in recent years. 
However from the past of the view of household this appears not to be the case. The 
decline contribution of interest earning of disposable income was even greater since 
the government introduce a 20 percent tax on interest income. More importantly 
interest earning loan in line with the household bank deposit would have been greater 
than the actual contribution. 
 China’s banking transformation is indeed interlocked with the entire change of 
reform in insurance securities market, pension and other currencies or inters rate 
liberalization. All these effort had led to some improvement in transparency, 
efficiency, corporate governance, management and share holder value which will lead 
to higher investor demand, thus fascinating the privatization and reform process. All 
the above facts point that’s China’s complex and huge economy is on the rise and the 
long cherished goal is in view. 
2.2.4 Foreign Trade and Foreign Exchange 
 From 1949 to 1978, China was a planned economy and trade follows was 
entirely controlled by state. Meanwhile, a few state owned and state run trading 
companies and their subsidies controlled almost all foreign trade, insurance 
monopolies in many goods. Import and Export volumes for each trading company  
were centrally planned and prices and volumes for each trading company were strictly 
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administer by state to unified income and pavement rules. Since 1978 China has been 
moving towards a market economy and thus, a more liberal trade system. China’s 
trade system can be divided into two periods in terms of reform demarked by 1992. 
 During the first period China’s tractions towards a market system was gradual. 
In second terms, China first opened its market for considerable next; it liberalized 
trade in certain in fracture industries and intermediated. Therefore, it gradually 
opened various services activators to international    al competition that s China 
promoted decentralized since 1992 China’s trade system has begun to better reflect 
international norms and trade liberalization has accelerated. At a first broad measure, 
the government lowered its tariff rates for only 81 of about 6,300 duty codes by 30.85 
percent. By contrast in December 1992 China reduced import tariff for 3596 duty 
codes by an average of 7.3 percent. In another more non tariff barriers were reduce 
and China has retracted all list of substute imports goods. China reduced the average 
rate in a subsequent manner year on year. 
 To lower its tariff on agricultural products from 31.5 percent to 14.5 percent 
overall tariff on industrial products have been lowered heir products from 35 to 75 
percent but foreign manufactures showed  in their products directly to domestic 
consumers without having to go through Chinese trade organization. Tariff 
agricultural products felt sharply both prior to Chinas accession to the WTO. 
Agricultural trade reform I China shows that protection was quite strongly negative 
for most commodities and particularly for exported goods. Since then the taxation for 
agriculture has declined and reduction in trade distortion for both imported and 
exported goods, Infect Schiff and valder (1991) concluded that the indirect taxation 
for agriculture resulting from protection to other sector and exchange rate over 
valuation was generally   more important then direct distortion to agriculture. In case 
of China there has been an enormous amount of liberalization of non agricultural 
barriers including tariff, exchange rate overvaluation through the two tire system, 
quotas and licenses. In essence each farm household was assigned a piece of land was 
held responsible for delivering a given quantity of a specified product in other that the 
Cummins could satisfy its procurement price requirement. This responsibility system 
has the economic characteristics of private farming in market economy. According to 
the account of Zhaw (1996) revealed that farmer attempted unorganized grassroots 
land reform in many parts of rural China farm economy in essence returned to the 
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private economy. China still has state firms, but they produce less than 1 percent of 
agricultural output. 
 In China total value of foreign trade grew from US $ 21 billon in 1978 to US $ 
237 billion in 1994, a secular ten fold increase. China had now become firmly 
integrated into the world economy. The rapid increase in foreign trade ad investment 
was successful due to its foreign trade system. 
 Trade liberalization has now become one of the top priorities in the 
marketization of the Chinese economy. The major thrust of trade reform was to turn 
away the policies of self sufficient or an import substation strategy towards the 
strategy of export led growth. The main role of foregone trade was to make up for 
domestic shortage by imports and to smooth out excessive suppliers of domestic 
goods by exports within the framework of the national economic plan. Two major 
components in the Chinese economic reforms programs: one is decentralization of 
economic decision making power and rationalization of prices. Trade reform has 
involved restoration of price based incentives mainly through reform of the foreign 
exchange system. The export pattern in China’s trends. China’s foreign exchange rate 
had little role   influencing the allocation of resources and performed largely on 
accounting function. The two major elements of reforms are introduced of foreign 
exchange system and devaluation of Rmb Yuan for trade related transaction. Chinese 
government introduce internal settlement rate for trade and is  calculated from the 
average cost of earning as US dollar through export and was set as Rmb Yuan 2.8 to 1 
US dollar. This represented on 80 percent defector devaluation as the official rate was 
only Rmb Yuan 1.55 to 1 US dollar, by 1993 80 percent of foreign exchange earning 
were price at the swap rate. China continued to apply the foreign exchange retention 
system and to increase retention rate. Martin simulated the effects of deprecation of 
the official rate by 10 percent using a computable general equilibrium model of the 
Chinese economy. 
2.3 SECOND PHASE OF REFORM: 1994 to 2008 
 The noticeable inflow of foreign capital surged into China in the period of 
high growth. The phenomenon began after the southern tour of former leader Deng 
Xiaoping in 1992. He urged the country to accelerate economic reform and open up 
further. In the meanwhile, many previously suspended reform policies were ready to 
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be implemented after three years of harsh measures had brought inflation under 
control. However, unlike in the 1980s the reform policy in the 1990’s shifted from 
costal region to western inland areas. This was mainly because the large amount of 
foreign investment in the costal areas had widened the income gap between the coast 
and west of China. There cities enjoyed the same policy treatment as that given to 
costal open areas Foreign capital followed into China from 150 countries, the majority 
in Asia. In December 2001, China became the 143rd member of WTO. The state 
government has committed to a wide range of reforms as part of WTO accession in 
late 1990s and early 2000s.The reform includes:  
1. Boosting transparency to both legal and administrative systems. 
2. Improving intellectual property protection. 
3. Reducing tariffs and tax: and 
4. Privatizing SOEs. 
2.3.1 State Owned Enterprises 
 There is a scope for the process of restructuring about SOEs. Just between 
1995 and 1997, for example, the total number of industrial SOE employees dropped 
by 3.6 million over the same period. However, private sector employment rose by 12 
million and overall employment was more than 16 million, despite the loss in SOEs 
position. Officially reported net profit of SOEs in aggregate have fallen by half in the 
several past years and are infact negative in the first five months of 1998. Moreover 
subsidies reported in the official balance sheet fail to tell full story. Much of the 
lending to SOEs as noted is policy based and constitutes a hidden subsidy at that 
sector. 
 Most of the elements of restructuring the SOEs are by now well understood. In 
some cases the prospects for restructuring that closing will be the preferred option at 
the other extreme many are already making profits, even burden with social 
expenditures. There may be room for improvement but these enterprises are a drained 
on neither the financial system nor the government. In between are the difficult 
judgment call cases where restructuring may be possible. Investigation shows that 
hard budget constraints, which mean not only phasing down subsidies but also 
eliminating soft loans-, are important in providing incentives for restructuring. But as 
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China marks a transaction to a market socialistic economy, the debt equity ratio 
matters a great deal. In China the government is both the owner and the leaders in the 
process. The value of loans will have to be written down and a direct subsidy to the 
restructuring agency may be required. 
 Since 1994, however, the SOEs have discovered another important source of 
capital apart from bank loans and retain profits: namely equities. This is the direct 
result of the introduction of the so called “modern enterprises system”. There have 
been two key steps in SOEs reform since 1994: the introduction of MES in 1994 and 
the three year program to turn around SOEs from 1998 through 2000. It is evident that 
a primary strategy of the three year complains was to introduce the MES to a majority 
of the targeted large and medium sized SOEs. However from 1997 the government 
significantly steeped up its exploitation of the stock market as a source of chief 
finance designation SOEs. In fact the Chinese stock market expanded raising on 
average Rmb 100 billion a year for the listed companies during 1997-1999 and as 
much as Rmb 210 billion in 2000. On the other hand between 1998 and 2002 a total 
of Rmb 600 billion in long terms Treasury bond was issued. 
 The authorities recognized the need to complete the decentralization process 
by insulating the SOEs from government interference and giving them complete 
autonomy in management. In March 1996 the government announced to consent rate 
reform on 1,000 large SOEs and dispose of the roughly 90,000 small SOEs through 
mergers, leasing or sale. Through researchers it had been identified the from 1985 to 
1995 the proportion of SOEs that suffered from a loss has risen distractedly from 9.6 
percent to 33.8 percent (Lo 1999:p-699). Over a same period of time losses incurred 
of by SOEs, increased almost twenty fold from Rmb 3.2 billion to Rmb 63.9 billion 
(CSSB : 1998 p-52). 
 The first explanation draws its inspiration from institutional perspective and 
attributes the difficulties of SOEs to the ambiguous property rights or ownership 
rights. It was argued that public property rights. SOEs were not clearly defined the 
only solution for SOEs would be to redefine it along the line of complete privatization 
(Jhang: 1997). It is believed that a reduction of entry barriers to non state sector and 
subsequently erosion of monopolistic profit previously enjoyed solely by SOEs 
(Naughton; 1995). The overall compensation of the workers in SOEs suggests that the 
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sum direct and indirect expenditure of SOEs had increased much more than the 
growth of lab our productivity, resulting in the decline of profits. This interpretation 
has correctly pointed on that progress in welfare reform was a necessary per-condition 
for the success of China’s SOEs reform. 
2.3.2 Foreign Direct Investment 
 In continued efforts of FDI reform private sector was expected a component 
of, rather than as a supplement to the Chinese economy. In the March 1999, not with 
standing the progressive removal of legal disabilities, private firms continued to face 
discrimination from the banking system in the availability of credit. Until 1998 in the 
largest Chinese banks were under instructions not to lend the private firms. It was 
only in July 2001, after the announcement of President Jiang Zemin that the 
communist party would welcome private entrepreneurs to join their ranks that things 
eased somewhat for the domestic private sector. China accepted in recognitation of 
ground realities that FDI could be deployed as a change agent between 1993 and 
1997. FDI accounted for over 30 percent of fixed asset investment by the non state 
firms: if one adds to it enterprise in which foreign investment has been made, the 
figure is 53 percent. Some 1504 manufacturing FIEs were operating in 1995 (Wang; 
1995). They accounted for over 60 percent of Chinese export in these industries. The 
impressive development of rural industries was primarily due to their connection to 
the international market. In these TVEs the area of highest growth was also the areas 
of deepest foreign penetration. A trend is sharply different from what has been 
observed in other developing countries. In these countries, in the production of labor 
extensive exports products, local investor, learn the skills and crafts and displayed 
crafts the foreign producers. The case in China was reverse as perceived in many 
other developing countries where there had been strong FDIs alliance through 
technologies licensing and marketing arrangements with local entrepreneurs. The 
upsurge of indigenous entrepreneurship with the benefits of FDI inflow acquiring to 
the economy the regime felt encourage to introduce steadily the concepts of and 
institution of private into the Chinese economy. The domestic private sector had 
increased output five fold from 1998 to 2003. During this period it created 80 millions 
jobs while SOEs set 22 million jobs and added many jobs prior to it. The private 
sector shares in Chinese economy is as much as two-third (OECD; 2005). With the 
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observed benefits following from FDI the political regime felt in allowing significant 
relaxation that had virtually became a bible with the banking system. This causes a 
rapid increase in export processing organization by private firms from $ 6.3 million to 
$ 536 million from 1996 -2000. FDI flows were mainly restricted to the collective and 
joint venture in provinces and selected regions. As benefits started flowing from FDI 
with the surge of domestic entrepreneurship the regime could afford to shift gear. In 
1997 President declared the state do not have to dominate every sector or have 
majority ownership in every enterprises in order to maintain broad control of the 
economy and should focus mainly few enterprises (Steinfold ; 1998). It follows 
naturally that large FDI inflow would have lead to a substantial role of FIE’s in 
China’s economy. As of 1995, FIEs controlled over half of China’s manufactured 
exports, or 51.2 percent. FIEs accounted for 45.5 percent of Guangdong’s exports in 
1995, 49.5 percent in 1997, 51.8 percent in 1998, and 50.7 percent in1999.  
 Lemoine (2000) in his study conducted that despite the size of the China’s 
economy, the past taken by foreign affiliates in its manufacturing industry and export 
is comparable with that they play in other developing Asian economies. She revealed 
that the low employment share at 11 percent in China compared with 23 percent in 
Taiwan, 38 percent in Malaysia and 14 percent in Indonesia is easily explained by the 
excess employment among SOEs in China, Summarizing the theoretical work on FDI. 
Moran (1998) writes “barriers to entry imperfect competition are the sine qua non for 
the FDI process to be possible”. In 1995 the average FDI/capital formation ratio for 
fourteen interior and western provinces was 4.9 percent; if investment by SOEs is 
excluded, the ratio was 14.9 percent. From 1992 to 1998 period this 4.9 percent figure 
put the provinces above Taiwan (2.2 %), Korea (1.2%), India (2.2%) and Russia 
(2.0%). Lemoine in her own study shows that the FDI stock/GDP ratio for interior 
provinces was 10.9 percent in 1998 where the FDI stock/GDP ratio for North America 
was 10.5 percent, for the central and eastern Europe 12.9 percent and for South east 
Asia 10.5 percent. This indicates that round trip FDI has on effect on China’s that 
capital inflow as the capital that is imported is cancelled out by the capital that is first 
exported. 
 Institutional factor exert relatively few influences on this type of FDI. It is 
possible that China’s economic and financial institution improve, China will became 
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more attractive to conventional FDI. One category of FDI concern, the operations of 
MNC’s seeking to sell “global products” to prospects national resources, or to locate 
production facilities of highly technological products close to their customers. Wei 
(1996) reports that the usual pull factor in fact over predict China’s FDI’s incidence, 
that is the predicted level generated by China’s market size, economic growth and 
human capital endowment is greater that the actual level of FDI absorption. 
 Chinese firm can be divided into four category first category consist of SOEs 
but variant types of SOEs, second one is composed of collection firms closest to 
SOEs in urban area owned by SOEs. The third categories of firm encompass purely 
private firms and are more likely to be partnerships or proprietorship. The fourth 
category of firms with mixed ownership structure which includes FIEs as listed on 
China’s stock exchange and firms with substantial employee’s stock holding. 
 FDI which surplus US $ 50 billion 2002 (an increase of 20% year on year) can 
be called the single most significant drive of China’s economic expansion. This is 
especially true since FDI experience a growth spurts starting in 1998: and 2001, 
utilized FDI amounted to over US $ 173 billion. In addition the economy beyond the 
heavy industrial base, led the education of generation of Chinese professional in 
different ways of doing business. Zhu Rongjit’s landmark SOE reform program in 
1997, still act as a dead system is dominant by the “big four” bank which accounts for 
over 67 percent of deposits and 60 percent of loans. In 2002 the private sector 
accounted for over 60 percent the service industry 50 percent of export and 24 percent 
of current GDP. As current growth rates, it will comprises as much as 40 percent of 
GDP by 2010. It is also a potential sauce of investment into the state sector with one 
recent example being the purchase of 18 percent of China’s eastern airlines by private 
sector. Even then the government needs to make a more concentrated effort to 
embrace and support the private sector. The key elements of approach to reform are 
that the development of new sector and charges of economic sector will create and 
improve the conditions for reform of the old sector. The overall economic growth, 
supported by the growth of non state sector has made it possible for the government to 
mobilize some resources to compensate the unemployment state sector has workers. 
Some reports indicate that in some region 70 percent of small SOEs have seen 
privatized including employees share holding companies as the first step in the 
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process of reforms. For a country like China it may take long time to complete its 
industrialization process which more than 400 million rural laborers will have to find 
new jobs in non farming sectors in the current global environment of technology 
revolution and oversupply. 
2.3.3 Banking and Finance 
 The most dramatic turning point for China’s financial reform occurred in 
1994. The People Bank of China together with identities such as the state commission 
for reform of economic system the ministry of finance and state administration of 
foreign exchange control underwent an adjustment leading to both banking foreign 
exchange and tax reforms which brought China’s financial system with international 
standards. Zhu develop a system of “macro economic control” cutting credit lines and 
money supply. By 1995 the inflation dropped to 10 percent barely higher than the rate 
of the economic expansion. By 1997 inflation closed the year at 1.1 percent while 
growth registered in impressive 9.7 percent. At the end of 1999 growth was still high 
at 7.6 percent while inflation has turned to disinflation at falling by negative 3.6 
percent. 
 Reforms of the insurance system gained momentum in 1996, with the 
implementation of a separation of property and life insurance. China maintained its 
foreign exchange reserves assuring exchange rate stability when the Asian financial 
system was in crisis. Foreign exchange reserves were at US $ 153 billion in 2000, 
putting pressure on the Rmb to revalue upward rather than devalue. 
 State was in structuring the new asset management companies as to which 
enterprises should be undertaking depth to equity swaps. The state council has 
selected some 500 enterprises for the ground experiment which in principle is based 
on models adopted in other countries but with Chinese characteristics. 
 In March 1999, Chinese government step-up four management companies 
each serving to restructure to bad debt of large back. The purpose was to strengthen 
the structure of balance sheet of the Commercial Bank. The asset management 
companies in turn try to collect from the state enterprises part or whole of the debt in 
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the conjunction. It has the power to supervise and monitor the financial position of the 
state enterprises. 
 By the end of 1999, a breakdown shows that the asset state-owned commercial 
bank amounted to Rmb 10.4 trillion or 60.5 percent the assets of various shareholding 
commercial banks amounted to 2 trillion, or 11.6 percent and urban and rural credit 
cooperative and trusts and investment financial institution amounted to Rmb 10.4 
trillion accounting for the remaining 27.9 percent. 
 China, there are more than 39,000 rural credit cooperative. At the end of 1999 
China had 90 securities investment funds. In future the market will be managed on the 
principles of market economy according to the direction of low supervision, self-
discipline and standardization. During this period insurance premium was Rmb 139.3 
billion, insurance density was 1.67 percent and penetration was worth Rmb 10.85 
billion. China intended to increase the number of insurance companies to complete 
the development of its market. In recent years monetary market situation leading to 
the general expansion of the scale of financial institution transaction emerged sharply. 
There was an important reform carried out in the management system of the Peoples 
Bank of China involving management was abolishment of the former 32 provincial 
autonomous region and municipality branches directly under the central government. 
This measure reinforced the independence and fairness of the Central Bank in 
fulfilling its responsibility. There were 182 financial institutions in operation of which 
87 were foreign financial institution and group enterprises from 22 countries and 
region established in China. This will push further to participate in the process of 
financial globalization. After joining WTO China’s economy has further integrated 
into the global financial market. China successfully conducted foreign exchange 
management system reforms realizing the mergers of dual foreign exchange rates: 
establishing a single and managerial floating exchange rates system based on market 
supply and demand. The People Bank of China through open market operations 
purchase US $120 billion in foreign exchange then rapidly increased foreign 
exchange reserve and established the exchange rate. From 2000 China’s international 
balance of increase and expenditure has been good, foreign exchange supply new 
exceeds demand and the Rmb exchange rate has been stable. 
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 In future based on the principles of four competition and mutual benefit China 
will strengthen cooperation among national and among the Central Bank of Asian 
countries. It will continue to support IMF in international financial affairs. It must 
actively seek mechanism for maintaining current stability for future economic 
integration into the world. 
 Part of the explanation about financial systems shows that household deposits 
in the banking system as a share of GDP almost doubled between 1993 and 2003, the 
extreme of pre tax interest earnings generated by these saving declined from an 
average of about 5 percent in 1992-95 to only 2.2 percent of GDP in 2003. Most 
importantly if interest earning by household bank deposit had grown up, the 
government had not introduce a tax on interest income the contribution by 2003 
would have been 7.5 percent of GDP, 5.7 percent points greater than the actual 
contribution. Apparently the newly found power of the restructured Central Bank was 
evidenced from the closer of some bad local financial institution. Nevertheless POCB 
had paid more attention to these problems and attempts were made to recapitalize the 
program and important tools were invented to resolve the huge NPL problem. The 
POCB believes that the utilize loss will be below 9 percent on an NPL ratio of 25 
percent employing a recovery of 64 percent. 
2.3.4 Foreign Trade and Foreign Exchange 
  At the beginning of 1994 the main features of reforms included, confining the 
official and market exchange rate by merging the former with the latter and the 
abolition of approval procedures for acquiring and using foreign uses for current 
account transaction.  
 Reform over two decade lowered the simple average tariff to 23 percent by the 
end of 1996. However, high tariff still prevailed for some goods of China’s 6,549 
tariff lines, 28 percent had rate in excess of 30 percent. The number of products still 
subject to quota and licensing requirement was 36 percent. These made up about 15 
percent of Chinese import in 1996. 
 Over the past 50 years many countries have protected them agricultural sector 
reflecting concerns for food security and for the welfare of farmers. In 1994 these 
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three revenue sources earned the government 62.2 billion Yuan accounting for 26 
percent of its total tax collection. In April 1996 it undertook last tariff reduction and 
eliminated a number of special exemptions, as expected, tariff revenue increase. 
 We estimate that for 1994, China’s consumer surplus loss from trade 
protection for these 25 goods totaled $35 billion, which suggests that liberalizing 
trade for these 25 products would create a significant consumer surplus again. The 
gain would be about 6.2 percent of GNP using nominal exchange rates. The 25 
selected products represent 30 percent of Chinese total merchandise import in Cost 
Insurance and Freight (C.I.F) values. Many Chinese observers question whether 
increased imports would benefit the average Chinese firm. Primary resources 
accounted for 14.2 percent of total imported goods in 1994, while manufactured 
products accounted for 85.5 percent of the total. 
 Reduction employment in the protected industries would be one of the major 
drawbacks of liberalization. Job losses of about 11.2 million, about 26.9 percent of 
employment in affected industries from total liberalization. Thus trade liberalization 
would do only negligible damage to the already distorted Chinese industrial labor 
market. In 1994, China still maintained a system of high tariffs. Despite prior 
reductions, nominal tariffs remained high; at an average of nearly 36 percent about 30 
percent point higher than most developed countries and 15 to 20 percent point higher 
than many developing countries in Asia. If the tariff rates on these items are strictly 
enforced and if value- added and consumption taxes were imposed on top of the 
tariffs, then the gross tariffs plus tax on such imports would exceed 100 percent and 
sometimes reach 40 percent. However, duties were not strictly enforced. 
 Since WTO membership requires China to lower tariffs on agricultural and 
manufactures products and allows foreign firm to enter China’s manufacturing 
services sector there will be structural change in China’s economy. Hundreds of 
companies joined in a high powered alliance to get the US to back China’s admission 
to the WTO. Bankers say that concrete gain is accepted from the reduction of 
agriculture tariff from 31.5 to 14.5 percent overall by 2004 and the termination of 
subsidies to China’s export. 
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 Li, et al, (1999) applied a dynamic computational journal equilibrium model 
of Chinese economy consisting of 41 sector and ten types of household to study the 
impact of WTO membership. The impact of WTO membership on economic growth 
comes from the gains from speculation through international trade. The study 
estimates that China’s real GDP in 2005 was 1.5 percent higher from the first source 
due to the above policies if the gain in total factor productivity is incorporated, the 
average annual growth rate in GDP from 1997 to 2000 will be 1 percent higher from 
the entry into the WTO. The annual growth rate projected for this period is 7.5 
percent. 
 China is now the ninth target trading nation, ahead of Korea and Spain for 
example, and is likely to become the second largest trading nation by 2025 exceeded 
solely by the United States. Given the direction of economic reform the outlook for 
China’s growth is bright. The average growth rate of China’s real GDP is estimated at 
7 percent per annum between 2001 and 2025, well above the United States 3.4 percent 
and Europe 2-3 percent GDP growth rate. By the end of May 2000 there were over 
47.7 million stock investors in China. Domestic savings have also increased about 
eight times from 1990, reaching US $ 24 billion. This establishes a considerable 
market for assets management. Capital markets continued to be a positive influence 
on China’s economy. There are 25 balanced and index funds with total assets of US $ 
9.56 billion. 
 In 1999 there where 90 securities companies and 203 trust investment 
companies operating in the securities market. Private and foreign Joint Ventures 
companies are now responsible for 70 percent of industrial output, and are growing at 
an 11 percent per annum, creating more than 1,00 million jobs. The improvement in 
markets, the number of villages that have become specialized producer of a single 
commodity rose from less than 20 percent in 1995 to nearly 40 percent in 2004 
[Rosen, et al, 2004]. Such integration also had allowed relative small and poor farms 
to participate in emerging markets and the substantial income gains associated with 
moving from substance market orientation [Wang, et al, 2007, Bi, et al, 2007].  
 The Economic Intelligence Unit forecast that GDP growth after recording 9.3 
percent and 9.2 percent in 2003 and 2004, will slow just a little over the of non 
performing loans. Ending unprofitable landing has been a slow and incremental 
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process which continues today. For further performance on NPL ratio of about 5.6 
percent in a strong economy should be consider great for a Chinese Bank. 
 Growth in fixed asset investment which is not a national account measure is 
believed to run consistently higher than gross fixed investment as defined in national 
account terms. Net export has provided a large boost to GDP growth. However 
slowing investment growth and a slight higher trajectory for imports following the 
late July 2005, revaluation of the currency will bring down the contribution of next 
export and thus slow over all GDP growth. Later report on NPL ratio of China’s bank, 
the China banking regulatory commission the country’s principle banking regulator 
noted that the big four Rmb 1.72 trillion [US $ 213 billion] to Rmb 1.28 trillion. 
 True the Chinese banks has slowly being improving, but the improvements 
have been incremental, with all of the big four generally perceived as only marginally 
in better shape. More over their new foreign partners can help China’s bank to better 
identified stronger less risky loan opportunities the banks in terms will find 
themselves contributing to sustain and sustainable economic growth. As significant as 
bank listing for China’s financial sector reform is the reform of the countries a share 
market. Some 30 new securities investment front were launched in the first half of 
2005 and big end- June. The next asset value of all such funds had risen by 20.4 
percent since the end of 2004, to Rmb 391 billion. 
 In order to maintain its track record China needs to  its careful review of the 
long term challenges and develop strategies to next two years, but still average 8 
percent on the prior to it. It is be that theirs will be on measure dip from 2007 
afterwards at least for economic reason the main one of there is that China’s 
manufacturing capacity now around 7 percent of world total, should continue to 
expand. China’s biggest impact on trade shows that foreign inverted business 
accounts for 55 percent Chinese export; there are forecast of keeping growing by 
around 20 percent a year, and of course required continuing huge of foreign 
investment.  
 Li Lihui, President of Bank of China announced Rmb 53.3 billion (US $ 6.4 
billion) of operating profits for the first ten months of the year a Rmb 250 billion fall 
in non performing loans NPLs to Rmb 96.4 billion, just 4.6 percent of its total loan 
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and a more than respectable capital adequacy ratio of 8.6 percent. The result make the 
bank the most profitable of China’s big four stated owned bank the mark a huge 
turned around in its fortune. China Construction Bank it was selected to blaze the way 
towards the establishment of a more independent, profit oriented banking system. A 
key incentive for this was the time table for market liberalization notable the entrance 
of foreign bank in 2006 agreed in China’s WTO accession agreement. Now, along 
with the wide ranging internal shake up, the BOC is looking for a strategic investor 
from abroad to help it, advanced its plans for an international public listing in 2005, 
probably before China’s construction bank which also received a US $ 22.5 billion 
injection. 
 In 1998, when NPLs made up nearly half of the assets of the big four the 
ministry of finance injected Rmb 270 billion (US $ 32.5 billion) of new capital. Then 
in 1999 and 2000 four especially created vehicles so called asset management 
companies, took on Rmb 1.4 trillion (US $ 170 billion) to meet them. Brown 
estimates that China per capita annual demand for grain could increase from the 
current 300 kg to at least 400 kg by 2030. He suggests that production is likely to 
decline over the same period by as much as 20 percent. It concludes that in an 
integrated world economy China’s rising food price will become every bodies land 
scarcity and water scarcity in China will affect the entire world. China also had 
several avenues to increase agricultural productivity. In 1995 Jiangsu provincial 
government established eight agricultural “export zone” and implemented many 
incentives to attract investors who could offer advanced agricultural, technologies, 
management system and equipment. 
 In finance, insurance, science, technologies as well as legal services accounts 
and audits China’s demands needs international support and assistance for bringing 
there services to the level that the economy demands. With increased emphasis on 
service sector development China can except to tackle its employment problem with 
about 8 percent per annum growth of GDP between 2000 and 2020. 
 Reform of SOE sector matter in competition not ownership China’s increased 
competition in the non state sectors. The results have been on the whole quite 
impressive flow of fund data prepared by the PBC indicates that the SOEs sector has 
saving of over 15 percent of GDP, which is more than saving rate of the entire 
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economy in many countries such as the US. The self finance ratio for investment of 
SOEs is quite high in China and higher in non SOE sector. 
 Even with the four in oil consumption and eight fold increase in natural gas 
consumption and a seven fold increase in hydroelectricity and nuclear power 
production, coal use would need to provide about two third of China’s commercial 
energy by 2020. This corresponds to an increase in coal consumption from just over 1 
billion ton in 1990 to 3 billion ton 2020. China thus becomes the largest economy by 
2020. It will only be just remaining its normal ranking for much of the world recorded 
history. 
2.3.5 Housing and Social Welfare  
 The largest obstacle to enterprises reform has been the employee welfare 
system that guarantees the workers cradle to grave benefits. These benefits are 
provided directly by the State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and constitute a heavy 
burden on them, especially in the face of increasing market competition from other 
type of firms-such as collectives, township and village enterprises, and foreign owned 
business. 
 Reform in having, medical care, children education and old age pension were 
started before 1994, some of these have been accelerated. Although little progress has 
been made on medical care and education because of lack of funds, reportedly 70 
percent of the urban workers have joined some sort of pension system and 53 percent 
are new covered by unemployment insurance. In addition, 50 million rural workers 
have joined a national rural old age pension plan. Out of a total rural population of 
900 million this is a more fraction. Nevertheless, it is a significant beginning. 
 China’s economic growth has been exceptionally strong over a long period 9.8 
percent per year an average since 1980. A rapid increase in China’s weight and 
influence in world economy have accompanied this. In 2005, China’s GDP amounted 
to US $ 2,200 billion, or 5.5 percent of world GDP. This is more than three times the 
level in the world total. The Chinese GDP amounted to 1.5 percent of the total. The 
Chinese economy now ranks four that world level, behind the US, Japan and 
Germany and ahead of the UK and France. In terms of foreign trade, Chinese exports 
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accounted for 7 percent of total world exports in 2005, behind the US (9.5 %) but 
ahead of Japan (5 %). Thus, China’s economic expansion has mixed consequences on 
social development.  
 This formidable growth has been accomplished by a very significant 
improvement in living standards. Since the 1990s, China has claimed in places in the 
Human Development Index (HDI) ranking to 85 in 2005. In 25 years, average per 
capital purchasing power has been multiplied by 4.5 (in dollars at nominal exchange 
rates) and by a factor of sector of seven (in dollars at purchasing power parity). At the 
same time as wealth has increased poverty has declined dramatically. 
 Based on the official criterion i.e. a minimum energy intake of 2,100 k cal per 
day, the number of poor people in rural area has dropped from 260 million in 1978 to 
85 million in1990, and to 28 million in 2003. The World Bank’s estimates are two 
times higher than the official government figures. Despite the differences in estimates, 
the downward trend in poverty since economic reform was introduced in 1978 in 
disputable. 
 Poverty reduction was above all concentrated in the first five years following 
the launch of reforms. During this period, reform focused on agriculture with the de-
collective vision of agricultural production, equitable land distribution and a certain 
freedom in terms of the choice of crops. Reforms were substantially implemented in 
industry and foreign trade. While these have been successful in economic terms, they 
appear to have been less successful in reduction poverty that the first phase. 
 In addition, the reduction in poverty has not been evenly spread across the 
country. Poverty is greater in inland areas than in costal areas, which were the main 
beneficiaries of liberalization. Poverty has almost disappeared in urban areas since the 
mid 1990’s but still concerns around 10 percent of the rural population which appear 
to have received a smaller share of the benefits of China’s strong economic growth?  
2.3.6 Education 
 Progress was made in education development, which is a national priority. The 
goal of making nine-year compulsory education generally available and basically 
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eliminated illiteracy among young and middle-aged adults are realized in an 
additional 83 countries. Reform of the mechanism to guarantee funding for 
compulsory education and middle school students in 2006. Each elementary school 
student paid 140 Yuan less an average and middle school student 180 Yuan. A total of 
37.3 million students from poor rural families in the central and western regions 
received free textbooks and 7.8 million rural students living on campus were provided 
with living allowances. A fund of 4 billion Yuan from the central government budget 
was invested to support the building of 2,858 boarding schools and facilities for 
providing modern distance learning at 85,800 elementary and middle schools. A 
further 2.85 billion Yuan from the central government budget was allocated to fund 
the construction of 321 practice laboratories for vocational education, 28 
deconstruction vocational college, 478 secondary vocational schools and country level 
vocational education centers. The secondary gross enrollment ratio reached 59 percent 
and the tertiary gross enrolment ratio 22 percent. 
 Further improvement in the public health system and family planning was 
made last year. Funds totaling 2.7 billion Yuan from the scale of Treasury bond and 
1.7 billion Yuan from local government were pumped into infrastructure development 
of 5,436 town and township health clinics and 672 country level hospitals; Chinese 
medical hospital and maturity and child-care centers. 
 A community based health service network covering all big and medium sized 
citied across the country were established. People received more real benefits in 2006. 
Per capita, net income of rural residents and per capita disposable income of urban 
residents grew by 7.4 percent and 10.4 percent respectively in real terms. The urban 
workforce expanded by 11.84 million, and urban registered unemployment at the end 
of the year stood at 4.1 percent. A system to provide basic cost of living allowances to 
rural residence was introduced in 25 provinces, autonomous region and municipalities 
directly under the central government. A number of small infrastructure projects were 
built in poverty stricken area to create jobs and replace assistance allowances. 
Inspections were conducted of the prices of products and services such as electricity, 
grain, fertilizers, drugs, refined oil and real state as well as charges levied on farmers 
and enterprises, educational fees, medical charges and taxi fares. 
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2.4 CONCLUSION 
 There are mainly three set of forces affecting the Chinese reform process in 
the early 21st century. The role of government which is by and large positive in 
initiating reform in state enterprises and the banking system, and in promoting foreign 
trade and investment. It also allows privatization to take place in Agriculture 
Township and Village Enterprises to develop. For economist who believes in limiting 
the role of government in market economy, the experience in China confirms the 
important role of government in carrying out institutional reform and implementing 
economic policies to deal with crisis. Private enterprises and foreign investments are 
important components of such forces in China. After its joining WTO have added 
impetus in that direction. 
 For almost two decade of continued economic growth and reform had been the 
too most important characteristic of the Chinese economy. Reform of banking system 
and state enterprises remained to the most important task facing the Chinese 
government. In case the Asian financial crisis let to a re-examination of existing 
economic revolution that will benefit the outcome of reform in the long run. Although 
China has become essentially a market economy to anticipate and access the future 
economic policies it has been attempting to understand them in a pragmatic way 
whose objective will be to improve the market economy of China. It took that 
economy will continue to grow rapidly in the next decade two because of the 
resourcefulness of the Chinese people.  
 One might call the Chinese economic as bureaucratic market economy is 
socialist market economy. The state owned institution, including the commercial 
banks and the state enterprises are controlled and run by bureaucrats. The non state 
enterprises both domestic and foreign have to deal with bureaucrats in the 
government, and sometimes also in the state sector to conduct their business. Both 
institutional characteristic hamper the growth of the Chinese economy and are 
unlikely to change in the near future. 
 Reforms process includes housing reform, labor mobility in the formation of 
human capital, the banking and financial, sector SOEs, the non state sector, foreign 
trade and foreign investment, legal reform and education. In the mean time a two tire 
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price system was introduce to allocate scare resources formally under the control of 
central planning including material inputs to state enterprises and foreign exchange. 
 Becoming a member of WTO in December 2001 China attached more 
importance to redefining the roles and responsibilities of government and making 
transformation accordingly. This comprises economic tuning up and regulation at 
macro level market monitoring and supervision, social control and management and 
public services delivering. WTO membership also posed challenges to China financial 
system (Banking and Insurance sector) and many industries like agriculture, 
automobiles, Information Technology and Telecom. China needs a stock market that 
is to encourage people for investment and to dispose of state assets to fund their social 
liabilities. All these efforts have let to some improvement in transparency, efficiency, 
corporate governance and share holder value which will lead to higher investor in 
fascinating the privatization and reform process. In fact the leadership with its long 
standing practice may help to explain the beginning of the preparation process. But 
there are two aspect which may be, have not yet attracted enough attention especially 
in view of their implications not only for the future evaluation of the country but also 
with respect to China being fully able to fulfill its role and obligations in contest of 
WTO. 
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Chapter - 3 
GROWTH IN CHINA’S TRADE 
 
3.1 HISTORICAL PRESPECTIVE 
 With the abandoning of the Maoist legacy of self-sufficiency and import 
substitution in favor of a policy of 'openness' that has encouraged foreign trade and 
investment since the late 1970s, China has become one of the most dynamic 
trading countries in the world. Total value of foreign trade grew from US $ 21 
billion in 1978 to US $ 237 billion in 1994, a spectacular ten-fold increase. Actual 
direct foreign investment into China grew from nil to US $ 33.8 billion over the 
same period of time. China has now become firmly integrated into the world 
economy with its trade dependence ratio (share of total value of foreign trade in 
the total national output) having increased to over 30 per cent in 1994, a figure 
which is much higher than what would be expected for a large country. 
 The rapid increase in foreign trade and investment was due to successful 
reforms of China's economic and foreign trade systems. Economic reform has 
led to increases in productivity (through better allocation of economic resources 
and improvement in efficiency) and hence to a higher growth rate of the Chinese 
economy. Real GNP has quadrupled since 1978 providing an increasing amount of 
products for export and creating both an increasing capacity and an ever growing 
need for imports. Reform of the foreign trade system has led to an improvement in 
institutional supporting systems for foreign trade and an incentive framework. 
 Despite the fact that much has been achieved in reforming China's foreign 
trade system, China still has a long way to go in replacing direct administrative 
intervention with ice-based instruments for managing its trade policy, particularly 
with respect to imports. Trade liberalization has now become one of the top 
priorities in the marketization of the Chinese economy. China has become a much 
more important player in the international economy and trade since reform and 
opening began in 1979. This raises an important issue about the need for China to 
undertake further reform in its economic and foreign trade system in order to 
advance its credentials in the international trading community. It also raises a 
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related issue about the need of investment of efforts by the international trading 
community in the accommodation of internationally-oriented growth in China. In 
fact, these two issues are inter-related as the accommodation of China's growth by 
legitimating China's status in the World Trade Organization (WTO) will put 
pressure on, and provide assurances for, the continuing economic and trade reform 
in China. 
 Asia-Pacific countries have also become a more important source of 
Chinese imports. Within the Asia-Pacific economies, Japan has the largest share 
of China's total imports, but that share has tended to fluctuate considerably and 
trend downwards since the mid 1980s. The large drop in imports from Japan 
reflects the sharp rise of the yen and the resultant shift in the import source of 
producers' goods from Japan to "Other APEC". The US share of Chinese imports 
remained quite stable at around 12 per cent during the past decade. Unlike 
exports, Hong Kong has been a much less important source of Chinese imports, 
accounting for only 8.2 per cent in 1994. Chinese imports from Australia 
increased from US $ 1.1 billion in 1980 to US  $ 2.5 billion, but Australia's share in 
Chinese imports decreased from 5.3 per cent to 2.1 per cent over the same period. 
This indicates that Australian exporters were outperformed by exporters from other 
countries. 
 One important development in China's bilateral trade relations since 1990 
has been a shift in China's trade with the US from a deficit into a surplus. 
According to Chinese figures, China's trade surplus with US reached US $ 7.5 
billion in 1994. The US figures put this number even higher, at US $ 30 billion. 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, booming foreign direct investment (FDI) has 
become an important factor behind the successful expansion drive of China’s 
foreign trade. Foreign direct investment, both pledge and actual, has grown 
rapidly in recent years. The growing FDI has greatly improved China’s export 
performance through the provision of new technology and marketing skills. 
During 1990-94, the share of exports from firms, in which there was foreign 
investment, in the total value of the country’s exports rose from 17.4 per cent 
to 28.4 per cent. There is a higher import intensity (imports as a share of total 
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output) of firms in which there is foreign investment. FDI has also contributed 
significantly to the growth of imports in recent years. 
 On the whole, China's economy has become increasingly open. This can be 
seen not only in the increasing share of foreign trade in China's gross national 
product (GNP) but also in the growing importance of China in the world's total 
trade. Growth in foreign trade has been faster than that in GNP resulting in an 
increase in China's trade dependence ratio. The real trade dependence ratio went up 
from 15 percent in 1978 to over 30 per cent in 1994, with imports accounting for 
15 percent. In 1994, China's share of the world's total imports reached 2.7 per cent 
compared with less than 1 per cent in the late 1970s. 
 One question is whether the momentum of growth in China's foreign trade will 
continue in future. Lau predicts that the share of exports in GNP will fall in future 
because the world economy will have some difficulty in adjusting to a continued 
rapid expansion of China's exports and there is a scope to increase the relative 
importance of internal demand. However, this view is challenged by Garnaut and 
Huang who argue within an effective, rule-based international trading system, and with 
continued trade liberalization in the framework of the Uruguay Round settlement, China's 
foreign trade will continue to grow more rapidly than output. Although the average trade 
growth rate of the reform era so far might reasonably be considered an upper limit to future 
growth.  
 Applying this upper limit for growth rate, Garnaut and Huang estimate 
that China's share in the world's trade of goods and non-factor services would 
increase from 1.6 per cent in 1990 to 2.9 per cent in 2000, and would increase as 
5.3 per cent in 2010. Garnaut and Huang further show that the challenge which 
China poses for adjustment in industrialized economies would be no greater than 
that which has already been faced in the rise of Japan in the 1960s or the newly 
industrialized economies (NIEs) in the 1970s.Garnaut and Huang's view is 
supported by Drysdale and Song whose argument is, however, based on an 
understanding of the nature of industrialization in the East Asian economies. 
Drysdale and Song stated: 
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 “Chinese economic modernization is not an independent event. In all major East 
Asian economies, domestic market growth as well as openness to international market 
disciplines has been key elements in the development of dynamic comparative advantage 
and internationally competitive economies. China is far from reaching its full potential 
in the development of externally oriented activities and will continue to realize 
significant gains through trade, investment and technology flows and integration into the 
international economy.” 
 In sum, despite the large size of its domestic market, foreign trade 
appears now to have become the main engine of growth for China and will 
continue to be so for some time to come. Therefore, trade policy within and 
outside China is critical to the growth prospects for China's foreign trade and 
economy. 
3.2 TRENDS IN CHINA’S FOREIGN TRADE 
 Prior to 1978, foreign trade was not a significant part of China’s economy. 
However, as a key component of the 1978 economic reform program, the government 
sought to attract foreign investment to China and develop foreign trade. Since then, 
foreign trade has become an increasingly important part of People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) economy. Imports provide China with advanced technologies and 
equipment, which China needs to modernize its economy, and equipment, as well as 
increased employment opportunities. Although overall foreign policy is formulated by 
the central government, the local government and enterprises have enjoyed autonomy 
in conducting foreign trade activities. China’s trading over 200 countries and regions 
throughout the world. 
 China’s foreign trade has grown significantly since 1978 in both value and in 
the range of products traded. Overall foreign policy is formulated by the central 
government. However, local governments and enterprises enjoy increasing autonomy 
in conducting foreign trade activities. Individuals and privately owned enterprises can 
now import and export further enhanced its trade relationships with other countries 
and regions. 
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 China’s entry into World Trade Organization (WTO) on December 11th 2001 
further promoted the trade. China’s total foreign trade volume increased from US $ 
1,154.6 billion in 2004 to US $ 1,421.9 billion in 2005. China’s export in 2005 
increased by 28.4 % to US $ 762 billion and its import increased by 17.6 % to US $ 
660 billion, each as compared with 2004. 
 As a result of rapid industrial growth and the inflow of foreign capital, 
manufactured goods have become China’s major exports in recent years. The 
composition of import has also changed in recent years as import of manufactured 
goods has steadily out paced imports of primary goods. 
3.2.1.  CHINA’S SHARE IN WORLD TRADE 
Table 3.2.1 
Growth of China’s Trade 
Unit: RMB/USD 100 Million % 
CHINA'S TRADE 
Export Import 
Volume Volume 
Year China's 
GDP in 
RMB 
World 
Trade 
USD 
RMB USD 
Rank 
in 
world 
% in 
GDP 
% in 
World RMB USD 
% in 
GDP 
% in 
World 
1980 4518 19906 271 181 26 6.00% 0.90% 299 200 6.60% 1.00% 
1981 4862 19724 368 220 19 7.60% 1.10% 368 220 7.60% 1.10% 
1982 5295 18308 414 223 17 7.80% 1.20% 358 193 6.80% 1.10% 
1983 5935 18078 438 222 17 7.40% 1.20% 422 214 7.10% 1.20% 
1984 7171 19019 581 261 18 8.10% 1.40% 621 274 8.70% 1.40% 
1985 8964 19277 809 274 17 9.00% 1.40% 1258 423 14.00% 2.20% 
1986 10202 21157 1082 309 16 10.60% 1.50% 1498 429 14.70% 2.00% 
1987 11963 24969 1470 394 16 12.30% 1.60% 1614 432 13.50% 1.70% 
1988 14928 28382 1767 475 16 11.80% 1.70% 2055 553 13.80% 1.90% 
1989 16909 30361 1956 525 14 11.60% 1.70% 2200 591 13.00% 1.90% 
1990 18548 34700 2986 621 15 16.10% 1.80% 2574 534 13.90% 1.50% 
1991 21618 35300 3827 71.8 13 17.70% 2.00% 3399 638 15.70% 1.80% 
1992 26638 37000 4676 849 11 17.60% 2.30% 4443 806 16.70% 2.20% 
1993 34634 36870 5285 917 11 15.30% 2.50% 5986 1040 17.30% 2.80% 
1994 46759 41683 10422 1210 11 22.30% 2.90% 9960 1156 21.30% 2.80% 
1995 58478 50200 12452 1488 11 21.30% 3.00% 11048 1321 18.90% 2.60% 
1996 67885 52540 12576 1511 11 18.50% 2.90% 11557 1388 17.00% 2.60% 
1997 74463 55364 15161 1828 10 20.40% 3.30% 11807 1424 15.90% 2.60% 
1998 78345 53750 15232 1837 9 19.40% 3.40% 11626 1402 14.80% 2.60% 
1999 82068 53595 16160 1949 9 19.70% 3.60% 13737 1657 16.70% 3.10% 
2000 89404 63640 20635 2492 7 23.10% 3.90% 18638 2251 2.080% 3.50% 
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Sources: China Foreign Economic and Trade Statistical Yearbook, various years. 
  
                      Table 3.2.1 clearly reveals that one direct outcome of China’s 
economic reform is the expansion of China’s trade with the rest of the world. External 
trade has become a very important element of China’s economy. During the past 20 
years, China’s total trade increased from US $ 38 billion in 1980 to more than US $ 
474 billion in 2000. In 1980, China’s export and import account for 0.9 % and 1% of 
world total in 1980. The importance of China’s as a large trading nations had been 
growing steadily. In 2000, the figures are 3.9 % and 3.5% of world trade, respectively. 
China is the world number 7 largest exporter in 2000, up from number 26 in 1980. At 
the same time, trade also becomes increasing important as a percentage of China’s 
GDP. In 1980, the ratio of export and import in GDP are 6.0 5 and 6.6% respectively. 
In 2000, they increased to 23.1% and 20.8%. 
 
Table 3.2.2 
The share of China in the world trade 
Export Import Year World 
Trade China's 
Trade 
China's 
% 
World 
Trade 
China's 
Trade 
China's %
2005 761953 130283 5.84 659953 135084 4.88 
2006 969380 148853 6.51 791605 153651 5.15 
2007 1015100 122137 8.31 796900 123670 6.44 
Sources: China Foreign Economic and Trade Statistical Yearbook, various years. 
                      At insight at Table 3.2.2 reveals that during 2005 to 2007 China’s export 
and import increased at an average 1.4 % and 1.32 % of the world total next only to 
South-East Asia, Central-East Europe recorded the strongest growth in 1994.After the 
peak of 1990, their economies had been running down-hill and only in 1994 they 
recorded sharply the strongest growth in imports, brining them to the 1990 level of 11 
% spurred by the import demand and high share of intra regional trade of Asia, 
alongside Japan, the major player is China. It shows that the phase of that China’s 
trade growth is a regular occurrence. 
GROWTH IN CHINA'S TRADE
 
 
China's Integration into Global Trading System and Its Implications for India 
87
Table 3.2.3 
China's Export Ratio and Trade Balance, 1980-2002 
Year Export/GDP(A) Export value 
(US billion) 
Import value 
(US balance) 
Trade balance 
1980 6 181.2 108.9 -11.4 
1985 9 273.5 422.5 -149 
1990 16.1 620.9 533.5 87.4 
1991 17.7 719.1 637.9 81.2 
1992 17.6 849.4 805.9 43.5 
1993 15.3 917.4 1039.6 -122.2 
1994 22.3 1210.1 1156.2 53.9 
1995 21.3 1487.9 1320.8 167 
1996 18.5 1510.5 1388.3 122.2 
1997 20.4 1827.9 1423.7 404.7 
1998 19.4 1837.1 1402.4 434.7 
1999 19.7 1949.3 1657 292.3 
2000 23.1 2492.1 2252 241.1 
2001 23 2661.5 2436.1 225.4 
2002 26.1 3256 2951 305 
Sources: China Foreign Economic and Trade Statistical Yearbook, various years. 
 When the Chinese government introduced its reform and opening up policy in 
1978, China’s foreign trade level was quite low, with the value of total trade only US 
$ 36 billion. After twenty-five years, China now stand’s as a world trading power. In 
2003, the total trade value reached over US $ 700 billion dollar. The China’s exports 
rose from 1 percent of the world total in 1978, to over 5 percent today. During this 
time the ratio of exports to GD steadily increased from a low level of 6 percent in 
1980 to a high level of over 25 percent in 2002. One direct consequences of the rapid 
export expansion has been the growth of foreign exchange reserves. As shows China 
has maintained a trade surplus throughout the time since 1994. In 2003, the trade 
surplus reached US $ 30 billion, and foreign exchange reserves exceeded US $ 300 
billion, next only to Japan. The RMB has remained stable since a sharp devaluation 
in 1994. China has achieved a successful transition from foreign exchange shortage 
to surplus. Until 1901, China's, foreign trade had been conducted mainly by domestic 
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enterprises. Among domestic enterprises, the role of Township and Village Enterprises 
(TVEs) had steadily increased since the middle of the 1980s. From 1992 onwards, the 
proportion of  FIEs in China's foreign trade rapidly increased, reaching over 50 percent by 2003. 
In the meantime, the proportion of TVEs witnessed a sharp decline, while the proportion 
of state-owned enterprises remained basically unchanged. 
Table 3.2.4 
China’s Merchandise World Trade, 1979-2005 
(Unit- $ billion) 
Year Exports Imports Trade balance 
1979 13.70 15.70 -2 
1980 18.10 19.50 -1.4 
1981 21.50 21.60 -0.1 
1982 21.90 18.90 2.90 
1983 22.10 21.30 0.80 
1984 24.80 26.00 -1.1 
1985 27.30 42.50 -15.3 
1986 31.40 43.20 -11.9 
1987 39.40 43.20 -3.8 
1988 47.60 55.30 -7.7 
1989 52.90 59.10 -6.2 
1990 62.90 53.90 9.00 
1991 71.90 63.90 8.10 
1992 85.50 81.80 3.60 
1993 91.60 103.60 -11.9 
1994 120.80 115.60 5.20 
1995 148.80 132. 1 16.70 
1996 151.10 138.80 12 
1997 182.70 142.20 40.50 
1998 183.80 140.20 43.60 
1999 194.90 165.80 29.10 
2000 249.20 225.10 24.10 
2001 266.20 243.60 22.60 
2002 325.60 295.20 30.40 
2003 438.40 412.80 25.60 
2004 593.40 561.40 32.00 
2005 762.00 660.10 101.90 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics, and official Chinese statistics. 
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 A close look at Table 3.2.4 demonstrates that economic reforms have 
transferred China into a major trading power. Chinese exports rose from $ 14 billion 
in 1979 to $ 762 billion in 2005, while imports over this period grew from $ 16 billion  
to $ 660 billion in 2005. In 2004, China surpassed Japan as the world’s third-largest 
trading economy (after the United States and Germany). China’s trade continues to 
grow dramatically: From 2002 to 2005, the size of China’s exports and imports more 
doubled. In 2005, exports and imports rose by 28.4 % and 17.6 % respectively. 
China’s trade surplus, which totaled $ 32 billion in 2004, tripled to $ 102 billion. 
 Data for the first three months of 2006 indicate that China’s rapid trade growth 
is continuing, although at a slight slower pace than 2005 levels. During this period, 
exports and imports rose by 26.6 % and 24.8 %, respectively over the same period in 
2005.  
3.2.2 Structure and Direction of China’s Foreign trade 
 The rapid expansion of China’s foreign trade has been accompanied by a 
significant shift in the commodity structure which was more in line with China’s 
relative resource endowment. China’s exports was more concentrated on lab our 
incentive products such as textile and clothing products, in which China has a 
distinctive comparative advantage. During 1978-92, the share of lab our intensive 
products rose from 31.3 percent to 55.7 percent mainly at the expensive of exports of 
agricultural and mineral intensive products. China’s import trade is dominated by 
capital intensive products in which China has a comparative disadvantage. The pattern 
of China’s foreign trade indicates that China has now been following a typical 
‘export-led growth’ path many developing countries have already taken. 
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Table 3.2.5 
China's trade by partner 
(Unit- million US $) 
1980 1985 1990 1994 Export 
Value Share% Value Share% Value Share % Value Share%
Japan 4,032 22.3 6,109 22.3 9,011 14.5 21,573 17.8 
U.S 983 5.4 2,352 8.6 5,179 8.3 21,461 17.7 
Hong Kong 4,401 24.3 7,206 26.3 26,650 42.9 32,365 26.7 
Australia 224 1.2 187 0.7 455 0.7 1,489 1.2 
Other APEC 1,319 7.3 3,581 13.1 5,411 8.7 11,132 9.4 
APEC Total 10,959 60.5 19,435 71 46,706 75.2 88,200 72.8 
E.U 2,135 11.8 2,367 8.7 5,830 9.4 14,580 12 
Rest of world 5,025 27.7 5,562 20.3 9,555 15.4 18,258 15.2 
Total Import 18,199 100 27,364 100 62,091 100 121,038 100 
Japan 5,169 25.8 15,035 35.6 7,588 14.2 26,321 22.7 
U.S 3,830 19.1 5,090 12 6,588 12.3 13,970 12.1 
Hong Kong 1,253 6.3 4,797 11.4 14,258 26.7 9,488 8.2 
Australia 1,063 5.3 1,134 2.7 1,354 2.5 2,450 2.1 
Other APEC 867 4.3 2,781 6.6 7,104 13.3 23,505 20.4 
APEC Total 12,182 60.9 28,837 68.3 36,892 69.2 75,734 65.5 
E.U 2,726 13.6 6,390 15.1 8,350 15.7 16,939 14.6 
Rest of world 5,109 25.5 7,025 16.6 8,103 15.2 23,020 19.9 
Total 20,017 100 42,252 100 53,345 100 115,693 100 
Notes: EU refers to EU12. EU for 1980 covers France, West Germany, Italy and U.K. only.  
Sources: Statistical Yearbook of China, various issues; China's Customs Statistics, December 1994.  
 
 Table-3.2.5 indicates that changes were also observed in China’s export and 
import destination in the case of export markets. Asia-Pacific countries as a group 
have become a more important destination for Chinese exports with their share having 
increased from 60.5 percent in 1980 to 72.0 percent in 1994. Within that group, Hong 
Kong was the most important export destination for China, but a substantial portion of 
exports of Hong Kong are re-exported (about 60 percent since the 1990s). Japan’s 
share of China’s total exports has declined in China’s total exports has increased since 
the mid 1980s but the absolute value has remained relatively small. The issues 
GROWTH IN CHINA'S TRADE
 
 
China's Integration into Global Trading System and Its Implications for India 
91
covered by this survey have important policy implications for Australia. Bilateral 
trade between Australia and China rose from US $ 1.29 billion in 1980 to US $ 3.9 
billion in 1994, with China becoming a more important destination for Australia’s 
exports. But Australia’s share of total Chinese imports declined over the same period, 
reflecting in part the fact Australia’s export are largely based on primary commodities 
whose real price has showed a declining trend and whose trade policy, and in parts, 
the trade restrictions imposed by China on such commodities as wool in which 
Australia has a distinctive comparative advantage. It is important that Australia ensure 
China makes a firm commitment to reduce this trade restriction as part of its 
negotiations for accession to the WTO. 
TABLE 3.2.6 
China’s top five trading partners: 2005 
(Unit: $ billion) 
Country Total 
trade 
Chinese
Exports
Chinese
imports
China's 
Trade balance
Trade 
Balance as  
Reported by Partner
Hong Kong 246.80 124.50 122.30 2.20 -4.7 
European Union 219.30 143.70 75.60 68.10 -132 
United States 2116 162.90 48.7 1142 -201.6 
Japan 184.50 84.00 100.50 -16.5 -28.5 
'ASEAN* 1 130.40 55.41 75.01 -20 N/A 
Sources: Official Chinese trade data and Global Trade Atlas. 
Note: Chinese data on its bilateral trade often differ substantially from the official trade data of other 
countries on their trade with China. 
* Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member countries are Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar (Burma), and Vietnam. 
 
 An analysis of Table 3.2.6 shows that China’s trade data often differ 
significantly from those of its major trading partners. This is due to the fact that a 
large share of China’s trade (both export and import) passes through Hong Kong 
(which reverted back to Chinese rule in July 1997 but is treated as a separate customs 
area by most countries, including China and the United States). China treats a large 
share of its exports through Hong Kong as Chinese exports to Hong Kong for 
statistically purposes, while many countries that import Chinese product through 
Hong Kong generally attribute their origin to China for statistical purposes. According 
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to Chinese trade data, its top five trading partners in 2004 were the European Union 
(EU), the United States, Japan, Hong Kong, and the 10 nations that constitutes the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). China’s largest export markets 
were the United States, Hong Kong, and the EU, while it’s top source for imports 
were Japan, the EU, and Taiwan (the United States ranked sixth). US trade data 
indicate that the importance of the U.S market to China’s export sector is likely much 
higher than is reflected in Chinese trade data based on U.S data on Chinese export to 
the United States (which, as noted, do not agree with Chinese data). And Chinese data 
on total Chinese exports, it is estimated that Chinese export to the United States as a 
share of total Chinese export grew from 15.3 % in 1986 to 32.0 % in 2005. 
 A growing level of Chinese exports is from foreign- funded enterprises (FFEs) 
in China. According to Chinese data, FFEs were responsible for 58 % of Chinese 
exports in 2005, compared with 41 % in 1996. A large share of these FFEs are owned 
by Hong Kong and Taiwan investors, many of whom have shifted from labor 
intensive, export-oriented, firms to China to take advantage of low-cost labor. A 
significantly share of the product made by such firms is likely exported to the United 
States. 
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Figure 3.2.1: Foreign Trade 
Source: World Bank (2001) and author's calculations based on data from this source. 
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 As shown in figure 3.2.1, one of the most remarkable features of the post-
reform economic performance of China is the rapid growth in exports. Measured in 
constant Yuan, exports of goods and services grew at an average annual rate of 13.1 % 
from 1978 to 1999. At 12.0% per year on average, imports grew nearly as fast. The result 
has been a sharp increase in the share of trade in China's GDP. In 1978 imports plus 
exports constituted less than 10% of GDP. Today, the ratio hovers around 40%, 
having come down from nearly 50% in 1994. According to Nordas (2002), in 2000 
China was the world 7th largest exporter, with shares of world merchandise and services 
exports of 4% and 2%, respectively. In terms of imports, China ranked 8th, its share in 
world merchandise imports being 3.5%. It had a share of 2.5% in the world's service 
imports. 
 Foreign enterprises accounted for as much as 52% of imports and 48% of 
exports in 2000 (Nordas 2002). Inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
really took off after 1992, propelled by Deng Xiaoing's strong endorsement of the 
need for reform in his famous tour of the south and the liberalization measures that 
followed in its wake. The country has progressed from being the 16th largest net 
recipient in 1982 to 6th place in 1999. In cumulative terms, China's performance is 
even more impressive. Based on the data in World Bank (2001), I have calculated that 
by 1999 China's cumulative net FDI flows since 1982 (the first year in which there is a 
non-zero entry for China) stood at a staggering 298 billion dollars. Over 1982-99, it 
ranks third overall, only being surpassed by the US and the UK . Among developing 
countries, China is the star performer, having received more than twice the amount of 
the runner-up, Brazil, and three times the net flows going to third-placed Mexico. In 
fact, net FDI to China in this period amounted to more than the combined flows to 
Argentina, Malaysia, Thailand, Chile, South Korea, and Indonesia!  
GROWTH IN CHINA'S TRADE
 
 
China's Integration into Global Trading System and Its Implications for India 
94
Table 3.2.7 
Exports and imports of foreign capital-invested enterprises (FIEs) 1985-2005 
Year Export 
Amount 
(US $100m) 
As % of
Total 
Import 
(US$ 100m)
As % of
Total 
Balance 
(US$100m) 
Balance of China’s
Total foreign trade
(US$100m) 
1985 31.00 1.10% 21 4.97% -18 -149 
1986 5 1.62%` 26 6.06% -21 -120 
1987 12 3.04% 34 7.87% -22 -38 
1988 25 5.26% 59 10.67% -34 -78 
1989 49 9.35%` 88 14.88% -39 -66 
1990 78 12.59% 123 23.09% -45 87 
1991 123 17.12% 169 26.56% -46 81 
1992 174 20.44% 211 26.23% -38 44 
1993 252 27.51% 418 40.24% -166 -122 
1994 347 28.68% 529 45.78% -182 54 
1995 469 31.51%: 629 47.66% -161 167 
1996 615 40.72% 756 54.46% -141 122 
1997 749 40.98% 777 54.59% -28 404 
1998 810 44.07% 767 54.70% 42 435 
1999 886 45.47% 859 51.83% 27 292 
2000 1194 47.93% 1173 52.10% 22 241 
2001 1332 50.06% 1259 51.67%: 74 225 
2002 1693 52.00% 1624 55.00% 69 304 
2003 2403 54.84% 2319 56.17% 84 255 
2004 3386 57.07% 32441 57.81% 141 321 
2005 4442 58.30% 3875 58.71% 567 1020 
Sources: Zhongguo Tongli Nianjian [China Statistical Yearbook], various issues; Wang Luolin (ed.) 
(1997) Report on Foreign Direct Investment in China, Beijing, Economic Science Press. 
 As can be seen from Table 3.2.7 those FIEs have accounted for a rapidly 
expanding share of China's total exports, exceeding 40% from 1996 and 50% from 
2001. Yet, it is also true that FIEs have accounted for an even larger share of total 
imports. For 13 years from 1985 to 1997, FIEs ran a sizeable foreign trade deficit every 
year, quite in contrast to China's overall trade surplus for most years after 1989. 
And, although FIEs have enjoyed trade surplus every year from 1998, such 
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surplus has in most years accounted for only a minor part of the national total. It is, 
of course, noted that parts of the imports by FIEs are production equipment which they 
bring along with their investment. The possible contribution to TFP growth in this regard 
then comes down to two forms: technology transfer to FDI-receiving firms which use the 
imported equipment, and the potential for FIEs to become important net exporters over the 
long term-the latter possible contribution, as noted, did not really material until the very 
recent years. 
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Figure 3.2.2: Exports, Imports, and Trade Balance Share in GDP, 1985-2006 
Note: Trade magnitudes represent goods and non-factor services as reported in the balance of payments in US 
dollar terms. Conversion to common currency units for comparison with GDP is based on the yearly average 
exchange rate value. 
Source: State Administration of Foreign Exchange & National Bureau of Statistics 
 It can be seen from Figure 3.2.2 that economic imbalances have emerged 
forcefully in mid-2000s China in the context of extraordinarily rapid economic growth. 
The imbalance in the trade account shot upward suddenly starting from 2005. Through 
the early 2000's the trade surplus had been modest at around two and a half percent of 
gross domestic product or less (see Figure 3.2.4). But in 2005, it jumped to 5.6 percent 
of GDP and continued to climb to 8.0 percent in 2006. Both exports and imports rose at a 
fast clip in the wake of China's 2001 entry into the World Trade Organization with 
growth of imports actually outpacing that of exports in 2003. But in 2005 import 
growth slowed sharply as export growth pushed on, and the surplus flared open. 
Year Exports Imports
2002 22.0 20.9
2003 32.7 36.9
2004 35.2 35.1
2005 27.6 17.4
2006 26.9 19.8
Growth Rates (%)
% of GDP USD bn 
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 Behind this increase in the trade surplus lays a domestic counterpart in saving 
rising faster than investment. Saving not absorbed in investment at home is directed 
abroad as a net capital outflow, where the counterpart of a net capital outflow is an 
excess of export revenues not spent on imports. In China's case, the capital outflow has 
largely taken the form of mounting foreign reserve asset held by the central bank. This 
accumulation of reserves would be mitigated if Chinese consumer consumers increased 
their demand for goods and services. The increase in domestic consumption demand 
would be by a combination of rising imports and division of resources from production for 
export to production of domestic market. In consequences, the central bank would be 
relieved of having to absorb large rates. 
Table 3.2.8 
China’s processing trade, 1990-2005 
Sources: China Foreign Economic and Trade Statistical Yearbook, various years. 
 Table 3.2.8 provides some figures indicating the actual performance, 
particular note-worthy the production characteristics of China’s processing trade 
 Year Exports Imports Value-added rate
1990  254 188 26.20% 
1991 324 250 22.82% 
1992 396 315 20.39% 
1993 443 364 17.81% 
1994 570 476  16.51% 
1995 737 584  20.80% 
1996 843 623 26.16% 
1997 996 702 29.51% 
1998 1045 686 34.33% 
1999 1109 736 33.64% 
2000 1377 926 32.76% 
2001 1474 940 36.26% 
2002 1799 1222 32.08% 
2003 2419 1629  32.64% 
2004 3280 2217 32.40% 
2005 4165 2740 34.21% 
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since 1990. It is noted that the value-added rate, defined as the ratio of net to 
gross exports, first increased steadily but then has from 1998 onwards ceased to 
further increase. The rate has remained at a  lower level, 34 % both in 1998 and 
2005.This low rate of domestic value-added for a major part of China’s foreign 
trade might have well been significantly responsible for the secular trend of 
deterioration of China’s pursuit of upgrading its industrial structure. And those 
are why the state leadership has been in recent years strongly promoting the 
development of indigenous, independent technological capabilities. 
3.3 TRADE POLICY 
 Reform of foreign trade policy has played an important role in boosting 
China's foreign trade since the late 1970s. The major thrust of trade reform was to 
turn away from a policy of self-sufficiency or an import-substitution strategy 
towards a strategy of export-led growth. 
 China's pre-reform foreign trade regime was an extreme example of import 
substitution. Under that regime, foreign trade was regarded as a necessary evil which 
had no merit in itself and which could not contribute substantially to a viable 
strategy for China's development. The main role of foreign trade was to make up 
for domestic shortages by imports and to smooth out excessive supplies of 
domestic goods by exports within the framework of the national economic plan. 
Foreign trade was heavily controlled by the central government with a very 
limited number of foreign trade corporations (FTCs) allowed to be in the foreign 
trade business. Prices, including the foreign exchange rate, had virtually no role in 
resource allocation. 
 Trade reform has been closely related to broader economic reform in 
China which was initiated in December 1978 at the Third Plenum of the 11th 
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, when Deng Xiaoping 
assumed power. There are two major components in the Chinese economic reform 
program: one is decentralization of economic decision-making power and the other 
is rationalization of prices based on market forces. These two elements, interacting 
with each other, have contributed to the transformation of China's economic system 
from one in which, at the start of the reform period, nearly all economic activities 
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were planned, to one in which the market mechanism now plays a major role in 
determining prices of both consumer and producer goods. Recent reports show 
that as a result of successful economic reform over the past fifteen years the state's 
share of total national output now accounts for less than 50 per cent. In addition, 
over 90 per cent of consumer goods and 85 per cent of producer goods are now 
transacted at prices set by the market. 
 Trade reform has followed basically the same strands of broader economic 
reform. It has involved decentralization of trading rights and restoration of price-
based incentives mainly through reform of the foreign exchange system. 
Decentralization of foreign trade rights: 
 Trade reform in China started with the decentralization of trading rights 
to local authorities, industrial ministries and production enterprises. This also 
has been accompanied by a substantial reduction in the scope of direct foreign trade 
planning. Historically, China's foreign trade was monopolized by only a dozen FTCs 
through a rigid state planning system. However, this situation has changed rapidly 
since 1979 when reform in China's foreign trade system began. By 1986 there were 
already 1200 FTCs in operation. This number was further increased to over 8 000 in 
1994 of which 30 per cent were productive enterprises. In addition, there were 174 
000 foreign-invested enterprises which enjoyed foreign trade rights. Simultaneously 
with the decentralization of trading rights, there was a reduction in the importance 
of the national foreign trade plan. Prior to economic reform, the foreign trade plan 
governed nearly 3 000 export commodities. The import plan was similarly 
comprehensive, covering 90 per cent of Chinese imports. However, after successive 
reductions in the scale of the foreign trade plan over the past fifteen years, the 
number of plan-controlled export commodities has been reduced to 38 and import' 
commodities to 11. For the limited number of commodities which were still subject 
to foreign trade planning, the nature of planning has also changed. Mandatory 
planning was subsided and replaced by guidance or indirect planning which is less 
specific and non-binding. In the process of decentralizing its foreign trade activities, 
the Chinese government has strengthened macro economic control and improved 
the administrative system governing foreign trade, including the implementation 
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of a more rational approach to the regulation of foreign trade through more 
effective management of exchange rates, custom duties, taxes and credits.                                      
Foreign Exchange System: A further element in the reform of China's foreign 
trade system was to provide incentives to firms for engaging in foreign trade. This 
was achieved mainly through the reform of China's foreign exchange system. 
Before the 1980s, there was stringent control of foreign exchange in China. The 
exchange rate had little role in influencing the allocation of resources and 
performed largely an accounting function. under this system, Chinese enterprises 
had little incentive to export. They were paid in domestic currency for the goods 
delivered to foreign trade corporations. The price they received was the same 
regardless of whether goods were sold abroad or at home. Enterprises gained no 
explicit claim to the use of any of the foreign exchange earned. 
 Since 1979, there have been substantial reforms in the foreign exchange 
system in China. Wu, in his analysis of China's foreign exchange regime since 
1979, identified three distinctive stages of reform: the foreign exchange retention 
and adjustment system within the planning framework from 1979 to 1986; the 
planning-market double track system from 1987 to 1993; and unification of foreign 
exchange rates after 1994. 
1979-86: Reforms-within the planning framework : 
 There were two major elements in the reform of the foreign exchange 
system in this period: one was the introduction of a foreign exchange retention 
system and the other was the devaluation of RMB yuan (Chinese currency unit, 
A$1=6.4 RMB yuan in 1994) for trade-related transactions. 
 The foreign exchange retention system was first introduced in 1979. Under 
this system, exporting enterprises and their super ordinate level of government 
administration were allowed to retain the right to use a certain portion of the 
foreign exchange they earned above the level set by the plan But the amount of 
retained foreign exchange was small during this period and its use was heavily 
regulated. 
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 Although the relaxation of foreign exchange control was modest, there was 
substantial devaluation of RMB yuan during this period. In 1981, instead of 
devaluating the official exchange rate, the Chinese government introduced a 
shadow rate known as the Internal Settlement Rate for Trade. This rate was 
calculated from the average cost of earning a US dollar through exports and was 
set at RMB yuan 2.8 to one US dollar"). This represented an 80 per cent de facto 
devaluation as the official rate was only RMB yuan 1.55 to one US dollar at that 
time. The difference between the official and shadow rates, however, had to be 
financed by the government as a subsidy. Initially this subsidy only applied to 
exports but later also to imports because of the lag in adjusting the domestic 
price for importable. The rapid increases in subsidies as a result of growth in foreign 
trade led to successive devaluation of the official rate from 1982. In 1985, the 
official rate merged with the shadow rate. The overall effects of reform on trade in this 
period appeared to be relatively small. This is reflected in a much slower growth 
of foreign trade in this period than the period after 1986. The main reasons for this 
were that reform of the whole economic system was at that time in its early stage 
and planning still dominated the system. Moreover, there was a lack of well-
developed secondary markets, which undermined the effectiveness of the incentive 
system. 
1987-93: Dual foreign exchange system : 
 More market-oriented reforms to China's foreign exchange regime began 
with the formal introduction of a swap market or secondary market in late 1986. 
This was the beginning of the transition from a planned foreign exchange regime 
towards one which was more market oriented. Although there were substantial 
devaluations in the first half of 1980s, the foreign exchange rate in China was 
still overvalued in the mid 1980s. This can be seen in the substantial devaluation 
of RMB yuan on the swap market from 1986. After the introduction of the swap 
market, its importance grew substantially. By 1993, 80 per cent of foreign 
exchange earnings were priced at the swap rate. This clearly indicated that 
market forces had already played a dominant role in determining the foreign 
exchange rate.  
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 At this stage, China continued to apply the foreign exchange retention 
system and to increase retention rates. Considerably higher rates were applied to 
corporations trading in priority sectors - light industries, arts and crafts, clothing, 
machinery, and electronic products - and to open coastal cities and special 
economic zones such as Guangdong, Fujian and Shenzheng. Incentives provided 
by this system for firms to participate in foreign trade were because: (1) the 
emergence of the swap market and the devaluation on that market allowed firms to 
make higher earnings on their exports; (2) the declining importance of the plan in 
the national economy and in foreign trade meant that there were less import 
restrictions, which allowed firms to import technology and raw materials in their 
export-oriented production or to import items which sold well on the domestic 
market and hence allowed them to make even higher returns than those on the 
swap market. 
 The double-track foreign exchange rate is systematically analyzed by Martin 
who shows that the system has the characteristics of an overvalued official rate and an 
undervalued swap rate. An overvalued official rate constituted an implicit tax on 
exports and an undervalued swap rate an implicit duty on imports. Martin simulated the 
effects of depreciation of the official rate by 10 per cent using a Computable General 
Equilibrium (CGE) model of the Chinese economy.  The results show an 
appreciation of the swap rate (6.6 per cent) and dramatic expansion of GNP, trade 
volumes and lab our intensive industries. 
 Despite the shortcomings of the double-track foreign exchange system, reform 
in this period greatly enhanced China's export performance. Within just seven years 
China's total exports tripled, rising from USS31 billion in 1986 to US$92 billion in 
1993. 
After 1994: Foreign exchange rate re-unification :  
 At the beginning of 1994, China took another bold step in reforming its 
foreign exchange regime. The main features of this round of reform included (1) 
unifying the official and market exchange rate by merging the former with the 
latter; (2) abolishing the foreign exchange retention system and replacing it with a 
RMB settlement system for all export earnings; (3) replacing the swap system by 
GROWTH IN CHINA'S TRADE
 
 
China's Integration into Global Trading System and Its Implications for India 
102
an inter-bank foreign exchange market with a system of managed float; and (4) the 
abolition of approval procedures for acquiring and using foreign exchanges for 
current account transactions. 
 Since the unification of the double-track system, the exchange rate for RMB 
has remained basically stable and has even appreciated slightly thanks to 
improvements in the reserve position due to stronger growth in exports (in 1994, 
China's exports grew by over 30 per cent and in the first eight months of 1995 by 37 
per cent) and continuing inflows of foreign capital. 
 The 1994 reform constituted a watershed in China's efforts to bring the 
Chinese currency towards full convertibility. In view of the remarkable export 
performance following unification and achieving a stable unified exchange rate, 
Chinese officials are now talking about achieving full convertibility of RMB yuan by 
the year 2000. 
 One important implication of the 1994 reform is that foreign exchange 
control will no longer be a major instrument for controlling imports. With market 
forces dominating the economy and increasing responsiveness of firms-to price 
signals, other measures (such as quotas and tariffs) will become more important 
factors influencing China's future foreign trade. Past reform of China's foreign trade 
and exchange system has been concentrated on introducing measures to stimulate 
exports. Reform of the import regime, particularly with respect to reduction in trade 
barriers, has remained comparatively neglected and is now taking on some urgency.  
 Since the late 1980s, as a part of China's bid to attain full membership status in 
the GATT and as part of its bilateral trade negotiations with the US, China 
unilaterally undertook several cuts in its import tariffs. In 1991, China reduced 
tariffs on 265 import commodities. Regulatory duties on imports were abolished in 
1992. From December 1993, China adjusted import tariffs on 2,898 commodities, 
reducing the average tariff rates by 9 per cent. 
 Despite these reductions, import tariffs remain high by international 
standards China's 1992 average rate, measured on a trade weighted basis, was equal 
to that of Brazil and was the third highest among the listed countries. 
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 One point worth noting about is that the rate of actual duty collection (total 
tariff revenue divided by total value of imports) is low, at 5.6 per cent. This was 
mainly due to high levels of duty exemption in China. Raw material imports 
which were used inducing export goods were dirty f foreign-funded enterprises 
received a 50 per cent duty concession; a range of imports for priority projects was also 
exempted. However, the duty collection rate cannot be used as an indicator of effective 
protection as the method of calculation biases it downwards. The duty collection 
ratio depends on the commodity import structure as well as on tariff rates. If the low 
proportion of manufactured consumer good imports is caused by high effective tariff 
rates, the calculated duty collection ratio reminds nothing about the true degree of 
protection. An example illustrates this point clearly. It shows the commodity pattern 
of tariff systems in China and some other developing countries. Like many other 
developing countries, China imposes a much higher tariff rate on manufactured 
consumer goods than producer goods. In some cases (for example private passenger 
cars), tariff rates are so high that they sometimes become prohibitive. In the 
extreme case, there could be zero imports. This is obviously a source of bias, if the 
duty collection ratio is used as an indicator for effective protection. 
 On the other hand, price comparison data suggest that there appears to be 
considerable 'water in tariff (which means that tariffs are not binding constraints on 
imports) for many products as Chinese industries in a broad range of import 
categories are globally competitive. While this tariff redundancy indicates that the 
effective protection rate is lower than suggested by the nominal rate, the 
existence of such tariff barriers could become a threat to China's trading partners 
in future. 
 In line with its bid to obtain full WTO membership, China has also made 
some advances in reducing quantitative restrictions. For instance, China abolished 
import licenses and quotas on more than 280 commodities in 1993, reducing the 
number of commodities subject to quantitative restrictions to 1300.36 China 
announced a plan to reduce the number of these commodities to 200 by the year 
2000, but this number is still large. 
 In addition to tariff and quota restrictions, administrative controls are still 
pervasive. The most important method of administrative control is to assign import 
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rights to one or a few FTCs. The World Bank called this process 'canalization'. 
Currently there are 12 categories of commodities subject to canalization, including 
such important items as wheat, fertilizers, rubber, steel products, timber, wool, 
acrylic fiber and cotton. These products accounted for 32 per cent of total imports in 
1993. 
 Although in most cases trading rights are assigned to more than one FTC, it 
is not unusual for FTCs to be in collusion with the government administration. 
This is because canalization gives FTCs import monopolies and FTCs have a 
vested interest in retaining this power by adopting a cooperative approach. 
 In sum, despite substantial decline in trade planning since 1979, China still 
operates a relatively complex trade regime particularly with respect to imports. As 
the importance of import planning has shrunk and foreign exchange control has 
been relaxed, border restrictions and administrative controls stand out as the main 
instruments for controlling imports. The need to have a further reform in China's 
import regime has been recognized by the Chinese government as well as by China's 
major trading partners. 
 The World Bank suggests that China is currently well positioned to 
implement bold measures in the area of import liberalization because of: 
• its comfortable reserve position; 
• the advanced state of price reform; 
• the expanding role of the non-state sector and growing flexibility in 
domestic resource allocation; and 
• evidence of tariff redundancy which implies that cuts in tariffs and non-
tariff barriers (NTBs) will not entail major contractions even in the most 
protected sectors such as textiles and machinery. 
 The World Bank also argues that the early implementation of a bold 
program of import liberalization will contribute to the growing momentum of 
China's drive to become a full member of the international trading community. It 
can also help improve the efficiency of state-owned firms which has been a 
mounting concern. Furthermore, given China's positive outlook on exports and 
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the availability of external capital, including FDI, the favorable balance of 
payments situation leaves much scope for increasing imports. 
 There are signs that China has begun to move in the right direction. China 
had promised at APEC summit in Osaka in November 1995 a sweeping 
reduction in trade barriers from 1996. Under the plan, China will remove quotas 
and licensing on 170 items accounting for more than 30 per cent of the commodities 
now subject to import quotas and licensing requirements. China will also reduce its 
overall tariff level by a margin of no less than 30 per cent. The tariff cuts would be 
applied to more than 4000 of the 6000 items that China imports and would mean 
that the nation's average tariffs will be lowered to about 22 per cent from a current 
35.9 per cent. 
China's entry into the WTO and its role in APEC 
 With deeper integration into the world economy, China has shown a 
strong interest in seeking global and regional economic and trade cooperation 
through mechanisms such as WTO and APEC. 
 China made its formal application for re-joining the GATT (now the 
WTO) on 10 July 1986. WTO membership is desirable for China as it will cement 
non-discriminatory trade relations with its trading partners and give China access to 
a rules-based system of dispute settlement. Since lodging its application for WTO 
membership, China has accelerated reform in its economic and trade system. 
China has also started to proceed unilaterally with its trade liberalization program 
as discussed earlier. 
 China's bid for WTO membership was rejected in December 1994 when the 
United States, leading other members, contested China's claim that it should be 
admitted as a developing country with reduced commitments on the pace and extent 
of trade liberalization. Western nations have insisted that China's accession must be 
based on respect for WTO rules and the achievement of meaningful market access. 
 Failure to enter the WTO was a stunning setback for China as it had put a 
high priority on becoming a founding member of WTO on 1 January 1995. Perhaps 
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more significant is the fact that liberal forces within China which had intended to 
use the WTO-entry as a means of assurance for continuing reforms found 
themselves politically exposed. 
 China now seems to be in no hurry for accession and some voices even query 
the value of membership. Accession to the WTO requires that China make 
substantial concessions in terms of foreign access to its domestic market and this 
could be politicized in the current uncertain political and economic transition 
period. It appears that at present none in the Chinese leadership could risk taking a 
clear stand on the extent of Chinese concessions because of the difficulty of 
building a coalition of support. The current standstill prolonged, could add to 
future uncertainty not only for China but also for the world trading system given the 
increasing impact China now has on world economy and trade. 
 Currently, issues affecting China's accession to the WTO include whether 
special safeguard measures should be applied to Chinese exports, whether 
China should be allowed to protect its infant industries, whether it should be 
mandatory or voluntary for China to join some multilateral agreements such as 
the Government Procurement Agreement and Civil Aviation Agreement, and the 
time period for implementation of new rules on, for example, intellectual property 
rights would be met. However, the key issue in the negotiation of China's membership 
is whether China should be admitted to the WTO as a developing or developed 
country. 
 There are some major differences in the entry requirements between a 
developing and developed country. Membership based on a developing country 
status means that China has to commit much less in terms of extent and pace of 
trade reform. On the other hand, China's entry based on a developed country basis 
would require a larger extent and faster pace of trade liberalization. But if China's 
admission to the WTO has to be based on a developed country basis, some of the 
entry requirements may simply be impractical. For instance, under the Uruguay 
Round, rules for intellectual property rights are to be strictly enforced, and 
developed countries are committed to meet new requirements within one year. But 
China does not at the moment have the institutions to comply in this 
timeframe. 
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 It seems now critical to define an end point to China's achieving equal 
status within GATT/WTO. The definition of such an end point is by no means 
an easy task as no precedent exists by which to set the standards for China's entry. 
For that reason, Drysdale and his colleagues believe that the resolution of terms of 
entry requires a considerable measure of trust and understanding which will not be 
achieved at the high political level. They propose negotiating a binding 
agreement at the outset, which provides for full membership in the WTO, in 
return for agreement to a protocol based on actual reforms or set out the timetable 
for reforms steps such as further removal of quantitative restrictions to trade. 
 A key argument behind this idea is that China has a good record in terms of 
adhering to international undertakings, so that any agreement to a future program 
of reform towards full compliance with GATT can be expected to be honored' 
Another argument is that in view of the 'gradualist' approach being taken to reform 
of the Chinese economic system and its apparent success in the past, the 
international trading community should allow some time for China to adjust 
its trade policy to the full application of WTO principles. 
 Drysdale and his colleagues believe that locking China into its own self-
declared reform agenda through the negotiations on the terms of entry is an 
important means for assuring continuing economic reform in China and for 
avoiding retrogression towards a costly 'import-substitution' development 
strategy which is the last thing the world trading community wants to see. 
 Alongside efforts made in seeking an early entry into the WTO, China has 
also actively participated in APEC activities. Akira and Hiromi outlined three 
major reasons why China has a special interest in APEC. First, as discussed 
earlier, APEC includes China's major trading partners, covering 73 per cent of 
its exports and 65.5 per cent of imports. The bulk of foreign direct investment also 
comes from the region which was 80 per cent in 1993 (Wu 1994). Second, APEC 
could potentially provide a mechanism for settling trade disputes (currently under 
discussion), even if more limited than the WTO. As China is not yet a WTO 
member, APEC provides an alternative framework for solving trade disputes. 
Third, APEC adopts a 'concerted unilateralism' approach to trade liberalization, 
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which China feels more comfortable with in determining the pace and scope of 
its own trade liberalization. 
 Klintworth notes that China's APEC diplomacy is aimed, in large part, at 
dealing with the US which has been a main obstacle for China's WTO entry. By 
using the tactic of coalition building among most APEC member countries, 
China hopes to moderate America's tough stance on China's WTO entry. Some 
member countries are now suggesting that APEC should play a complementary 
role in defining the terms of China's accession to the WTO, for example, the 
development of the idea that China commits to the rules of the world trading 
system but not need to meet all those rules immediately upon entry while adopting 
a definite timetable for meeting its commitments. 
 In sum, the emergence of China as a large economic power poses a major 
challenge for both global and regional trading communities. China's participation in 
global and regional economic cooperation will greatly affect the world trade 
system. Negotiation of the issues of China's involvement in the world system is 
important to successful management of the adjustments involved, both for China 
and the rest of the world. 
3.4 FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
 FDI is the category of international investment that reflects the objective of a 
resident entity in one economy (“direct investor” or parent enterprise) obtaining of a 
‘largest interest’ in an enterprise resident in another economy (“direct investment 
enterprise). The two criteria incorporated in the notion of “lasting interest” are the 
existence of a long term relationship between the direct investor and the enterprise 
and the significant degree of influence that gives the direct investor an effective voice 
in the management of the enterprise. 
 The concept of lasting is not defined by IMF in terms of a specific time frame, 
and the more pertinent criterion adopted is that of the degree of ownership in an 
enterprise. A direct investment relationship is established when the direct investor has 
acquired 10 percent or more of the ordinary shares or voting power of an enterprise 
abroad. Thus, the IMF threshold is 10 percent ownership of the ordinary shares or 
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voting power or the equivalent for unincorporated enterprise. Direct investment 
comprises not only the initial transaction establishing the FDI relationship between 
the direct investor and the direct investment enterprise but all subsequent capital 
transactions between them and among affiliated enterprises resident in different 
economies. According to the above criteria: 
 Direct Investment enterprises are those in which the foreign direct investor 
owns an amount of shares or voting power that allows him to participate effectively in 
the management of the enterprise or in its control. It explains that “most direct 
investment enterprises are either (i) branches or (ii) subsidiaries that are a rather small 
proportion of the universe”. 
 There could be cases in which a foreign investor controls a company even 
owing a rather small amount of shares or when an investor owns a significant amount 
of shares but does not have an effective voice in the management of the enterprise. 
 FDI  includes as many as twelve different elements, namely; equity capital, 
reinvested earnings of foreign companies, inter company debt transaction including 
short term loans, overseas commercial borrowing (financial leasing trade credits, 
grants, bonds, non-cash acquisition of equity, investment made by foreign venture 
capital investor, earnings data of indirectly-held FDI enterprise, control premium, 
non-competition fee and so on. 
 FDI reflects the objective of objective of obtaining a lasting interest by a 
resident entity in one economy (direct investor) in an entity resident in an economy 
other than that of the investor (direct investment enterprise). The lasting interest 
implies the existence of a long-term relationship between the direct investor and the 
enterprise and a significant degree of influence on the management of the enterprise. 
 The concept of Direct Investment includes the capital funds received by the 
direct investment enterprises from the direct investor. Direct investment involves both 
the initial transaction establishing the relationship between the investor and the 
enterprises. Both incorporated and unincorporated. Direct investment enterprises often 
represent units in a multinational operation, the overall profitability of which depends 
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on the advantage    to be gained by deploying the various resources available to the 
investors in units located in addition to the investment income that may accrue on the 
capital that they invest (e.g. The opportunity to earn management fees or other sorts 
on income). Such extra benefits are likely to be derived from the investors’ 
associations with the enterprises over considerable period of time. 
 The OECD like the IMF also recommends the 10 percent numerical guidelines 
of ownership of ordinary shares or voting sock to determine the existence of a direct 
investment relationship. If the criteria are met, then the concept of FDI includes the 
following bodies: 
• Subsidiaries (in which the non-resident investor owns more than 50 percent). 
• Associated (in which the non-resident investor owns between 10 and 50 
percent) and 
• Branches (unincorporated enterprises, wholly or jointly owned by the non-
resident investor). 
 An important part of the economic reform process in China has been the 
reinforcement of FDI. Investment began to pour into China after 1992, and annual 
inflow have been over 40 billion dollar since 1996. Trending steadily upward, FDI 
inflows were around 70 billion dollars in both 2005 and 2006. These inflows are by 
far the largest of any developing country and have remained remarkably stable despite 
disparities in the Asia and global economies. Inflows to China in 2006 reached an 
calculated  US $ 69 billion, which represented 10 percent of the world FDI flows. 
China’s FDI outflows increased 32 percent over 2005 to US $ 16.1 billion in 2006. It 
traces the development of China’s economic policy in context of FDI the resulting 
changes in both inflows and outflows. The objective is to discuss the determinants and 
the impact of FDI of China’s economic development. It provides an overview of the 
trends and pattern of FDI into and from China with special reference to world, region, 
sector and direction of trade in special economic zones. These reflect some future 
trends of China’s development, and are analyzed in detail separately below. 
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 Numerous studies have been conducted to explain the level of FDI activity in 
China since the reforms in late 70s. From the aspect of conventional microeconomics, 
firm seeking business abroad are motivated by production cost, resource acquisition, 
minimization of competition risk and market penetration. From the location advantage 
aspect FDI is influenced by four categories of factors: and the investment 
environment improving factor: macro economic factors: and the development strategy 
of the host country. As there are international differences in production resources and 
market imperfections of one kind or another, firms move across the borders and 
produce in higher-return countries. Early literature tried to explain FDI at the micro-
economic level in terms of market imperfection, ownership, product superiority, cost 
advantages, economies of scale, multi-plant economies, advanced technology, 
marketing and product distribution. In macroeconomics terms, FDI focused in the 
positive effects of exchange rates, as a depreciated exchange rate lowers the cost of 
production and investment in the host countries. Alternatively explanations for FDI 
have focused on regulatory restrictions, tariffs, quotas, infrastructure quality and 
political stability. FDI in China can be grouped in three categories the most important 
factors that attracted FDI inflow were average wage, labor quality, market size and 
level of infrastructure development location distribution of FDI shows that transaction 
cost, firm size, and quota effects are all significant in the location choice of foreign 
firms. The last category is concerned with the aspect of investors from various 
countries and the motivation behind Western and Asian direct investment direct 
investment are significantly influenced by labor quality and are more sensitive to local 
market demand. 
 Since the late 1970s, Chinese government has pursued policies aiming at 
opening up the economy and attracting foreign participation. FDI inflow in China has 
grown continuously and rapidly at time, from its very low level in the early 1980 to 
over US $ 40 billion annually in recent years. Various preferential treatment offered 
by the Chinese government in different level are no doubt favored by region investors. 
Other factors also contributed to the surge of FDI inflow in China, such as low labor 
cost, growing market potential, and so on. China has become the world second largest 
FDI recipient countries and the largest among developing countries in the late 1990s. 
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3.4.1 Direct Impact of FDI  
 Evidently, FDI brings capital. A sufficient amount of capital has been 
necessary to build-up China’s economy and FDI has made a substantial contribution 
to this. The ratio of FDI to GDP rose to 15 % of domestic gross investment in 1994, 
stayed around 13 % up to 1998 and stabilized around 11% in the necessary to counter 
insufficient domestic saving. Indeed, the current account (which measures the 
difference between domestic saving and investment) has been in surplus for all but 
one year since 1991. Rather, the role of foreign companies has been to use 
management skills and technology, together with local labor, to exports and improve 
the overall productivity of the economy. 
 The creation of employment opportunities-either directly or indirectly-has 
been one of the most prominent impacts of FDI on Chinese economy. The report 
evaluates those foreign firms’ employed around 20 million workers (3 % of China’s 
total employment) at the end of the 1990 FDI has been at the core of China’s foreign 
trade expansion. It has furthermore been a decisive factor in China’s involvement in 
the international segmentation of the production process. OECD (2000) emphasizes 
the role of foreign investment enterprises (FIEs) in the modification of China’s 
industrial structure, the diversification of lob our incentive products export and the 
strengthening of China’s competitive position in rapidly expanding markets an 
important specificity of FIEs is that while investment in Chinese firms is mostly 
devoted to the expansion of production capabilities, FDI incorporates much more 
equipment and technology knowledge. This is consistent with findings of greater 
allocate and technical efficiency in labor utilization in production in FDI firms 
compared to domestic firms. FIEs have improved the overall efficiency with resources 
are used. Their efficiency can be judged from the level of their overall productivity, 
which was over 90 % greater than that of directly controlled state companies (OECD, 
2005). 
 The contribution of some imperfection in the banking sector and state 
investment policies to the inflow of FDI into China, there is some evidence of a FDI 
contingent finance growth relation in China. 
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 FDI can help to alleviate the costs associated with financial distortions, and 
could provide an explanation for why as discussed by Allen (2005). China is a counter 
example to the findings of the finance growth literature, being characterized by 
malfunctioning finance institutions and phenomenal growth rates. 
 There are also concerns that FDI may bring about deter mental effects. Some 
claim that foreign companies can crowd the access to credit of domestic firms. FDI 
can also have a negative impact on the local economy by substituting for domestic 
saving or lending to balance of payment deficits as a result of rising equity repayment 
obligations. 
3.4.2 Inflow and Outflow of FDI in China: 
3.4.2.1: Trends and patterns of FDI 
 Chinese government has formulated a series of preferential policy for the 
growth of FDI. S hare of China in the national volume of investment in capital 
construction during different five year plan periods have estimated each year. A 
comparative analysis has been done with the world economy and China’s FDI growth 
year on year. Summary of results by different statistical sources have been treated as a 
core of study in this section below:                                         
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Table 3.4.1 
FDI in China 1980-2001 
(Unit: US $ 100 million) 
Year Number 
of 
Projects 
Contractual 
FDI 
Realized 
FDI 
Realized/ 
Contractual
Average size 
(realized) 
Average 
size 
(contract)
1980-82 904 4459 1168 26.20% 1.29 4.93 
1983 474 1767 636 36.00% 1.34 3.73 
1984 1856 2619 1250 47.70% 0.67 1.41 
1985 2962 4611 1653 35.80% 0.56 1.56 
1986 1498 2833 1870 66.00% 1.25 1.89 
1987 2233 3670 2305 47.70% 1.03 1.65 
1988 5945 5298 3193 60.30% 0.54 0.89 
1989 5579 5600 3392 60.65% 0.61 1.00 
1990 7273 6596 3487 52.90% 0.48 0.91 
1991 12978 11977 4366 36.50% 0.34 0.92 
1992 48764 58124 11008 18.90% 0.23 1.19 
1993 83437 111436 27515 24.70% 0.33 1.34 
1994 47549 82680 33767 40.80% 0.71 1.74 
1995 37011 91282 37521 41.10% 1.01 2.47 
1996 24556 73278 41726 56.90% 1.70 2.98 
1997 21001 51003 45726 88.70% 2.15 2.43 
1998 19799 52102 46463 87.30% 2.30 2.63 
1999 19846 41238 40398 98.00% 2.04 2.08 
2000 22347 62380 40715 65.30% 1.82 2.79 
2001 370700 711286 378073 53.20% 1.02 1.922 
Sources: Pomfret  (1994) & NBSC, China Foreign Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1991-2002. 
 An insight at Table 3.4.1 clearly reveals that FDI facilitates the Chinese 
transition process. In a similar vein, FDI has improved the reform of the state owned 
enterprises (SOE) form. Directly, foreign enterprises have joined SOE-restructuring 
initiatives through joint ventures (JV) or mergers and acquisitions. Indirectly, FDI 
influenced SOE-reform by the demonstration effects from the operations of FIEs. 
Foreign Companies preferred to minimize their resource and management committee 
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by using flexible arrangements such as contractual joint ventures (CJVs), 
subcontracting and compensatory trade arrangements. As a result of the importance of 
joint explorations (JEs), the average size of FDI projects was not small as companion 
with later stages. FDI in this initial stage was characterized by slow pace, small size, 
and high concentration in terms of source countries and sub-national allocation. More 
than 80 percent of FDI came from Hong Kong, the US and Japan. The location of FDI 
was largely concentrated in the four SEZs in south China. The ratio of realized FDI to 
total FDI increased to 47.3 percent in 2000. The number of projects increased from 
904 in 1982 to 26139 in 2001. This caused 2.03 percent more realized/contractual 
percentage during the same period. Simultaneously the ratio of average size realized 
and contracted shows a variation effect year on year for 1980 to 2001. It indicates that 
countries with high productivity, large market and an advanced structure were eager 
of investigating more in China, and thereby, enjoyed a higher FDI value in 
comparison to other countries.  
Table 3.4.2 
China's Outward FDI Flows in Relation to the World's Total FDI Flows* 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
China's outward FDI flow(US$ Bn) 2.70 2.85 5.50 12.26 16.10 
World's total FDI flow(US$ Bn) 539.50 561.10 813.10 778.70 N.A. 
Percentage (%) 0.50 0.51 0.68 1.57 N.A. 
*The percentages reported in this table are, slightly different from those reported in the Ministry of Commerce's 
Statistical Bulletins from 2003 and 2004. The percentages reported in these bulletins were taken as 
percentages of the world's total FDI flows in the preceding instead of the same years. 
Table 3.4.3 
China's Outward FDI Stocks in Relation to the World's Total FDI 
Stocks by Year End" 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
China's outward FDI stock (US$ Bn) 22.90 33.20 44.80 57.20 73.30
World's total FDI stock(US$ Bn) 7684.10 9046.30 10325.20 10671.90 N.A. 
Percentage (%) 0.29 0.37 0.43 0.54 N.A. 
*The percentages reported in this table are slightly different from those reported in the Ministry of 
Commerce's Statistical Bulletins from 2003, 2004 and 2005. The percentages reported in these bulletins 
were taken as percentages of the world's total FDI stocks in the preceding instead of the same years. 
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 The flow of China’s FDI from 1990 to 2006 is depicted in Table 3.4.2, where 
the data from 1982 to 2001 were based on UNCTAD’s World Investment Report 
while data from 2002 were provided by MOFCOM based on international definitions 
and data collection methods. Despite of the rapid growth of China’s FDI in recent 
years, it shares of the world’s total FDI remained very small. As shown in Table 3.4.3, 
China’s FDI flow in 2002 and 2003 accounted for a miniscule 0.5 %, but it was 
tripled to 1.57 % in 2005. China’s FDI stock over the same period accounted for an 
even smaller percentage of the world’s total FDI stock. As shown in Table 3.4.4. 
China’s global share in 2002 was 0.29 %, and grew to 0.54 % in 2005. 
 By the end of 1996, China’s total stock of FDI outflows was over US $ 18 
billion. It surpassed South Korea (US $ 13.8 billion) and Brazil (US $ 7.4 billion) to 
move up to the number four position among developing economies, behind Hong 
Kong (US $ 112 billion), Singapore (US $ 37 billion) and Taiwan (US $ 27 billion) 
(Cal, 1999, p861). For the period of 1979-93, almost two thirds of China’s FDI was 
found in Asia, including Hong Kong and Macau. The other regions in descending 
order were North America (15 %)Oceania (8 %), Central and Eastern Europe(5%) 
;Africa(2 5% ), Latin America (2%),; Western Europe (2 %) (Cal, 1999, p 864).60 % 
of China’s FDI up to 1994 was in the service sector, mainly to service and promote its 
exports. The remaining FDI was in natural resources (25 %) and manufacturing (25 
%, mainly in textile and clothing, and other labor-intensive industries, located 
primarily in Africa, Asia and Pacific). 
 Hong and Sun (2004), also using UNCTAD’s FDI statistics, reported that the 
stock of China’s outward FDI flow reached about US $ billion by the end of 2002. 
ranked No 6 among 188 developing economies. They found that China’s aggregate 
FDI outflows during 1988-2002 were quite similar to those of South Korea during the 
same period, and to Japan’s FDI, with 40-50 % of shares in the non-trade category, 
was similar to that of South Korea in the 1980’s and that of  Japan in the 1960s and 
1970s. 
 As a matter of comparison, China’s FDI and stocks were not only much 
smaller than those of the world’s major industrial economies, but smaller than some 
small developed economies. For instance, its FDI flow in 2005 at US $ 12.26 billion 
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was more than doubling its flow in 2004, but still below those of Ireland (US 4 12.93 
billion) and Norway (US $ 14.46 billion). When compared with developing 
economies, its flow in 2005 exceeded Singapore (US $ 5.52 billion) for the first time 
in history. China’s FDI stock at the end of 2005 stood at US $ 57.2 billion. As a 
latecomer in outward FDI, this stock was slightly below those of Austria (US $ 67.24 
billion), Brazil (US $ 71.56), and Finland (US $ 74.41), and significantly behind 
Singapore (US $ 110.9 billion) and Russia (US $ 120.42 billion). However, given the 
expectation that China’s FDI flows in the future will continue to grow, its ranking by 
flow and stock can be expected to move up reveals the average share of GDP, trade 
and FDI for each of China’s provinces between 1995 and 2000 (for FDI Figure-3.4.1, 
between 1990-196 and 1995-2000). The GDP volume reveals the economic capacity 
within each province, while trade and FDI statistics represent the level of international 
attachment to the world and assess the economic dynamism of the provinces. The data 
suggest the existence of five spatial clusters, which are either the traditional centers of 
concentration of GDP, trade, and FDI, or areas that have a higher growth rate for 
these indicators than the national average.  
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Figure 3.4.1: FDI inflows to China: 1983-2006 
Source: Sandra Poncet, Inward and Outward FDI in China (Panthéon-Sorbonne-Economie, Université 
Paris 1 CNRS and CEPII), April 28, 2007 
$ billion Source: MOFCOM 
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3.4.2.1.1. Inward FDI 
3.4.2.1.1.1- Inward FDI: trends and policies 
 Over the past decade, China has established itself as the top recipient of FDI 
among developing countries and as the second destination in the world after the 
United States. FDI flows to China have increased massively in recent years, reaching 
an estimated $69 billion in 2006, which represented 10% of world FDI flows 
(UNCTAD, 2006, p. 51). Since economic reforms launching in 1979, China has 
received a large part of international direct investment flows. China decided to accept 
foreign investment in 1978 and broke sharply with socialist orthodoxy in establishing 
SEZs in 1979 and 1980. Nationwide the impact of FDI was moderate until the early 
1990s. As Figure3.4.1 shows, beginning in 1992-1993, the stream of incoming FDI 
turned into a flood. 
 China moved from restrictive to permissive policies in the early 1980s, then to 
policies encouraging FDI in general in the mid-1980s to policies encouraging more 
high-tech and more capital intensive FDI projects in the mid-1990s (Fung et al., 
2004). During the permissive period, the Chinese government established four Special 
Economic Zones (SEZs) in Guangdong and Fujian provinces and offered special 
incentive policies for FDI in these SEZs. While FDI inflows were highly concentrated 
within these provinces, the amounts remained rather limited (Cheung and Lin, 2004). 
After 1984, Hainan Island and fourteen coastal cities across ten provinces were 
opened, and FDI levels really started to take off. The realized value of inward FDI to 
China reached US $3.49 billion in 1990. This kind of preferential regimes policies 
resulted in an overwhelming concentration of FDI in the east. 
 The expected spillover effects from coastal to inland provinces failed to 
materialize. In reaction to the widening regional gap, more broadly-based economic 
reforms and open door policies were pushed forward in the 1990s. In the spring of 
1992, Deng Xiaoping adopted a new approach which turned away from special 
regimes toward more nation-wide implementation of open policies for FDI inflows. 
New policies and regulations encouraging FDI inflows were implemented and 
produced remarkable results. 
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 Since 1992 inward FDI in China has accelerated and reached the peak level of 
US$45.5 billion in 1998. After a drop due to the Asian crisis, FDI inflows into China 
surged again, so that by 2003 China received US $53 billion in FDI, surpassing the 
United States to become the world's largest single recipient of FDI. The peak of $72 
billion recorded in 2005 is partly related to changes in the methodology underlying 
Chinese FDI statistics - for the first time data on Chinese inward FDI include inflows 
to financial industries (UNCTAD, 2006, p51). In 2005, non-financial FDI alone was 
$60 billion, and it registered a slight decline after five years of increase. FDI into 
financial services surged to $12 billion, driven by large-scale investments in China’s 
largest State-owned banks. However, a significant share of China’s inward FDI might 
be the result of round-tripping. FDI to China may be overstated by between 25% and 
50%.2 The United Nations put China’s stock of inward FDI close to $400 billion, 
around 16% and 43% of China’s GDP and Gross Fixed Capital Formation 
respectively. 
3.4.2.1.2-Inward FDI: main features 
 Naughton (2007) emphasizes that three distinctive characteristics have marked 
FDI in China over the past decade and that each of these characteristics reflects the 
dominant role played by the cross-border restructuring of export-oriented production 
networks that originally developed in other, neighboring East Asian economies. The 
first specificity stressed by Naughton (2007) is that foreign direct investment has been 
the predominant form in which China has accessed global capital (as opposed to 
portfolio capital or bank loans). Between 1979 and 2000, China’s actual usage of 
foreign capital amount to more than $500 billion of which more than two third are in 
the form of direct investment (Fung et al., 2004). The second specificity is that an 
unusually large proportion of Chinese FDI inflows are in manufacturing industry, as 
opposed to services or resource extraction. The third specific characteristic of China’s 
FDI inflows is the predominance of other East Asian economies, especially Hong 
Kong, Taiwan and Macao as sources. 
 An additional important feature of China’s FDI inflow is that it is mostly 
concentrated in the eastern coastal regions. For the 11 years from 1993-2003 the 
average annual incoming FDI/GDP ratio was 13% for Guangdong and 11% for 
Fujian. Other open coastal areas include Shanghai, Jiangsu and Beijing. The 
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contractual forms in which FDI is embodied in China have evolved steadily toward 
modes that permit the foreign investor a higher level of control. In the early 1980s, 
FDI was dominated by contractual joint ventures (JVs) and joint development 
projects. After the mid- 1980s, China began to strongly encourage the use of equity 
joint ventures (EJVs), which became the dominant mode of investment4. As China 
evolved toward a market economy, the share of FDI in the form of wholly owned 
subsidiaries of foreign companies has climbed steadily, and in 2005 it accounted for 
two-thirds of total realized FDI inflows. 
 As a consequence, Foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) play a large role in 
China's economy, accounting for 27% of value-added production, 4.1% of national 
tax revenue, more than 58% of foreign trade in 2005, and 88% of high-technology 
exports, nearly all under Export Processing arrangements. Companies from 190 
countries and regions have invested in China, including 450 of the world's Fortune 
500 companies. By the end of 2005, FIEs in China employed more than 24 million 
workers. Manufacturing accounted for 63% of registered foreign capital at the end of 
2005 (see Table 1). To a large extent, this emphasis is explainable in terms of the 
restrictions that China has maintained on foreign entry into the most important service 
sectors (Naughton, 2007). 
 While large proportions of FDI inflows in all developing countries typically 
go to wholesale and retail trade, transport and telecommunications and finance, 
wholesale and retail trade, they are clear underperformers in China. Naughton (2007) 
notes that these three sectors together account for 27% of world developing-country 
inflows (including China) but only 4% of inflows into China itself. In China, by 
contrast, incoming FDI in the service sector is highly concentrated in real estate, 
specifically in property development. This sector accounted for 11% of total 
investment in 2005. The real estate industry has indeed become a hot spot for FDI, 
attracting as high as $9 billion annually in the recent years (UNCTAD, 2007). 
According to SAFE estimates, FDI now accounts for 15% of China's real estate 
market. 
 The high tech sector has just begun to catch up and cross border M&A barely 
took form. In these areas, there is still a large gap between China and developed 
countries. It seems nevertheless that FDI in China’s manufacturing sector is shifting 
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towards more advanced technologies. The number of foreign-invested R&D centers 
has risen to 750 in China by the end of 2005 (UNCTAD 2006, p. 56), with at least 
107 set between October 2004 and September 2005 (Locomonitor, 2005). 
3.4.2.1.2 Outward FDI 
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Figure 3.4.2: FDI outflows to China: 1983-2006 
Source: Sandra Poncet, Inward and Outward FDI in China (Panthéon-Sorbonne-Economie, Université 
Paris 1 CNRS and CEPII),April 28, 2007. 
3.4.2.1.2.1. Outward FDI: trends and policies 
 Although China’s Outward Direct Investment (ODI) is still small in absolute 
terms, especially compared to the huge inward flow, its overseas enterprises have 
been quietly gaining importance as new sources of international capital. As China's 
economy continues to grow and becomes a capital-surplus economy and its policies 
encourage the development of brands that can be considered “national champions”, 
FDI originating from China has been growing at a considerable rate. 
 China’s ODI, excluding the financial sector, reached $16.1 billion in 2006, up 
32 % over 2005. It now represents the fourth largest outflow from developing and 
transition countries. The United Nations put China’s stock of FDI held in other 
countries at $62 billion, around 0.6% of the world total and 3% of China’s GDP. 
$ billion Source: MOFCOM 
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UNCTAD (2006) considers, however, that as many large Mergers & Acquisitions 
(M&A) deals undertaken by Chinese companies are financed outside, China’s 
outward investment may be significantly underestimated. Wong and Chan (2003) 
describe China’s ODI has having undergone four stages of development. During the 
first stage (1979-85) when foreign trade was still under state monopoly and foreign 
investment was under state guide, only state-owned trading corporations as well as 
local enterprises regulated by the State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC) 
were allowed to invest overseas. During that period of time, the scale of the projects 
was small and the total investment was limited amounting around $200 million. 
 During the second stage (1986-1991), the liberalization of restrictive policies 
and the authorization for more enterprises, including non-state firms, to apply for 
permission to establish subsidiaries provided they had sufficient capital and know- 
how and a suitable partner, led to a sharp rise in ODI, reaching $ 200 million 
annually. 
 The third stage (1992-98), witnessed a big surge in local and provincial 
enterprises investing abroad as national- level support for ODI was mirrored at the 
local levels. Annually ODI reached $ 700 million. It appeared that part of the outflows 
engaged in real estate and stock market speculation in Hong Kong and many oversea 
branches suffered from heavy losses and were characterized by nepotistic and corrupt 
management. In a reaction to what Beijing saw as a serious loss of state asset and 
leakage of foreign currency, MOFTEC applied a stricter and more rigorous screening 
and monitoring. 
 This stage corresponds to the consolidation of China’s “going global” strategy. 
The strategy, envisaged in the mid-1990s and formally adopted in 2000, intends to 
promote the international operation of capable Chinese firms with a view to 
improving resources allocation and enhancing their international competitiveness 
(UNCTAD, 2006, p210). The Ministry of Commerce (MOFTEC) is responsible for 
implementing and coordinating of the strategy and encourages ODI through provision 
of information about foreign locations, the granting of incentives and a gradual 
relaxation of foreign exchange controls. It seems that the conjunction of these 
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preferential measures with the successful penetration of Chinese manufactured 
exports into the world market boosted ODI. 
 As a result, an increasing number of Chinese firms are now among the largest 
Transnational Corporations (TNCs) from developing countries, I terms of foreign 
assets: while only seven Chinese enterprises were among the top 50 largest TNCs 
form developing economies in 1994: by 2001, twelve Chinese TNCs were in the top 
50 largest TNCs from developing economies, and as many as six had foreign assets of 
above $ 2 billion (UNCTAD, 2003b). 
3.4.2.1.2.2 Outward FDI: main features 
 Chinese TNCs emerged later than their counterparts in the Newly 
Industrialized Economics (NIEs). The first generation of Chinese TNCs mainly large 
State Owned enterprises operating in monopolized industries such as financial 
services, shipping, international trading and natural resources. Hong Kong (China) 
was usually the first stop along the path of the internationalization of these first- 
generation Chinese TNCs Hong Kong played an important role in giving them 
international experience and training their management team for further 
internationalization and it remains the major location for their “overseas” operations 
(UNCTAD, 2006, P. 130). The second generation of major Chinese TNCs emerged 
after the early 1990s in competitive manufacturing industries, in particular those 
related to electronics and Information and Communication Technologies (ICT). These 
TNCs have diverse ownership structure, including private ownership, local 
government ownership and foreign participation. Selective support policy to these 
firms has been adopted in the recent years. In October 2004, a circular issued by the 
National Development Research Council and the Export- Import Bank of China 
explicitly promotes M&A that could enhance the international competitiveness of 
Chinese enterprises and accelerated their entry into foreign markets through prefential 
credit and accelerated screening process. 
 While mainland shareholding companies and private companies are stepping 
up their investment, large State-owned enterprises account for the bulk of investment. 
By the end of 2005, China’s cumulative FDI abroad had reached $ 57.2 billion, 81% 
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of which was from state-owned enterprises that are directly managed by the State 
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC).Beijing and the 
nation’s coastal cities were the second major overseas investors after the largest SOEs 
under the central government. The top sources of outbound FDI from China were 
coastal and border provinces-specially Fujian, Guangdong, Heilongjing, Jiangsu, 
Shandong, Shanghi, and Zhejiang-which together accounted for 62.5 % of China’s 
outbound FDI. 
 The main activities attracting Chinese investment are business activities, trade 
and mining (40,18and 14 % respectively of total Net ODI in 2005). In recent years, 
FDI in manufacturing has grown especially fast.                              
Table 3.4.4 
Major Foreign Investors in China: 1979-2005 
($ billions and % of total) 
Cumulative Utilized FDI 
Amount 
Utilized FDI in 2005 
Amount 
Country 
($ billion) % of Total ($ billion) % of Total 
Total 620.7 100.0 60.3 100.0 
Hong Kong 259.5 41.8 17.9 29.7 
Japan 53.3 8.6 6.5 10.8 
United States 51.1 8.2 3.1 5.1 
British Virgin 
Islands 
45.9 7.4 9.0 14.9 
Taiwan 41.8 6.7 2.2 3.3 
South Korea 31.1 5.0 5.2 8.6 
Source: Chinese government statistics. Top six investors according to cumulative FDI from 1979 to 2005, 
 Table 3.4.4 evidences that Hong Kong and tax havens, such as the Cayman 
Islands and than British Virgin Island, received 80 % of total Chinese outbound 
investment (and perhaps explaining why these destinations in turn are some of the 
largest sources of “foreign” investment coming back into China). Although Africa 
accounts for a minor share of China’s total ODI, China is now among the top 10 
sources of FDI in Africa. 
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 China’s trade and investment reform and incentives led to a surge in foreign 
direct investment (FDI), which has been a major source of China’s capital growth. 
Annual utilized FDI in China grew from $ 636 million in 1983 to $ 60 billion in 2005. 
The cumulative level of FDI in China stood at about $ 621 billion at the end of 2005. 
Analysts predicted that FDI will continue to pour into China as investment barriers 
are reduced under China’s WTO commitments and Chinese demand for import 
continues to increase. 
 Based on cumulative FDI for 1979-2005 about 42 % of FDI in China has 
come from Hong Kong. In 2005, Japan replaced the United State as second largest 
overall investor in China. The United States ranked third accounting for 8.2 % ($ 51.1 
billion) of total FDI. Other major investors including the British Virgin Island, 
Taiwan, and South Korea. US FDI in China for 2005 was $ 3.1 billion (compared to $ 
3.9 billion in 2004), accounting for 5.1  % of FDI in China for that year, and ranked 
5th after Hong Kong, the British Virgin Island, Japan, and South Korea. 
3.4.3 Regional patterns of FDI : 
 Since the late 1970s, the costal areas of east China have markedly outstripped 
central and west China in the rate of economic growth. Scarity of inbound foreign 
capital in the capital in the central and west regime is a major reason behind this 
situation.Two factors; first the efforts of central and local governments in wooing 
foreign investors by offering better investment environments and most preferential 
policies; second, with China’s accession to the WTO, THE Chinese policy towards 
foreign investment will be so liberal as to allow foreign investors in more fields amd 
more flexible modes of investment. There are several reasons behind the fact that 
Central and West China is trailing way behind East China particularly when FDI 
inflow and outflow are taken into consideration. Major description of FDI 
characteristics of China’s economy by region is illustrated and analysed in this section 
below: 
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Table 3.4.5 
Provincial distribution of FDI in China 
(in million $ US) 
YEAR 1979-
1982 
1990 % 1992 % 1994 % 1996 % 1998 % 2000 %
EASTERN REGION 99.9% 2974 85.5 9802 89.1 29087 86.1 34974 83.8 39490 83.0 35411 87.0
Beijing 7.4 277 7.9 350 3.2 1374 4.1 1553 3.7 2168 4.6 1684 4.1
Tianjin 0.1 35 1.0 107 1.0 1015 3.0 2006 4.8 2114 4.4 1166 2.9
Hebei 0.0 39 1.1 110 1.0 509 1.5 826 2.0 1429 3.0 679 1.7
Liaoning 0.1 244 7.0 490 4.4 1437 4.3 174 0.4 2190 4.6 2044 5.0
Shandong 0.0 151 4.3 973 8.8 2532 7.5 2590 6.2 2203 4.6 2971 7.3
Shanghai 3.0 174 5.0 481 4.4 2473 7.3 3941 9.4 3602 7.6 3160 7.8
Jiangsu 0.0 124 3.6 1460 13.3 3763 11.1 5210 12.5 6632 13.9 6426 15.8
Zhejiang 0.0 48 1.4 232 2.1 1144 3.4 1521 3.6 1318 2.8 1613 4.0
Guandong 88.3 1460 41.9 3552 32.2 9397 27.8 11624 27.9 12020 25.3 11281 27.7
Guangxi 0.2 29 0.8 178 1.6 815 2.4 656 1.6 886 1.9 525 1.3
Hainan 0.0 103 3.0 453 4.1 918 2.7 789 1.9 717 1.5 431 1.1
Fujian 0.8 290 8.3 1416 12.9 3712 11.0 4085 9.8 4212 8.9 3432 8.4
CENTRAL REGION 0 154 4.4 766 7.0 2798 8.3 4177 10.0 4630 9.7 3883 9.5
Ahhui 0 10 0.3 50 0.5 370 1.1 507 1.2 277 0.6 318 0.8
Heilongjian 0 24 0.7 71 0.6 342 1.0 548 1.3 526 1.1 301 0.7
Jilin 0 18 0.5 66 0.6 242 0.7 452 1.1 409 0.9 337 0.8
Shangxi 0 3 0.1 54 0.5 32 0.1 138 0.3 245 0.5 225 0.6
Jiangxi 0 6 0.2 97 0.9 262 0.8 301 0.7 465 1.0 227 0.6
Henan 0 10 0.3 52 0.5 386 1.1 524 1.3 617 1.3 564 1.4
Hubei 0 29 0.8 203 1.8 602 1.8 680 1.6 973 2.0 944 2.3
Hunan 0 11 0.3 129 1.2 325 1.0 703 1.7 818 1.7 678 1.7
Shaanxi 0 42 1.2 46 0.4 239 0.7 325 0.8 300 0.6 288 0.7
WESTERN REGION 0 40 1.2 155 1.4 1923 5.7 755 1.8 733 1.5 795 2.0
Sichuan 0 16 0.5 102 0.9 889 2.6 425 1.0 372 0.8 437 1.1
Inner Mongolia 0 11 0.3 5 0.0 40 0.1 72 0.2 91 0.2 106 0.3
Guizhou 0 5 0.1 20 0.2 64 0.2 31 0.1 45 0.1 25 0.1
Yunnan 0 3 0.1 23 0.2 65 0.2 65 0.2 146 0.3 128 0.3
Gansu 0 1 0.0 0 0.0 88 0.3 90 0.2 39 0.1 62 0.2
Qinghai 0 - 0.0 1 0.0 1 0.0 1 0.0 - 0.0 0 0.0
Ningxia 0 0 0.0 4 0.0 4 2.2 6 0.0 19 0.0 17 0.0
Xinjiang 0 5 0.2 - 0.0 - 0.1 64 0.2 22 0.0 19 0.0
Central Ministries & 
Commissions 
- 319 9.1 284 2.6 687 2.0 - - 179 0.4 382 0.9
Sources: NBSC,China Foreign Economic Statistics Yearbook, 191-2002  
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 As Table 3.4.5 provides, around mid-1980s costal region received US $ 1 
billion of foreign capital while the central and western regions to the tune of US $ 50 
and 7 million. Although in the next 13 years to the FDI to central region increased to 
over US $ 6 billion and to the western to almost 1.5 billion, this was still not enough 
compared to the absolute inflow of over US $ 38 billion in the costal region. A look at 
it suggest the coastal provinces were losing some of their share of over 90 percent 
which they provides, around mid-1980s costal region received US $ 1 billion of 
foreign capital while the central and western regions to the tune of US $ 50 and 7 
million. Although in the next 13 years to the FDI to central region increased to over 
US $ 6 billion and to the western to almost 1.5 billion, this was still not enough 
compared to the absolute inflow of over US $ 38 billion into the costal region. A look 
at  got in mid-1980 and the beginning of the 1990s in the total FDI inflow, which then 
decrease to 85.9 in 1997. It suggests another interesting aspect of the regional 
distribution where it says the area like Guangdong and Fujian garnered more than 70 
percent of the foreign capital. This over concentration of capital came down 
substantially over the years, yet both secured a combine share of almost 44 percent. 
As can be seen from Table 3.4.5 Hainan the fifth SEZ, was with less than 2 percent of 
the overall investment in the coastal provinces, not a major destination for attracting 
FDI. The unevenness of the distribution of FDI inflows by province is well perceived. 
In flows to the ten eastern provinces which each took more than 2.5 percent of 
cumulated FDI inflows in 1985-96 accounted for 83.8 percent of the total inflows in 
the same period. The distribution of 500 largest foreign funded enterprises is even 
more skewed. The top 500 FIEs were mainly engaged in electronics; machine 
making; food processing; textiles and clothing and automobiles and more than half of 
them (257) were funded with capital from Hong Kong and Macao. Of the rest, Japan 
accounted for 66 and the USA for 50. The top 500 were distribution among 24 
provinces and municipalities, 91 percent along coast. 
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Table 3.4.6 
Values and Shares of China's FDI Flows by Region 
    
 2003 2004 2005 
Values of China's Outward 
FDI Flows (US$ Million) 
Asia 1498.95 3000.27 4374.64 
Africa 74.79 317.42 391.68 
Europe 151.14 170.92 505.02 
Latin America 1038.15 1762.72 6466.16 
North America 57.74 126.49 320.84 
Oceania 33.88 120.15 202.83 
Shares of China's Outward 
 FDI Flows (%)* 
Asia 52.51 54.57 35.68 
Africa 2.62 5.77 3.19 
Europe 5.29 3.11 4.12 
Latin America 36.37 32.06 52.74 
North America 2.02 2.30 2.62 
Oceania 1.19 2.19 1.65 
Relative ratio of China's Outward  
FDI flows** 
Asia 2.32 2.22 1.54 
Africa 0.79 2.39 0.95 
Europe 0.10 0.09 0.08 
Latin America 4.63 2.66 5.37 
North America 0.18 0.12 0.16 
Oceania 0.48 0.34 -0.47 
Sources: Ministry of Commerce, China (2004, 2005, 2006), World Investment Report (2006). 
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Table 3.4.7 
Values and Shares of China’s Outward FDI Stocks by Region  
 2003 2004 2005 
Values of China's Outward FDI Stocks (US$ Million) 
Asia 26559.39 33409.53 40629.04
Africa 491.22 899.55 1595.25 
Europe 531.52 746.66 1598.19 
Latin America 4619.34 8268.37 11469.62
North America 548.49 909.21 1263.24 
Oceania 472.26 543.94 650.28 
Shares of China's outward FDI Stocks (%)*  
Asia 79.94 74.61 71.02 
Africa 1.48 2.01 2.90 
Europe 1.60 1.67 2.79 
Latin America 13.90 18.47 20.05 
North America 1.65 2.03 2.21 
Oceania 1.42 1.21 1.14 
Relative ratios of China's Outward FDI Stocks**  
Asia 5.08 4.83 4.15 
Africa 0.61 0.81 1.07 
Europe 0.03 0.03 0.06 
Latin America 1.85 2.47 2.43 
North America 0.08 0.10 0.11 
Oceania 0.47 0.36 0.42 
Sources: Ministry of Commerce, China (2004, 2005, 2006), World Investment Report (2006). 
 Table 3.4.6 and 3.4.7 show the geographical distribution of China’s FDI flow 
and stock, respectively. In 2005, 52.7 % of China outward FDI flow was destined for 
Latin America, exceeding the share of Asia for the first time in history, but much of 
the investment in Latin America was made in three taxes Investment in these and 
other tax havens typically result in reinvestment in other host economies, including 
China itself. Asia ranked second as a destination of China’s FDI, and accounted for a 
total of 35.7 %, including 27.8 % for Hong Kong alone. The other regions in the 
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world were not important destinations for China’s FDI at all with Europe accounting 
for 4.1 %, Africa accounting for 3.2 %, North America accounting for 2.6 % and 
Oceania accounting for 1.7 %. When compared with the share of world’s aggregate 
FDI flows to different regions, we see that the shares of China’s FDI flows in Asia 
and Latin America were significantly higher than those of the world’s but its share in 
Europe, North America and Oceania were very low, where as its share in Africa was 
below the world average in 2003, above, the world average in 2004, and close to the 
world average in 2005. 
 Asia’s shares of China’s FDI stocks in 2003-2005 were more than three times 
those of Latin America, the second largest share among all regions in this period. 
Clearly, China’s substantial flows to Latin America were a relatively recent 
phenomenon; the shares of Africa, Europe, and North America were in the range of 1-
3 %. When compared with the share of world’s aggregate FDI stocks in different 
regions, we see that the shares of China’s FDI stocks in Asia and Latin America were 
significantly higher than those of the world’s but its shares in Europe, North America 
and Oceania were very low, whereas its share in Africa was below the world average 
in 2003 and 2004, and slightly above the world average in 2005. 
 Ignoring Cayman Island and British Virginia, the top 10 recipients of China’s 
FDI in 2005 were Hong Kong (which is also a tax haven), South Korea, US, Russia, 
Australia, Germany, Sudan, and Kazakhstan. In 2004, Indonesia, Singapore, and 
Nigeria replace South Korea, Germany, and Kazakhstan. Both lists were inductive of 
the role of natural resources found in Africa, central Asia, and Southeast Asia. 
 Given that 81 % of China’s total FDI in 2005 was made in the world’s tax 
havens, and at least 78 %of its FDI in 2004 was made in three tax havens which led 
the list of top 10 destinations, the true breakdown of the destination of China’s FDI 
was basically unknown. Our attempts to obtain and the annual report s of publicly 
listed Chinese companies, unfortunately, proved to be unsuccessful. 
3.4.4 Sectoral distribution of FDI 
 The dramatic increase in China’s outward FDI inflows can be in part ascribed 
to the rise of transactional co-operations. The share of FDI in terms of amounts 
GROWTH IN CHINA'S TRADE
 
 
China's Integration into Global Trading System and Its Implications for India 
131
actually used across sectors fluctuated slightly from 1997 to 2002. In accordance with 
the growth trend of inward FDI across sectors, foreign investors have realized the 
importance of China’s advantages in terms of a large market, fast economic growth 
and low labour costs for their investment and operations .Shares of actually used FDI 
in amount by sectors have been critically examined in this section. A detail 
description is mentioned as below: 
Table 3.4.8 
Sectoral distribution of contracted FDI in China 
(Unit: US $ billion) 
Sector 1979-86
FDI 
(%) 
1987-91
FDI 
(%) 
1992-94 
FDI 
(%) 
1979-No of 
projects 
(%) 
1998 
FDI 
(%) 
Total 19.18 33.18 252.21 324,620 573 
Agriculture forestry, animal 
husbandry and fishing 
0.57 0.8 2.84 8772 9355 
 
(2.98) (2.41) (1.13) (2.70) (1.63) 
Industry 7.6 25.66 127.87 237054 338 
 (39.59) (77.33) (50.70) (73.03) (59.08) 
Construction 0.31 0.56 8.11 8579 17.8 
 
(1.63) (1.68) (3.22) (2.64) (3.10) 
Transport, warehousing, post & 
telecom 
0.28 0.29 5.06 3516 13.9 
 
(1.48) (0.87) (2.01) (1.08) (2.42) 
Wholesale & retailing, catering 1.42 0.44 9.97 16,733 20.8 
 
(7.40) (1.33) (3.95) (5.15) (3.63) 
Real Estate 5.99 4.48 85.71 31,731 143 
 
(31.21) (13.51) (33.98) (9.77) (24.93) 
Health care, sports & Social Welfare 0.07 0.15 2.85 971 4.55 
 (0.34) (0.46) (1.13) (0.30) (0.79) 
Education, Culture, art, broadcasting 
films & T.V 
0.08 0.13 1.16 1,288 1.97 
 
(0.42) (0.39) (0.46) (0.40) (0.34) 
Scientific research & technical 
services 
0.01 0.06 0.92 2,348 1.74 
 (0.05) (0.18) (0.37) (0.72) (0.30) 
Other 
 
2.86 
(14.89) 
0.61 
(1.85) 
7.72 
(2.86) 
13,628 
(4.2) 
21.6 
(3.77) 
Sources: Data for 1979-94 from Lee (1997); Data for 1979-98 MOFTEC (1999). 
 It can be seen from Table 3.4.8 that through the end of 1998, China has the 
establishment of over 3, 00000 foreign investment enterprises, involving of $ 522.4 
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billion in foreign capital. Of these, over 150,000 FIEs representing $ 221.04 billion 
investment commenced operations by the end of 1997. During 1986-89 over 70 % of 
Direct Foreign Investment projects were involved in manufacturing industries. The 
share of total industrial output in China made by FIEs reached 18.6 percent 
.Maximum contracted FDI in China is distributed in agriculture, forestry, fishing and 
animal husbandry industries and increased gradually from 1979 to 1998.     
Table 3.4.9 
Values and Shares of China’s Outward FDI by Sector 
FLOW STOCK  
2003+ 2004 
 
2005 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
Value 
(US$ M) 
 
85.5 288.66 105.36 332 834.23 511.62 
Agriculture, forestry, 
animal husfbandry, 
fishery And 
Share (%) 3 5.25 0.86 1 1.86 0.89 
Value 
(US$ M) 
1380 1800.20 1675.22 5900 5951.37 8651.61 
Mining, quarrying 
and petroleum 
Share (%) 48.40 32.74 13.66 18 13.29 15.12 
Value 
(US$ M) 
620 755.55 2280.40 2070 4539.07 5770.29 
Manufacturing 
Share (%) 21.80 13.74 18.60 6.20 10.14 10.09 
Value  
(US$ M) 
763.80 2643.40 8198.58 24833 33470.90 42280 
Services 
Share (%) 26.80 48.08 66.87 74.80 74.75 73.91 
Value  
(US$ M) 
280 749.31 4941.59 1992 16445.50 16553.60 
Business Services 
Share (%) 9.80 13.63 40.30 6 36.73 28.94 
Value 
 (US$ M) 
360 799.69 2260.12 6530 7843.27 11417.90 
Wholesale and Retail 
Share (%) 12.60 14.55 18.43 19.70 17.52 19.96 
Value  
(US$ M) 
85.50 828.66 576.79 1992 4580.55 7082.97 
Transportation and 
Storage 
Share (%) 3 15.07 4.70 6 10.23 12.38 
*The 2003 figures are subject to rounding errors, because the values by sector, if not explicitly 
provided in the 2003 Statistical Bulletin of China's Outward Foreign Direct Investment, are calculated 
from the sector percentages and aggregate FDI figures. 
 As seen in Table 3.4.9 in 2005, 40.3 % of China’s FDI flow went into business 
services: 18.6 % went into manufacturing (mainly, telecom equipment, computer and 
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other electronic equipment, transportation equipment, general equipment, textiles, 
wood products, metallurgy); 18.4 % went into wholesales and retail( mainly, imports 
and exports); 13.7 % went into mining and petroleum; 4.7 % went into transportation 
and storage. Also given in Table 3.4.9 are the sectoral compositions of FDI flows in 
2003, 2004 and 2005. As can be seen, mining and petroleum accounted for close to 
almost one half in 2003 and one third in 2004, but dropped to less than 14 % in 2005. 
In contrast, business services rose from less than 10% in 2003 to over 40 % in 005. 
 By the end of 2005, business services accounted for the largest share of 
China’s outward FDI stock (28.9 %), to be followed by wholesale and retail (20 %), 
mining and petroleum (15 %), transportation and storage (12.4 %), and manufacturing 
10 %). 
Table 3.4.10 
Shares of Actually Used in Percentage (%) by Sector (1997-2002) 
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total 
1997 1.39 64.21 4.58 3.21 3.66 3.10 11.42 4.39 0.64 3.41 100.00 
1998 137 57.54 6.82 4.54 3.62 2.60 14.10 6.33 0.79 1.87 100.00 
1999 1.76 57.44 9.18 2.28 3.85 2.39 14.10 6.33 0.79 1.87 100.00 
2000 1.66 64.91 5.51 2.24 2.49 2.11 11.63 5.37 0.53 3.57 100.00 
2001 1.92 67.66 4.85 1.74 1.94 2.49 11.03 5.54 0.59 2.24 100.00 
2002 1.95 70.87 2.61 1.36 1.73 1.77 10.94 5.58 0.69 2.50 100.00 
Sector 1 consists of farming, forestry, animal husbandry and fisher. 
Sector 2 represents secondary industry which consists of mining, quarrying and 
manufacturing. 
Sector 3 consist of production and supply electrical power, gas and water. 
Sector  4 consist of construction, geological prospecting and water conservancy. 
Sector  5 consists of transport & storage, post and telecommunication services. 
Sector  6 consists of wholesale & retail trade and catering services. 
Sector  7 consists of banking, insurance and real estate. 
Sector  8 consists of social services. 
Sector  9 consists of health care, sports, social welfare, education, art, films, scientific 
research and polytechnic services. 
Sector 10 consists of others industries. 
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Figure 3.4.3: Shares of actually used of FDI in 1997 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 1998 
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Figure 3.4.4: Shares of actually used of FDI  
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 1998  
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 The share of FDI in terms of amounts actually used sectors fluctuated slightly 
from 1997to2002. Accordingly to the available statistical data, as shown in Table 
3.4.10 and Figure 3.4.3 and 3.4.4, Sector 2 or manufacturing, mining and quarrying 
had the strongest attraction for foreign investment, accounting for 64 percent of the 
total actually used amount of FDI in 1997. This figure then dropped somewhat nearly 
57 percent in 1999 but it then rose to almost 71 percent in 2002, with the highest 
percentage of shares from 1997 to 2002. The sector with the second most inflow of 
FDI is sector 7, which consist of banking, insurance and real estate. The movement of 
percentage shares of sector 7 was quite different from sector 2 and sector 7 had 
approximately 11 percent of the total amount of FDI used in 1997 and increased to 
about 14 percent in the year 1998 and 1999, but its share then dropped slightly back to 
nearly 11 percent from 200 to 2002. Note that the sum of the shares between Sector 2 
and 7 accounted for more than 70 percent of the total amount FDI used over 5 years 
(75% share in 1997: 72 % share in 1998: 71.5 % share in 1999: 76.5 % share in 2000: 
78 % share in 2001:and 81.81 share in 2002). 
 However, some sector was less attractive to foreign investment from 1997 to 
2002. It can be noticed that the shares of the actually used FDI in Sector 3,4,5,6 and 
10 decreased its share from 3.2 % to 1.4% in 2002. Sector 5 dropped from 3.7 % to 
17% in 2002. Sector 6 moved down slightly to 1.8 % in 2002 from 3.1 % in 1997. 
Sector 10 also moved down slightly from 3.41 % in 1997 to 2.5% in 2002. Thus it is 
clear those different sector attracted different levels of FDI. 
 In accordance with the growth trend of inward FDI across sector, foreign 
investor have realized the importance of China’s advantages in terms of a large 
market, fast economic growth and low lob our costs for their investments and 
operations. The huge population means there are more potential customers and 
investors would be willing to move in. 
3.4.5 Special Economic Zones: 
 A special economic zone is a specific, delineated and duty free geographical 
region that has different economic laws of developmental process. It is a trade 
capacity development tool, with the goal to promote rapid economic growth by using 
tax and business incentive to attract foreign investment and technology. In China a 
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large number of SEZs are established which explores and details the procedure to be 
followed. This section explains the development pertaining to SEZs in China. 
 Many developing countries felt that the foreign capital has the necessary 
wherewithal in terms of providing monetary value, the required technology, the 
management practices and techniques and a sense of heightened competition essential 
for achieving higher economic growth. Various studies observed that foreign capital 
inflows to Asiatic region witnessed a continuous rise. The Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) inflow to Asia rose from a merger US $ 5,280 million in 1983-85 to US $ 
15,588 million in 1990 and finally reached US $ 80,299 million by 1998.China’s story 
wasn’t very different. Embarking on an open door policy in 1978, its initial 
modernization drive was accomplished due to the significant, contribution of FDI. In 
a span of 15 odd years, China had become the second only to the US and by fer the 
largest receiving country among developing countries. 
 All countries used different methods or instrument to attract foreign investors. 
One such important instrument was setting up of special geographical regions, 
popularly known as Export Processing Zones (EPZs) in the world. EPZs were 
practiced by many countries in the world to register high growth, promote exports and 
to create employment in the eighties and nineties the experiment with EPZs 
experienced an upward trend, totaling them to more than 850 around the world in 
1998. In 2003, about 116 countries across the world had established EPZs and the 
number further went up to reach 3000- mark (World Economic Processing Zones 
Association). In China, they were better known as Special Economic Zones (SEZs). 
Chinese initiative of developing the SEZs in 1979 is a conscious and carefully 
planned effort. Central Government provided Guangdong and Fujian province with 
external autonomy including the competence to establish and regulate SEZs. Soon 
after the regulation on SEZs in Guangdong province was adopted in August 1980.  
 Special status was thus granted to these two costal provinces to experiment 
with an alternative form of economic development apart from the mainstream policies 
of socialism. The year 1978 marked a watershed in the history of Chinese economy. 
The development strategy underwent a new paradigm shift-from import substituting 
policies to export led growth. Closer proximity to the sea cost and having access to 
free port system in Hong Kong the southern region became the favorite location for 
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Chinese leaders to established SEZs. With the establishment of SEZs, China could 
invite large amount of FDI for its economic development and got an access to 
international trade to integrate its economy with the world. During the 1980s 
developing countries received about US$ 15 billion, about one-third of the total world 
trade flows. 
 In 1987, 70 percent of FDI came from Hong Kong and Macao, Taiwan, 
Malaysia and Singapore. This share, however, decreased over the years to 67 percent 
in 1996 and 54 percent in 1997. By 1995 it was also found that 96 percent of 
Shenzhen’s textile industry and 95 percent of its garments industry were owned by 
Hong Kong investor (Lau, 2001). This indicates that the foreign flow from these 
countries to China is still controlled and decided by the overseas Chinese. 
 When China initiated its process of attracting foreign investment, it never 
meant it for SEZs only. Investment for the rest of the country was possible. That is 
why only part of the investment came to SEZs. Until mid-1980s the share of FDI in 
SEZs was 30 percent of the total foreign investment. And about 80 percent of the FDI 
in SEZs only came from Hong Kong and Macao. 
 Inflow of FDI also showed pattern of destinations. Some investors were 
attracted towards SEZs because of the preferential conditions while other located 
themselves in the major cities such as Beijing, Shanghi, Guangzhou, Dalian, etc. 
These investors were mostly interested in the manufacture of high-tech products as a 
result they were to keen have the skilled workers who can adapt and able to handle the 
technology application, plus demanded good infrastructure, wanted to remain closer 
to the political decision makers and invested larger volumes of capital in the 
individual projects. These investments came from developed countries like US and 
Japan who were interested in High-tech products and wanted to have strong foothold 
in the Chinese market. Examples are Volkswagon and Schindler in Shanghi and 
Beijing. 
3.5 FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVE 
 To keep the nominal exchange rate of the RMB against the US $ stable at 
around 8.28 to protect export competitiveness, China’s central bank began 
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accumulating foreign exchange reserves as a result of its dollar purchases on the 
Shanghai inter bank foreign exchange market. Until 2003, however, reserve 
accumulation was considerably slower than the country’s balance of payments 
surpluses (both on current and on capital account) would have suggested, because 
there was significant capital flight every year through 2002. The IMF estimate that the 
unexplained outflow of capital from China, reflected on the “errors and omissions” 
account of the balance of payments, averaged almost $ 14 billion during that 9 year 
period. China is probably the only developing country that was able to build up 
official reserve in spite of significant capital flight over an extended period.  
 From 1994, China had current account surpluses every year through 2003 and 
capital account surpluses in all years, except 1998, when foreign banks sharply 
reduced their expose in China’s in the wake of the Asian financial crisis. Even in 
1998, however, China’s official reserve increased, through only modestly, by $ 6.2 
billion. 
 Reserve accumulation accelerated in 2001 and 2002 when capital flight fell 
sharply. A dramatic turnaround occurred in 2003 capital flight reserved. Large 
amount of “hot” money, triggered by market expectations of RMB appreciation 
entered the country. This, together with continuing current account and “normal” 
capital account surpluses, explain the unprecedented increase in official reserves-more 
than $ 160 billion-in the course of 2003. On the last day of 2003, PBOC transferred $ 
45 billion from official reserves to the accounts of two state-owned commercial banks 
(China Construction Bank and Bank of China) to strength their capital base. Without 
this transaction official reserves at the end of 2003 would have amounted to $ 403 
billion. Market expectations of RMB appreciation was not only fed by China’s 
surprisingly strong economic performance in 2003-inspite of SARS-but also by 
growing international political pressures on China to revalue. 
 There are four indicators which indicate external imbalance and its exchange 
rate policies Indicator number one China's global current account surplus has grown 
without interruption over the past five years, mushrooming from about 1 percent of its 
GDP in 2001 to roughly 9 percent of GDP in 2006; (see Figure 3.5.1)  China now has the 
largest global current account surplus in the world in absolute dollar terms and one that is 
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larger relative to the size of the economy than even the troublesome US global current 
account deficit 3 And in the first quarter of 2007, China's trade balance-which typically 
makes up the lion's share of the current account was twice as large as in the first 
quarter of 2006. In short, the Chinese government has been allowing China's global 
external imbalance to expand out of control. 
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Figure 3.5.1: China's global current-account balance (as a percent of GDP, 1993-
2006 
Source: China State Administration of Foreign Exchange and IMF. 
 Indicator number two: It is evident from Figure 3.5.1 that China's real 
effective exchange rate-widely regarded as a more comprehensive and superior 
measure of China's overall competitive position, than the nominal exchange rate 
between the US dollar and the Chinese RMB-has actually depreciated since the dollar 
peak in February 2002 (the qualitative conclusion is similar if the dollar's average 
value in 2001 is used as the base period). The depreciation ranges from 2 to 11 
percent, depending on measures chosen; External payment adjustment call for 
appreciations of real effective exchange rates, that is, for declines in competitiveness, in 
countries with large global current account surpluses. But China's real effective 
exchange rate has moved in a direction opposite to what is needed. It is believed that 
because the RMB-US dollar rate has appreciated by about 61/2 percent since June of 
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2005 from 8.28 RMB to the dollar to 7.73 (as of April 25, 2007) it must be making real 
progress on the exchange rate front. The sad truth is that the RMB is now grossly 
undervalued on the order of 30 percent or more against an average of China's trading 
partners and 40 percent or more against the US dollar-and that the appreciation of the 
RMB that has taken place to date against the dollar is completely inadequate to make a 
real dent in this huge surplus. 
 
Figure 3.5.2: Real effective exchange rate of the renminbi 
Indicator number three. This indicates is well known by analyzing Figure 3.5.2 
When China launched its much-heralded currency reform in July 2005, the Chinese 
authorities said that they intended to increase the role of market forces in the 
determination of the RMB. No such thing has happened. The Chinese authorities have 
continued to intervene in the foreign exchange market in massive amounts-to the tune 
of about $20 billion a month in 2006 and $45 billion a month in the first quarter of 
2007 to keep the RMB from rising if anything, the level of monthly intervention has 
been increasing relative to that prior (e.g., the first half of 2005) to the announcement of 
the "new" exchange rate system. In each of the past three years, China's exchange market 
intervention has amounted to roughly 10 percent of its GDP-a truly extraordinary amount; 
see Figure 3.5.3. Moreover, this heavy exchange market intervention has been 
accompanied by large so-called sterilization operations, thereby short-circuiting the 
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process (of domestic monetary expansion and rising inflation) by which large reserve 
accumulation would otherwise lead to a deterioration in China's competitive position 
even with little flexibility in the (nominal) RMB exchange rate. Whatever the rhetoric, 
the facts say that the RMB remains a heavily managed, quasi fixed exchange rate. 
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Figure 3.5.3: Change in China's foreign exchange reserves, USD billions and 
as a share of GDP 
Note: The bars show billions of dollars and the line tracks percent of GDP.  
Source: China State   Administration of Foreign Exchange. 
 Indicator number four: compliance with China's obligations on exchange rate 
policy as a member of the IMF. Although each member country is obligated under the 
Fund's charter to desist from " ... manipulating exchange rates " and although one of 
the leading pointers of currency manipulation is large-scale, prolonged, one-way 
intervention in exchange markets, the Chinese authorities continue to assert that they do 
not accept the concept of currency manipulation and that the level of the RMB exchange 
rate is solely a matter of China's national sovereignty." Simultaneously, although that 
same IMF charter enjoins the Fund to exercise "..., firm surveillance over the 
exchange rate policies of member countries” the Fund’s Managing Director, Mr 
Rodrigo de Rato, has maintained repeatedly that he rejects a role for the fund as global 
“umpire” of exchange rate policies. Meanwhile, the US Treasury Department, while 
increasingly critical of China’s exchange rate policies, has ruled rapidly in its recent 
reports to Congress (on international and exchange rate policies) that it cannot find 
Billions of US dollars % of GDP 
GROWTH IN CHINA'S TRADE
 
 
China's Integration into Global Trading System and Its Implications for India 
142
China guilty of currency manipulation because it cannot prove “intent” to manipulate. 
The practical upshot of this is that the international community is operating without an 
enforced international code of conduct on exchange rate policies. Indeed, it’s as if a 
new IMF charter has been informally agreed under which there are two guidelines on 
exchange rates. Guidelines I cover the obligation of countries; it states: “member 
countries shall do as they wish on exchange rate policies.” Guideline II covers the 
obligations of the IMF for exchange rate surveillance: it states: “Sorry, it’s not our 
job”. 
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Figure 3.5.4: China’s Foreign Exchange Reserves: 1990-March 2006          
Source: Official Chinese government data 
 Merchandise trade surpluses, large-scale foreign investment, and its peg to the 
US dollar have enable China to accumulate the world’s second largest foreign 
exchange (after Japan). As seen in Figure 3.5.4, China’s accumulation of foreign 
exchange reserves has been particularly acute over the past few years. China’s total 
reserves reached $ 875.1 billion at the end of March 2006; more than double the level 
China’s had at the end of 2003. As of February 2006, China has become the world’s 
largest holder of foreign exchange reserves. Many analysts contend China’s reserve 
could hit $ 1 trillion by the end of 2006. 
($ in billion) 
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 A quality distribution of Foreign Exchange Reserve is mentioned in Table 
3.5.1 where China’s exchange reserve has increased to a peal value of 1248.57 in the 
fourth quarter of 2007. The surge in China’s foreign exchange reserves proves that the 
continuous economic growth distinguish the contribution of the trade surplus to 
foreign exchange accumulation as well as speculative capital inflows.  
Table 3.5.1 
Foreign Exchange Reserve:  Quarterly Indicators 
Year Foreign Exchange Reserve 
( US $ Billion) 
2004(a) 444.427 
2004(b) 475.10 
2004(c) 519.00 
2004(d) 614.5 
2005(a) 663.19 
2005(b) 714.95 
2005(c) 772.26 
2005(d) 821.51 
2006(a) 877.61 
2006(b) 943.61 
2006(c) 990.45 
2006(d) 1068.49 
2007(a) 1106.81 
2007(b) 1159.37 
2007(c)  1204.04 
2007(d) 1248.57 
Sources: Economic Intelligence Unit, China Country Report, March 2008   
3.6 EXCHANGE RATE POLICY 
Main Characteristic: 
 After exchange rate unification, the system of retention rights was no longer 
needed; it was no abolished on 1 January 1994. The Foreign Exchange Certificate, 
special currency for foreign tourists and foreign residents in China, issued at the 
official exchange rate, was also discounted. At the same time China began the process 
of gradually eliminating the system of differential domestic pricing for foreigners and 
local access to shops and markets that had until then been reserved for foreigners. 
Therefore, exchange rate unification also triggered significant movement towards 
domestic market integration and price harmonization. Today, few in China remember 
the differential of markets for foreigners and locals that existed only ten years ago. 
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Although, one can safely say that China’s exchange rate unification of 1 January 1994 
was extremely successful and a significant step forward in the reform process. At the 
same time, an important source of corruption and market distortions had been 
removed. 
 Proponents of currency revaluation cite the balance of payments situation, 
and the fact that following a 33% cut in the official rate on January 1, 1994, 
the dollar rate has effectively been pegged at 8.3 RMB, with a fluctuation 
range of 0.3% from the previous day's rates The exchange rate has thus not 
been adjusted to reflect productivity growth and differences in inflation rates. 
 Putting aside the complex debate on the issue of calculating fair 
currency value and the disparity with the actual value, the policy options 
available to Chinese authorities make it unlikely that the currency will be 
revalued in the near future. As already seen, a high growth rate must be 
sustained to absorb the surplus labor from state-owned companies and the rural 
sector, as well as to reduce the relative size of the bad loan problem and alleviate 
the fiscal imbalance. Market opening in goods and services to 2006, as stipulated 
by the conditions of WTO accession, will increasingly affect the balance of 
payments structure and fair exchange rate level. As long as the preconditions for 
deregulating capital transactions and implementing a variable exchange rate system 
are not achieved-including a sound and strong financial system, regulatory 
oversight, corporate governance, and accounting system-the central government 
is apt to limit deregulation of capital transactions, and prioritize currency stability to 
boost exports and direct investment. 
The Nominal versus the Real Effective Exchange Rate of the RMB: 
 After exchange rate unification on 1 January 1994, inflation in China 
continued relatively high for some times. The economic overheating problem was not 
brought under control until the end of 1996 when China claimed to have made a “soft 
landing”. Reflecting the progress in domestic macroeconomic management, China felt 
confident enough to subscribe to Article 8 of the IMF Charter at the end of 1996. This 
means that China agreed to a bid by IMF rules for currency convertibility for current 
account transactions, another significant step forward on the road of market reforms. 
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In the meantime, China’s real effective exchange rate, which is a much more 
meaningful indicator of changes in the country’s export competitiveness than the US 
$, because domestic inflation in China was higher than in the United States. This 
changed in 1998 when China began to experience domestic price deflation for the first 
time, while low inflation continued in the United States. China’s real effective 
exchange rate appreciated against the US $ (all major currencies) until the end of 
1997, depreciated in 1998 and 1999, appreciated again in 200 and 2001, and 
depreciated thereafter until the time of writing. On balance during the period 1994-
2003 the RMB appreciated by about 10 % against the US$. If December 1997 is taken 
as the base period instead of January 1994, China’s real effective exchange rate 
depreciated by about 10 %. The answer to the question whether China’s real effective 
exchange rate has appreciated or depreciated against the US $ depends critically the 
choice of base period. In the mid-1990s, the RMB was the only major currency to 
appreciated against the strong US $ of that time, both in nominal and real effective 
terms. Naturally, since the RMB was effectively pegged to the US $, China’s real 
effective exchange rate appreciated even more strongly against the European 
currencies and the Japanese Yen in that period. Relative to 1994, the real effective 
exchange rate of the RMB had appreciated some 40 % against the real effective 
exchange rate of the Yen by the end of 2003. 
China’s Currencies during the Asian Financial Crises of 1997-1998: 
 China was the only major Asian economy that was relatively unaffected by the 
crisis and the RMB was the only major currency that did not depreciate. It did not 
have to be devalued, because China’s balance of payments remained strong during the 
crisis, while size and maturity composition of its external debt gave no reason for 
concern. Moreover, China kept strict controls on capital account transactions, which 
made it very difficult to speculate against the RMB, even if market operators had 
wished to do so. Nonetheless, many in China feared that the sharp currency 
devaluation in neighboring countries triggered by the crisis would undermine the 
country’s export competitiveness; there was considerable sentiment in China in favor 
of devaluation. Discounts for the RMB on domestic black markets for foreign 
currencies revealed that many expected devaluation. However, the government 
decided wisely not to devalue and to maintain the fixed dollar rate that had prevailed 
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since 1994. China was praised for its decision by the United States and by countries in 
the region. 
Exchange Rate Policy  
 Most Directors noted that there is no clear evidence that the renminbi is 
substantially undervalued at this juncture. Director also felt that a currency 
revaluation would not by itself have a major impact on global current account 
imbalances- particularly given China’s relativity small share in world trade. 
Nevertheless, Director considered that the rapid build-up of foreign exchange reserves 
indicates some pressure on the exchange rates and imposes cost on the Chinese 
economy, especially difficulties I preventing excessive monetary expansion. In the 
context, Directors observed that increased flexibility of the exchange rate over time 
would be in the best interest of China. In particular, it would allow more room to 
pursue an independent monetary policy help cushion China’s economy against 
adverse shocks, and facilities adjustment to the major structural reforms that are 
underway. Directors considered that China could, in a phased manner, introduce more 
flexibility to its exchange rate without causing major disruptions to its economy. Most 
Directors stressed that a move towards flexibility should be carefully planned and 
sequenced with ongoing structural reforms that are crucial to its success, and 
emphasized the need to move speedily with these reforms They felt that the timing of 
a shift towards greater exchange rate flexibility should be left to the authorities to 
decide. A number of Directors, however, felt that the authorities should take 
advantage of the present circumstances to take quickly an initial step toward greater 
exchange rate flexibility. Directors underscored the need to improve the functioning 
of the foreign exchange market by eliminating trading restrictions and surrender 
requirements, widening the base of participants, and developing instruments for 
foreign exchange risk management. 
Exchange rate policy as an instrument of export promotion 
 As other East Asian countries previously, China has relied extensively on an 
undervalued exchange rate of the national currency to promote exports (Pomfret, 1997). The 
Bank of China was aggressively purchasing foreign currency to build up its 
reserves, so that renminbi remained strongly under priced during the whole period of 
reforms. The ratio of Chinese foreign exchange reserve to GDP increased from 5 
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percent in 1980 to 16 percent in 1998, where as the ratio of reserves to monthly 
imports of goods and services increased from 6 to 11 during the same period (World 
Bank, 2000b). For other developing countries, excluding those in East Asia, the ratio of 
reserves to GDP is typically much lower (for the world as a whole it is only about 8%). 
As a result of these persistent efforts to keep the exchange rate low, Chinese 
domestic prices in dollar terms remained at a level of 20%-25% of the US prices (for other 
developing countries this ratio is typically around 50%), which in turn created 
obvious advantages for Chinese exporters. 
 After the 1997 currency crises and devaluations in many Asian countries, China 
promised not to devalue its currency. Such a stand was based on political rather 
than economic considerations. China tried to avoid competitive devaluations, which 
would make it even more difficult for other East Asian countries to endure the storm, 
even though the policy of stable yuan involved obvious costs - in 1998 the rates of 
growth of Chinese exports dropped from double-digits to zero. In 1999-2000, however, 
the strong growth of exports resumed. 
 The currency of China is Renminbi; its unit is yuan (Y). As China's legal 
currency, Renminbi is issued and controlled solely by the People's Bank of China 
(PBoC). The exchange rates of the Renminbi are decided by PBoC and published by 
the State Administration of Exchange Control (SAEC). China adopts a regulated, 
floating-exchange-rate system based on market supply and demand. Along with its 
financial reform, China will further explore and improve the exchange-rate regime 
based on its economic development and performance as well as international balance 
of payment. On December 1, 1996, China formally accepted the Article Eight of the 
Agreement on International Monetary Fund, and realized the Renminbi's 
convertibility under the current account ahead of schedule. 
 On July 21, 2005, China cut the yuan's decade-long peg to the dollar, 
allowing its currency to move in a restricted float. China's central bank announced 
that the renminbi would no longer be pegged to a single currency following the rate 
reform. Instead, as the value of the yuan will be adjusted with reference to a basket of 
currencies, the mutual changes of major currencies in the world market would reduce the 
yuan's fluctuation. 
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 Dominant currencies used to determine the value of the yuan are the US 
dollar, the euro, the yen and South Korea's won. The Singapore dollar, pound 
sterling, the Malaysian ringgit, the Russian rouble, the Australian dollar, the Thai 
baht and the Canadian dollar are also considered in the calculation. 
 An exchange rate left unchanged for 11 years generated great interest in case 
of China. Outside government circles calls for greater exchange rate flexibility also 
became the norm from economist in the international organization such as IMF etc. 
A year wise variation in exchange rate gives a clear perception of exchange rate 
from the following Table 3.6.1 
Table 3.6.1 
Exchange rate: Quarterly Indicators 
(US$ Billion) 
Sources: Economic Intelligence Unit, China Country Report, March 2008  
3.7 CONCLUSION 
 The so-called "half way house" economy which characterized China's 
economic growth for a period of a decade and a half performed extremely well, which 
goes against the basic beliefs among economists. One such belief is that market 
socialism cannot work. This belief however, went against the Chinese approach 
towards reform, which stressed the need to combine virtues of market and plan. Many 
Year Exchange Rate 
2001-2005(b) 8.277 
2005(c) 8.092 
2005(d) 8.07 
2006(a) 8.017 
2006(b) 7.996 
2006(c) 7.909 
2006(d) 7.809 
2007(a) 7.734 
2007(b) 7.616 
2007(c) 7.74 
2007(d) 7.73 
GROWTH IN CHINA'S TRADE
 
 
China's Integration into Global Trading System and Its Implications for India 
149
observers stressed that the transition from a socialist to a market economy should be 
fast and done quickly. Another belief among economists is that enterprises will not 
respond in desirable ways to market signals unless private property rights are 
established. In all important areas of China's economy in the 1980's, however, 
transparent and legally protected individual property rights were the exception. In a 
village community, property rights for a piece of land were not distinguished in any 
tangible form such as a deed. China managed to succeed under these conditions, 
because the ability to gain from entrepreneurialism was absent, and ownership rights 
were ill-defined. Exports were promoted and imports were controlled according to 
administrative decisions at the industrial bureau or foreign trade corporation level, 
rather than by individual enterprises. Despite what economists would predict as a 
poorly performing economy, a striking shift occurred in China's growth. China 
outperformed all other developing countries in terms of exports and output growth in 
real terms. Performance-based monitoring and rewarding system become an organic 
part of Chinese politics. One party government gives Chinese central authority a 
power to implement its policies effectively and to reward or punish its local officials. 
Under such governance, a yardstick competition among local governments is 
introduced to generate the sources of dynamics in investment and output growth. 
China did not copy any model to trigger its economic growth. What it did was to give 
up the ideology that constrains its will to choose the right way to catch up. China set 
the growth target when it began the slow process of economic reform, and when 
China began economic reforms, its aim was not to replace the old system, but to make 
some change of it. The evolutionary process of China’s economic reform helps induce 
rather than retard economic growth. 
 China finds a better governance to serve its goal of growth. And during the 
early phase of economic development, when the average income of population is 
much lower, the growth target is easier to be placed on the top of government agenda. 
What challenges China in the future is how Chinese system responds effectively to 
diversified interests of society and how Chinese government enforces its cohesion 
when growth target is no longer on consensus. For instance, China’s rapid growth 
from below has increasingly enlarged the regional income disparity and social income 
gap in the past decade. These problems threat social and political stability in China. 
China needs to manage these social problems. Recent experience has indicated that 
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China is on the crossroad between implementation of growth target and moving 
towards to more distributional policies. 
 Economic growth is not the same as economic development. In the past 17 
years, China has achieved rapid economic growth, but made little progress in 
economic development. Without the essential parallel development of supporting 
market institutions and conventions, eventually the economic costs of growing chaos 
and wastefulness will override whatever remains of the economy's growth potential.  
Second, the comprehensive reform program launched in 1994 reflects the authorities' 
recognition of the numerous basic deficiencies in the economy, requiring correction. 
In the last two years, considerable progress has been made in foreign trade and 
foreign exchange liberalization, the development of a modern tax code and revenue-
sharing arrangements, as well as in social and economic legislation. However, despite 
these impressive achievements, enormous difficulties continue to confront enterprise 
reform, housing and social welfare, tax administration, financial reform, and law 
enforcement. China's output growth is sustainable into the next century, say, to 2010, 
if and only if it succeeds in implementing its current comprehensive reform program. 
Predictions of China's becoming a great economic power by the year 2010 are greatly 
exaggerated. At best, it could become another newly industrialized country. 
Nevertheless, because of its sheer size China remains an attractive market for 
businesses that are experienced in trading with or investing in developing economies. 
China's role in the world economy, the nation's open-door policy has contributed 
greatly to the success of its economic growth but, at the same time, exposed its 
economy to the vicissitudes of the world economy and world politics. That is the price 
of being a member of the world community. Like all other members, China too must 
be prepared to accept the rules and obligations of the community-both in form and in 
spirit. 
 In the coastal region of China, which possesses a pool of intelligent educated 
R&D staff and skilled labor and hosts most of China’s R&D activities and top 
universities and research institutes and where inward FDI has evolved from labour-
intensive processing activities to more strategic asset-seeking type FDI by major 
MNEs, FDI has played a significant role in promoting regional innovation capacity as 
well as regional innovation efficiency over the 2000-2004 period. This increased 
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regional innovation and technological capability contribute further to the fast regional 
economic growth in this region. However, in the inland provinces, they have not 
experienced such innovation-growth-promotion effect of FDI. China’s export 
competitiveness hinges on the coincidence of several factors: the favorable exchange 
rate, low wages and available supplies of unskilled labor, the reduced cost of 
communication and transportation, the flow of foreign direct investment and foreign 
management and its implications for China’s productive abilities, the large scale of 
the potential Chinese domestic market, the opening of world markets, and the 
encouragement of Chinese foreign trade policy. On the other hand, certain 
considerations have special importance. For example, Chinese export growth is more 
than a matter of low wages and an undervalued exchange rate. Chinese producers 
have become greatly more proficient at meeting world requirements for quality and 
product design. The large inflow of foreign direct investment and entrepreneurship, 
which is responsible for much of the export flow, has facilitated this process, and, in 
turn, reflects the favorable economics of export production in China. The shift of 
Chinese production toward more advanced products with technological content is also 
notable. 
 Credit growth and investment growth have slowed down from the torrid rates 
of the end of 2003 and the first quarter of 2004. But credit, investment in real estate, 
overall investment and above all exports are still growing more rapidly than the 
overall economy. All were already large in relation to China’s GDP, and all are still 
growing relative to China’s GDP. Real investment is now close to 50% of GDP – and 
China’s capital stock is no longer so small that it is obvious that China can profitably 
re-invest half of its yearly domestic product. China now exports over $600 billion 
worth of goods to the rest of the world – not all that much less than the US. It is not 
clear that its exports can keep on growing at 35% y/y.  
 China’s growth is strong, but it is based on the rapid expansion of sectors of its 
economy that are already well developed. That can work for a while, but it also adds 
to China’s internal imbalances. The last time around when investment rate spiked 
from 35% to 45% of GDP in the early 1990s, the outcome was a hard landing. The 
risk of another – economically painful and socio-politically destabilizing - hard 
landing is still high. China’s existing growth model looks to be running up against 
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real limits, both internally and globally. Sustaining growth will require reorienting 
China’s economy – and relying, at least on while, on rapid expansion of domestic 
consumption to sustain growth. Its rapid rate of GDP growth and the boom in exports 
and international reserves are without precedent. The latter phenomenon of course is a 
joint product: not only is it unprecedented for an emerging market to be such a large 
creditor, but it is equally unique for a reserve currency country to be such a large 
debtor. Still, the reserve buildup is at least in part a testimony to China’s 
competitiveness and of course to its massive savings rate. Moreover, by joining the 
WTO and welcoming capital inflows, it is signaling a desire to open its economy to 
international influences and, in turn, to influence international developments. 
 The Chinese government currently faces a number of major policy choices 
relating to the foreign investment policy framework its priorities are: 
1. To continue to attract high-technology, large ticket investment, in order to 
pursue industrial restructuring and to foster import-substituting investment; 
2. To attract large sums of FDI into infrastructure, where expenditure of over 
nearly $750bn is expected to be needed; 
3. To attract investment into the interior provinces, consonant with the aim, 
enshrined in the current ninth Five Year Plan, of spreading development 
inland; 
4. To design an investment regime which, while it does not conflict with the 
demands of membership of the World Trade Organization, also allows for 
the pursuit of industrial reform at a measured pace; and 
5. To open the domestic market to foreign investment across a broader 
spectrum. 
 With its entry into the WTO, China has emerged as a leading trading power in 
the global market. To meet its commitments to the WTO, it has reduced tariffs and 
removed most of non-tariff barriers. Low wages are the main source of China’s 
comparative advantage along with high labor productivity. China has developed a 
strong comparative advantage in assembly stage of technology/capital intensive 
products and processing trade for number of products. The supply of skilled labor is 
high in China, which increases its potential to produce skill intensive products. China 
will intensify competition in developing countries domestic market. However, the 
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safeguard measures and restrictions that are included in the protocol of accession of 
WTO may limit its ability to some extent. For all developing countries, including 
India, competition with China has intensified in the third markets for labor-intensive 
goods such as textiles, clothing, light manufacturing products, leather products and 
marbles and granites. China is also fortunate in the sense that its high savings rate, 
cheap labor force and attractive domestic market means that it does not face the same 
opportunity cost other developing countries might when retaining capital controls. It 
is incorrect to say that China has not liberalized capital controls. Restrictions over FDI 
have been gradually liberalized to the extent that in 2002 China received more FDI 
than any other country in the world. Consequently, the opportunity cost to China of 
maintaining the capital controls that support exchange rate stability is foregoing 
access to more non-FDI capital (that in aggregate it does not really need anyway) and 
the chance for domestic savers to earn higher returns abroad. Given that 
macroeconomic stability, foreign trade and FDI have underpinned the rapid growth in 
living standards during the reform period, forgoing the opportunities of higher returns 
abroad is likely to be considered an acceptable sacrifice by the average Chinese saver. 
 China’s foreign exchange reserves are reported to have reached $ 853.7 bn in 
late February 2006 when China surpassed Japan’s $ 650.1 bn to become the world’s 
largest holder of foreign exchange. Beijing is now faced with the growing challenge 
as to how to handle these vast reserves effectively. China’s soaring foreign exchange 
reserves not only show how its overall strength has grown, but have also created 
internal and external pressures on the balance the Chinese economy. The 
accumulation of large foreign exchange reserves was beneficial during the process of 
economic reforms, but the recent further rise has tended to exacerbate its imbalance of 
payments, with risks for China’s financial system. The Chinese government has 
started to consider whether its accumulated foreign exchange reserve are excessive 
and intends to undertake effective measures to address the issue. China’s steady 
accumulation of foreign exchange reserve was beneficial over the past two decades, 
but the recent rapid build-up has brought about implied risk and problems for the 
Chinese economy. In particular, rapid and huge speculative capital inflows have 
contributed to a huge rise in its reserves and increased risk to the financial system. 
With strict controls on capital flows, it is safe and necessary for the government to 
reduce its foreign exchange reserves gradually and carefully. It is estimated that 
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foreign exchange reserves of around $ 400 bn would have been appropriate in 2005 
under circumstances of a managed floating exchange rate regime and capital control. 
China’s actual reserves have far exceeded its normal demand. The spending and 
investing of foreign exchange reserves should be undertaken in combination with 
liberalization in the capital account, given careful consideration of assets duration 
match and risk problems. Liberalization should be extended further but gradually in 
order to allow companies and individuals to adjust to changes in financial markets and 
to manage a portfolio to avoid financial risks. During the first two months of 2006 the 
contributed rapid build-up of foreign exchange reserves suggests that speculative 
inflows, although they have abated somewhat, are still strong. The increase in the first 
two months of the year of about $ 35 bn is partially accounted for by the first two 
months of the year of about $12 bn and another $ 5 bn surplus in foreign investment, 
with the remainder consisting largely of speculative inflows. As foreign exchange 
reserves continue to increase, the government must beware of speculative capital 
inflows and encourage reasonable outflows in the near future.   
 China should not change its exchange rate policies simply because other 
countries are urging it to do so. But by the same token, the fact that many are 
recommending a revaluation of the RMB is not sufficient reason for rejecting that 
policy option if it is the best one available. The main reason for revaluing the RMB by 
an appropriate amount is that it increases the odds that China will be able to achieve 
the economic objectives it has long pursued, namely, domestic financial reform, 
domestic macroeconomic stability, open market access for its exports, and a healthy, 
sustainable rate of economic growth. One cannot rule out the possibility that China 
will be able to rein-in excessive bank lending and rising inflationary pressures without 
exchange rate action by implementing administrative controls and (if that fails) by 
increasing domestic interest rates.56 But the effectiveness of administrative controls 
over the medium term is uncertain, and higher domestic interest rates may suck in 
further capital inflows. If these measures do not do the job, imbalances will eventually 
grow in size, and there will be a need for more draconian policy adjustments 
thereafter. The exchange rate debate in China has emerged as one of the most talked 
about topics in international economics. There are numerous myths purporting to be 
facts and the debate regarding the appropriate degree of exchange rate flexibility is 
more one-sided than is desirable. There is little solid evidence that China’s currency is 
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undervalued and even if it were, given the variation in equilibrium exchange rate 
estimates offered by economists, reluctance on the part of China’s policymakers to 
significantly revalue the RMB is unsurprising. Many of the benefits currently 
accruing to China as a result of a stable exchange rate also appear insufficiently 
recognized and similarly many of the costs involved in moving to a flexible regime. 
Perhaps the most prominent shortcoming of the consensus position is that it fails to 
convincingly demonstrate how exchange rate stability is at the root of problems in 
China’s economy today. China’s economic performance over the past decade suggests 
that it has not been hopelessly trying to reconcile the "irreconcilable trilemma" from 
macroeconomic theory, which states that a country cannot simultaneously pursue free 
capital mobility, a fixed exchange rate and an independent monetary policy. While its 
capital controls are certainly porous to a degree, when combined with partial 
sterilization and monetary policy in which administrative tools remain effective, 
China has been able to maintain both macroeconomic stability and a stable exchange 
rate. 
3.7 CONCLUSION 
 The so-called "half way house" economy which characterized China's 
economic growth for a period of a decade and a half performed extremely well, which 
goes against the basic beliefs among economists. One such belief is that market 
socialism cannot work. This belief however, went against the Chinese approach 
towards reform, which stressed the need to combine virtues of market and plan. Many 
observers stressed that the transition from a socialist to a market economy should be 
fast and done quickly. Another belief among economists is that enterprises will not 
respond in desirable ways to market signals unless private property rights are 
established. In all important areas of China's economy in the 1980's, however, 
transparent and legally protected individual property rights were the exception. In a 
village community, property rights for a piece of land were not distinguished in any 
tangible form such as a deed. China managed to succeed under these conditions, 
because the ability to gain from entrepreneurialism was absent, and ownership rights 
were ill-defined. Exports were promoted and imports were controlled according to 
administrative decisions at the industrial bureau or foreign trade corporation level, 
rather than by individual enterprises. Despite what economists would predict as a 
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poorly performing economy, a striking shift occurred in China's growth. China 
outperformed all other developing countries in terms of exports and output growth in 
real terms. Performance-based monitoring and rewarding system become an organic 
part of Chinese politics. One party government gives Chinese central authority a 
power to implement its policies effectively and to reward or punish its local officials. 
Under such governance, a yardstick competition among local governments is 
introduced to generate the sources of dynamics in investment and output growth. 
China did not copy any model to trigger its economic growth. What it did was to give 
up the ideology that constrains its will to choose the right way to catch up. China set 
the growth target when it began the slow process of economic reform, and when 
China began economic reforms, its aim was not to replace the old system, but to make 
some change of it. The evolutionary process of China’s economic reform helps induce 
rather than retard economic growth. 
 China finds a better governance to serve its goal of growth. And during the 
early phase of economic development, when the average income of population is 
much lower, the growth target is easier to be placed on the top of government agenda. 
What challenges China in the future is how Chinese system responds effectively to 
diversified interests of society and how Chinese government enforces its cohesion 
when growth target is no longer on consensus. For instance, China’s rapid growth 
from below has increasingly enlarged the regional income disparity and social income 
gap in the past decade. These problems threat social and political stability in China. 
China needs to manage these social problems. Recent experience has indicated that 
China is on the crossroad between implementation of growth target and moving 
towards to more distributional policies. 
 Economic growth is not the same as economic development. In the past 17 
years, China has achieved rapid economic growth, but made little progress in 
economic development. Without the essential parallel development of supporting 
market institutions and conventions, eventually the economic costs of growing chaos 
and wastefulness will override whatever remains of the economy's growth potential.  
Second, the comprehensive reform program launched in 1994 reflects the authorities' 
recognition of the numerous basic deficiencies in the economy, requiring correction. 
In the last two years, considerable progress has been made in foreign trade and 
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foreign exchange liberalization, the development of a modern tax code and revenue-
sharing arrangements, as well as in social and economic legislation. However, despite 
these impressive achievements, enormous difficulties continue to confront enterprise 
reform, housing and social welfare, tax administration, financial reform, and law 
enforcement. China's output growth is sustainable into the next century, say, to 2010, 
if and only if it succeeds in implementing its current comprehensive reform program. 
Predictions of China's becoming a great economic power by the year 2010 are greatly 
exaggerated. At best, it could become another newly industrialized country. 
Nevertheless, because of its sheer size China remains an attractive market for 
businesses that are experienced in trading with or investing in developing economies. 
China's role in the world economy, the nation's open-door policy has contributed 
greatly to the success of its economic growth but, at the same time, exposed its 
economy to the vicissitudes of the world economy and world politics. That is the price 
of being a member of the world community. Like all other members, China too must 
be prepared to accept the rules and obligations of the community-both in form and in 
spirit. 
             In the coastal region of China, which possesses a pool of intelligent educated 
R&D staff and skilled labor and hosts most of China’s R&D activities and top 
universities and research institutes and where inward FDI has evolved from labour-
intensive processing activities to more strategic asset-seeking type FDI by major 
MNEs, FDI has played a significant role in promoting regional innovation capacity as 
well as regional innovation efficiency over the 2000-2004 period. This increased 
regional innovation and technological capability contribute further to the fast regional 
economic growth in this region. However, in the inland provinces, they have not 
experienced such innovation-growth-promotion effect of FDI. China’s export 
competitiveness hinges on the coincidence of several factors: the favorable exchange 
rate, low wages and available supplies of unskilled labor, the reduced cost of 
communication and transportation, the flow of foreign direct investment and foreign 
management and its implications for China’s productive abilities, the large scale of 
the potential Chinese domestic market, the opening of world markets, and the 
encouragement of Chinese foreign trade policy. On the other hand, certain 
considerations have special importance. For example, Chinese export growth is more 
than a matter of low wages and an undervalued exchange rate. Chinese producers 
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have become greatly more proficient at meeting world requirements for quality and 
product design. The large inflow of foreign direct investment and entrepreneurship, 
which is responsible for much of the export flow, has facilitated this process, and, in 
turn, reflects the favorable economics of export production in China. The shift of 
Chinese production toward more advanced products with technological content is also 
notable. 
 Credit growth and investment growth have slowed down from the torrid rates 
of the end of 2003 and the first quarter of 2004. But credit, investment in real estate, 
overall investment and above all exports are still growing more rapidly than the 
overall economy. All were already large in relation to China’s GDP, and all are still 
growing relative to China’s GDP. Real investment is now close to 50% of GDP – and 
China’s capital stock is no longer so small that it is obvious that China can profitably 
re-invest half of its yearly domestic product. China now exports over $600 billion 
worth of goods to the rest of the world – not all that much less than the US. It is not 
clear that its exports can keep on growing at 35% y/y.  
 China’s growth is strong, but it is based on the rapid expansion of sectors of its 
economy that are already well developed. That can work for a while, but it also adds 
to China’s internal imbalances. The last time around when investment rate spiked 
from 35% to 45% of GDP in the early 1990s, the outcome was a hard landing. The 
risk of another – economically painful and socio-politically destabilizing - hard 
landing is still high. China’s existing growth model looks to be running up against 
real limits, both internally and globally. Sustaining growth will require reorienting 
China’s economy – and relying, at least on while, on rapid expansion of domestic 
consumption to sustain growth. Its rapid rate of GDP growth and the boom in exports 
and international reserves are without precedent. The latter phenomenon of course is a 
joint product: not only is it unprecedented for an emerging market to be such a large 
creditor, but it is equally unique for a reserve currency country to be such a large 
debtor. Still, the reserve buildup is at least in part a testimony to China’s 
competitiveness and of course to its massive savings rate. Moreover, by joining the 
WTO and welcoming capital inflows, it is signaling a desire to open its economy to 
international influences and, in turn, to influence international developments. 
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 The Chinese government currently faces a number of major policy choices 
relating to the foreign investment policy framework its priorities are: 
1. To continue to attract high-technology, large ticket investment, in order to 
pursue industrial restructuring and to foster import-substituting investment; 
2. To attract large sums of FDI into infrastructure, where expenditure of over 
nearly $750bn is expected to be needed; 
3. To attract investment into the interior provinces, consonant with the aim, 
enshrined in the current ninth Five Year Plan, of spreading development 
inland; 
4. To design an investment regime which, while it does not conflict with the 
demands of membership of the World Trade Organization, also allows for 
the pursuit of industrial reform at a measured pace; and 
5. To open the domestic market to foreign investment across a broader 
spectrum. 
 With its entry into the WTO, China has emerged as a leading trading power in 
the global market. To meet its commitments to the WTO, it has reduced tariffs and 
removed most of non-tariff barriers. Low wages are the main source of China’s 
comparative advantage along with high labor productivity. China has developed a 
strong comparative advantage in assembly stage of technology/capital intensive 
products and processing trade for number of products. The supply of skilled labor is 
high in China, which increases its potential to produce skill intensive products. China 
will intensify competition in developing countries domestic market. However, the 
safeguard measures and restrictions that are included in the protocol of accession of 
WTO may limit its ability to some extent. For all developing countries, including 
India, competition with China has intensified in the third markets for labor-intensive 
goods such as textiles, clothing, light manufacturing products, leather products and 
marbles and granites. China is also fortunate in the sense that its high savings rate, 
cheap labor force and attractive domestic market means that it does not face the same 
opportunity cost other developing countries might when retaining capital controls. It 
is incorrect to say that China has not liberalized capital controls. Restrictions over FDI 
have been gradually liberalized to the extent that in 2002 China received more FDI 
than any other country in the world. Consequently, the opportunity cost to China of 
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maintaining the capital controls that support exchange rate stability is foregoing 
access to more non-FDI capital (that in aggregate it does not really need anyway) and 
the chance for domestic savers to earn higher returns abroad. Given that 
macroeconomic stability, foreign trade and FDI have underpinned the rapid growth in 
living standards during the reform period, forgoing the opportunities of higher returns 
abroad is likely to be considered an acceptable sacrifice by the average Chinese saver. 
 China’s foreign exchange reserves are reported to have reached $ 853.7 bn in 
late February 2006 when China surpassed Japan’s $ 650.1 bn to become the world’s 
largest holder of foreign exchange. Beijing is now faced with the growing challenge 
as to how to handle these vast reserves effectively. China’s soaring foreign exchange 
reserves not only show how its overall strength has grown, but have also created 
internal and external pressures on the balance the Chinese economy. The 
accumulation of large foreign exchange reserves was beneficial during the process of 
economic reforms, but the recent further rise has tended to exacerbate its imbalance of 
payments, with risks for China’s financial system. The Chinese government has 
started to consider whether its accumulated foreign exchange reserve are excessive 
and intends to undertake effective measures to address the issue. China’s steady 
accumulation of foreign exchange reserve was beneficial over the past two decades, 
but the recent rapid build-up has brought about implied risk and problems for the 
Chinese economy. In particular, rapid and huge speculative capital inflows have 
contributed to a huge rise in its reserves and increased risk to the financial system. 
With strict controls on capital flows, it is safe and necessary for the government to 
reduce its foreign exchange reserves gradually and carefully. It is estimated that 
foreign exchange reserves of around $ 400 bn would have been appropriate in 2005 
under circumstances of a managed floating exchange rate regime and capital control. 
China’s actual reserves have far exceeded its normal demand. The spending and 
investing of foreign exchange reserves should be undertaken in combination with 
liberalization in the capital account, given careful consideration of assets duration 
match and risk problems. Liberalization should be extended further but gradually in 
order to allow companies and individuals to adjust to changes in financial markets and 
to manage a portfolio to avoid financial risks. During the first two months of 2006 the 
contributed rapid build-up of foreign exchange reserves suggests that speculative 
inflows, although they have abated somewhat, are still strong. The increase in the first 
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two months of the year of about $ 35 bn is partially accounted for by the first two 
months of the year of about $12 bn and another $ 5 bn surplus in foreign investment, 
with the remainder consisting largely of speculative inflows. As foreign exchange 
reserves continue to increase, the government must beware of speculative capital 
inflows and encourage reasonable outflows in the near future.   
 China should not change its exchange rate policies simply because other 
countries are urging it to do so. But by the same token, the fact that many are 
recommending a revaluation of the RMB is not sufficient reason for rejecting that 
policy option if it is the best one available. The main reason for revaluing the RMB by 
an appropriate amount is that it increases the odds that China will be able to achieve 
the economic objectives it has long pursued, namely, domestic financial reform, 
domestic macroeconomic stability, open market access for its exports, and a healthy, 
sustainable rate of economic growth. One cannot rule out the possibility that China 
will be able to rein-in excessive bank lending and rising inflationary pressures without 
exchange rate action by implementing administrative controls and (if that fails) by 
increasing domestic interest rates.56 But the effectiveness of administrative controls 
over the medium term is uncertain, and higher domestic interest rates may suck in 
further capital inflows. If these measures do not do the job, imbalances will eventually 
grow in size, and there will be a need for more draconian policy adjustments 
thereafter. The exchange rate debate in China has emerged as one of the most talked 
about topics in international economics. There are numerous myths purporting to be 
facts and the debate regarding the appropriate degree of exchange rate flexibility is 
more one-sided than is desirable. There is little solid evidence that China’s currency is 
undervalued and even if it were, given the variation in equilibrium exchange rate 
estimates offered by economists, reluctance on the part of China’s policymakers to 
significantly revalue the RMB is unsurprising. Many of the benefits currently 
accruing to China as a result of a stable exchange rate also appear insufficiently 
recognized and similarly many of the costs involved in moving to a flexible regime. 
Perhaps the most prominent shortcoming of the consensus position is that it fails to 
convincingly demonstrate how exchange rate stability is at the root of problems in 
China’s economy today. China’s economic performance over the past decade suggests 
that it has not been hopelessly trying to reconcile the "irreconcilable trilemma" from 
macroeconomic theory, which states that a country cannot simultaneously pursue free 
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capital mobility, a fixed exchange rate and an independent monetary policy. While its 
capital controls are certainly porous to a degree, when combined with partial 
sterilization and monetary policy in which administrative tools remain effective, 
China has been able to maintain both macroeconomic stability and a stable exchange 
rate. 
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Chapter - 4 
SINO-INDIA TRADING RELATION 
4.1 HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 
4.1.1 INDIA AND CHINA PRE 1962: 
 India became independent two years before the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) secured power in China in 1949. India’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, 
initially conceived of a synergistic relationship between New Delhi and Beijing Both 
countries had huge populations and immense developmental challenges, and were 
assumed thus natural partners. China and India also shared a wariness of Western 
political meddling. India, in fact, was the first noncommunist state to formally 
recognize the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In 1954, talks in Beijing between 
Premier Zhou Enlai and an Indian government delegation resulted in the signing of 
the Panchsheel Agreement, which formally envisioned “peaceful coexistence” 
between China and India. The India-China honeymoon of the 1950s began to show 
signs of strain by the latter half of the decade. In 1956, the CCP promulgated its first 
official map of China and the surrounding area, rejecting the McMahon line first 
demarcated by the British colonial authorities in 1914. The map showed large swathes 
of Indian territory within the borders of China. The Indian government reacted 
angrily, accusing the CCP of arbitrarily extending China’s borders. In 1958, to 
improve Chinese leverage in the altercation, the CCP ordered the covert construction 
of a network of roads. The Indian response—the construction of military posts along 
the McMahon line—proved unacceptable to the Chinese. In October 1962, the 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) launched a preemptive assault, obliterating India’s 
weak and unorganized defenses. After a month of intense fighting, China declared a 
unilateral ceasefire. The PLA withdrew from some of the conquered areas, but 
retained over 38,000 square kilometers of disputed territory. Diplomatic and 
economic relations between Beijing and New Delhi collapsed after the 1962 war. In 
the three subsequent decades, bilateral trade figures dwindled to negligible amounts. 
 The Sino-Indian Agreement was signed on April 29, 1954. There was nothing 
new in these principles which should normally guide the relations between two 
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independent countries not at war with each other. The first article of the agreement 
allowed the establishment of Trade Agencies by India in Yantung, Gyantse and 
Gartok and by China in New Delhi, Calcutta and Kalimpong. The second article fixed 
the trade marts in the respective countries. The government of China also agreed to 
specify ten places as trade marts and reserved the right to obtain from India as and 
when the need arose. Article 3 allowed pilgrims from India to go to Mount Kailash, 
Mansarovar and Lasha and from Tibet to Benaras, Sarnath, Gaya and Sanchi and 
certain passes were fixed for the pilgrim traffic. Subsequently in the month of 
October, 1954, a Trade Agreement was signed between the two countries at Delhi 
according to which China got two important concessions: the establishment of 
branches of the People’s Bank of China in India. Both the Agreement had gone 
entirely in favor of China and against the interests of India. Moreover, the main 
commodity from Tibet, for which there was great demand in India, was Tibetan wool, 
and the Chinese diverted the entire wool trade to China. So there was little left for 
exchange.     
 In China, starting in the early 1950’s, trade flows came to be controlled 
through a centralized planning system under the Ministry of Foreign Trade (MFT).A 
limited number of centralized Foreign Trade Corporation (FTC) under the MFT 
organized along product lines such as iron and steel and textiles and clothing and 
having branch offices in the main provinces that produced export products or used 
imported inputs conducted all trade. So inward looking did China become that its total 
trade in current dollars grew from $ 3.15 billion in 1955 to just 4.6 billion in 1970.In 
December 1978 when China launched its “open door” policy, 12 such FTCs centrally 
controlled all its trade.              
 Christopher J. Rusko and Karthika Sasikumar Since the late 1950s, “relations 
between India and China have been fraught with tension and conflict. Yet the two 
countries have recently enjoyed a significant improvement in bilateral relations. In 
this article, we explore potential economic reasons for this rapprochement. We set out 
three possible mechanisms by which commercial interdependence could lead states 
toward peace, and then examine their operation in the India-China case. We conclude 
that the most likely explanation for the relational change is the concerted effort in 
both countries to be seen as responsible participants in the global economy. Thus, 
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general economic prudence, rather than any specific bilateral factor, may be having a 
positive effect on the India-China relationship”. 
4.1.2 INDIA AND CHINA POST 1962: 
 Meanwhile, China was engaged in a similar, though even more far-reaching, 
transformation of its domestic economic regulatory framework. Most analysts point to 
the Third Plenum of the CCP (December 1978) as the harbinger of China’s economic 
transformation. Deng Xiaoping’s speech at this plenary went much further toward 
establishing a new economic model for China than any other previous reform. Deng 
pursued a policy of economic modernization, decentralization, and privatization. 
 Although he maintained a rhetorical focus on the “socialist” benefits of 
economic change, Deng parted with Mao’s trenchant anti private sector and anti-
market exhortations. He also rejected Mao’s hostile attitude toward the West and the 
international system in general. The bellicosity of Mao’s “war and revolution” slogan 
was replaced with a declaration of “peace and development.”  Deng stated that a 
world war was unlikely in the next decade, and argued that China’s constant state of 
war readiness was financially taxing, unnecessary, and counterproductive to the 
national interest. Rather than rejecting economic engagement outright, as Mao had 
done, Deng tied Chinese nationalism to the pursuit of wealth and commercial 
achievement. Upon taking over the leadership of the CCP in the early 1990s, Jiang 
Zemin continued Deng’s broad reforms. Jiang’s rhetoric and policies were even more 
explicitly global than Deng’s; China, he argued, could use its growing economic 
power to secure its rightful place at the table of the great powers. Jiang connected 
Chinese national identity to shrewd fiscal and commercial policy, innovative business 
practices, and robust market competitiveness. 
 Decentralization was crucial to China’s economic overhaul. Even before 
Deng’s landmark 1978 speech, the control of a number of state-owned industrial 
enterprises was transferred from the central government to local governments. By 
1985, the central government controlled only 20 percent of the output from state-
owned enterprises, whereas provincial, city, and county governments controlled 54 
percent. The decentralization of state enterprises attracted more foreign capital; 
foreign investment increased from $ 4.5 billion in 1985 to $19.2 billion in 1992. In 
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1979, China created four special economic zones: Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou (across 
from Hong Kong), and Xiamen (adjacent to the Taiwan Strait). After the fall of 
communism in Europe, some within the CCP reflexively sought to protect the party 
through re-centralization.  
 However, the winning factions within the leadership resisted this temptation, 
understanding that an end to economic growth would actually challenge the 
legitimacy of the CCP more than anything else. Moreover, the semi-privatized 
economy was now far too massive and dynamic for the CCP to rein in. Meanwhile, a 
bureaucratic transformation also helped usher in economic reform. Mandatory 
retirement age forced revolutionary veterans to step down, allowing less ideologically 
rigid civil servants to move into the public service. Bureaucrats were also allowed to 
move away from public service to join the business community. This educated group 
of ex-bureaucrats—comfortable with and well versed in the Byzantine nature of the 
Chinese business climate—formed a new entrepreneurial, commercially oriented 
class. From 1979 to 2003, China’s economy grew at an annual rate of 8 to 9 percent. 
China’s foreign trade volume increased twenty-four times in the same period, 
reaching $1 trillion in 2004.24 Between 1987 and 2000, China’s exports grew from 
$39.44 billion to $249.2 billion. China’s rapprochement with the United States—
which began after President Richard Nixon’s visit to China in 1972, and gained 
additional impetus after Deng’s policy shift—facilitated a massive increase in the 
China-U.S. trading relationship. Between 1987 and 2000, Chinese exports to the 
United States, as a percentage of total U.S. imports, rose from 7.7 percent to 20.9 
percent. 
 Following that, it provide a brief overview of the key changes in the Indian 
and Chinese economies in the last three decades, and concomitant changes in their 
political and diplomatic behavior. In the article’s third section, we lay out three 
potential mechanisms linking economic interdependence and strategic de-escalation. 
The next section examines the operation of these mechanisms in the India-China case. 
We conclude with our predictions concerning the future conduct of Sino-Indian 
relations. 
 In 1971, India supported East Pakistan (later Bangladesh) in its war of 
secession from Pakistan. The role India played in the partition of Pakistan—a close 
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ally of China—and its refusal to renounce its nuclear ambitions, put China on guard. 
In the summer of 1974, India detonated an underground atomic device, proving its 
nuclear-weapon capabilities. Although Prime Minister Indira Gandhi (1967-1977; 
1980-1984) ordered the 1974 test, she also pursued the renewal of the Beijing-New 
Delhi diplomatic relationship. Ambassadorial-level relations were restored in 1976. 
Although diplomatic tension reemerged as a corollary of the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese 
war, this was merely a small bump in relations; in 1980, Indira Gandhi returned to 
power and met with the Chinese premier, reaffirming her desire to maintain friendly 
ties with Beijing. She also indicated that she shared the Chinese aspiration for greater 
economic cooperation. China and India granted one another Most Favored Nation 
(MFN) trading status in August 1984. Nonetheless, as late as 1990, bilateral trade 
amounted to a mere $190 million.                           
 “Clash of the Titans,” The Economist, November 6, 2004. Rajiv Gandhi 
(1984-1988), more than any other Indian prime minister, focused his diplomatic 
efforts on reconciliation with China. In 1988, he made an historic visit to Beijing, the 
first prime ministerial visit in thirty-four years. These overtures led to the creation of a 
Joint Working Group (JWG) to address the border issue. Rajiv Gandhi and the CCP 
leadership also signed several scientific and cultural exchange agreements during this 
meeting. Prime Minister Narasimha Rao (1991-1996) continued Rajiv Gandhi’s 
diplomatic efforts. In 1993, Rao and Jiang Zemin signed an agreement for “the 
maintenance of peace and tranquility along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).” They 
also set up the India-China Expert Group of Diplomatic and Military Officers, tasked 
with advising the JWG.3 These diplomatic steps led both the CCP and the Indian 
parliament to ratify mutual troop reductions along the LAC in 1997. Starting in the 
mid- 1990s, China also began to adopt more even-handed rhetoric in discussing Indo-
Pakistani relations, and the issue of Kashmir in particular. The incremental advances 
made in Sino-Indian diplomacy were dramatically set back after India conducted tests 
of its nuclear weapons in 1998. A letter, sent by Prime Minister Vajpayee (1996; 
1998-2004) to U.S. President Bill Clinton, was leaked to the New York Times. In the 
missive, Vajpayee defended the nuclear tests by pointing to China as a potential threat 
to Indian security. The Chinese government repudiated Vajpayee’s reasoning, calling 
his justification “utterly groundless.” China then declared Pakistan’s nuclear tests a 
necessary “reaction” to India’s “hegemonic designs.” Beijing also expressed 
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discontent by canceling the annual JWG meeting. However, shortly afterwards, India 
commenced a conscious process of reestablishing relations with China. There were 
several high-level meetings between the leaders of both countries, and the nuclear 
issue was put firmly on the back burner. When India and Pakistan were embroiled in a 
short, sharp war in the summer of 1999, China refrained from overt support for the 
Christopher J. Rusko and Karthika Sasikumar latter. In 2006, a Memorandum of 
Understanding on Defence Cooperation was signed during the Indian defense 
minister’s visit to China. The agreement increased the number of military exchanges 
between the armed forces of the two countries. The move was hailed in India and 
abroad as facilitating a joint concentration on economic growth. The Chinese defense 
and foreign ministers made specific reference on the occasion to the goal of 
promoting prosperity in the region. 
 In sum, numerous diplomatic efforts have been made to expand Sino-Indian 
rapprochement over the last three decades. However, there remain points of genuine 
contention, with the demarcation of the border being the most salient. Although the 
JWG has met thirteen times, it has failed to bring about any formal alteration to the 
border. With China accepting Sikkim as one of the states of India, one of the long 
standing border disputes between the two countries has come to an end. This can be 
considered as a milestone in the relation of the two countries and the overall economic 
and business impact it will have on them .A free trade Agreement (FTA) between the 
two countries is on the cards, which if materialize will create a market housing 40 % 
of global population. India ‘s Foreign secretary, Shyam Saran in a press conference 
said , On both international and regional issues, we have common concerns and 
common objectives. Therefore, the merit is in working together than as rivals”. But 
concerns about the domestic industry over trade pacts are pressurizing the government 
to open up trade with China only in phased manner. This will mean that the FTA will 
actually take several years to materialize. A panel has been set up to study the 
feasibility of the proposed FTA through China has currently agreed to the study, it is 
likely that it will pressurize India to hasten the process. However, the pacts on civil 
aviation, tourism, energy, science and technology and education will be a 
counterbalance for the hesitation showed by India in welcoming the FTA deal. As 
Joseph Nye, Professor at Harvard has commented, “The two countries recent 
rapprochement marks a huge change from the hospality that bedeviled their relations 
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following their 1962 war over a disputed border in the Himalayas. While the domestic 
industry is not very keen on the agreement, many are excited about the FTA. The 
chief mentor of CII, Tarun Das commented that. “A real gain from an FTA will be 
lower costs of products and services and competitiveness of the industry in the long-
term, focusing on a massive twin market- of India and China”. Experts are of the 
opinion that the fears of the domestic industry over increased competition and 
flooding of market are baseless, as India Inc. is it-self a force to reckon with. Through 
India lags behind in the field of manufacturing (China’s manufacturing is nearly 50 % 
of its GDP, at about $ 650 bn per year, whereas India stands at about $ 110 bn 
compared to its GDP of $ 440 bn) it has indeed come a long way and is now exporting 
and investing internationally. Foreign companies have also shown increasing interest 
in Indian manufacturing sector and many have set up their outlets in the country. O.P 
Garg, President of the Federation of Indian Export Organization (FIEO) opines that, 
”FTA will boost investment as both Indian and Chinese majors would be willing to 
invest in the integrated market since market risk and uncertainty are minimized 
through prefential agreement” Liberalization of services under a compressive 
agreement will mean greater benefits to India, since services contribute to 51 % of the 
country’s GDP as compared to 30 % in the case of China. India is strongly component 
in the field of financial services as well when compared to China’s deeply-fawned 
banking system. India also has the upper hand in education and technical services 
with nine times more engineers than China. Retarding tourism, both are considered to 
be equal, and therefore it will be mutually beneficial for them in this sector. The 
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao on his visit to India commented, “I strongly believed 
that if we join hands together, we will certainly be able to set a new trial in the IT 
business world. In the days to come, it will signify the coming of the Asian century of 
the century of the IT industry. Cooperation is just like two pagodas. One hardware 
and one software. Combined we can take the leadership position in the world” India 
Inc. has already made a mark on the land of the dragon. Almost all the major Indian 
companies have looked at manufacturing bases, forays or tie ups with China, are it the 
Tatas and Birlas or the new generation Narayan Murthys and Azim Premjis. Even the 
‘Man of Steel’ – Lakshmi Narayan Mittal is setting up a $ 100 mn steel plant in the 
mineral rich Liaoning province. 
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 Both countries, scared by their bitter experiences of foreign invasion, resisted 
any economic interests shown by foreign countries. After the Sino-Indian war of 
1962, India and China served their ties with each other and became complete 
strangers, even through they shared a common border. But the visit of Rajiv Gandhi to 
China in 1989, the then Prime Minister of India, brought a great deal of positive 
changes in the Sino –Indian ties. Now with both the giants walking hand-in hand, 
instead of crossing each other’s paths, there’s little the rest of the world can do to stop 
them from becoming global economic powerhouse. 
Growing bilateral economic ties:                        
 Sino-Indian economic engagement has a short history but a sharply rising 
trajectory. Although the two had signed an accord in 1984 granting MFN status to 
each other, bilateral trade was only about $ 332m until 1992. It has grown steadily 
since then, except during 1998-99 following the Indian tests, reaching $ 5 b in 2002, 
and $ 13.6b in 2005. China now ranks as India’s third largest trading partner, although 
India remains a distant 12th in China’s foreign trade statistics. During Premier Wen’s 
April 2005 visit, India and China set the foreign trade target of $ 20b by 2008, and $ 
30 b by 2010. Given the compounded annual growth rate of over 30 % since 1999, 
reaching these goals should not prove difficult. What is more noteworthy, however, is 
the massive untapped potential for broader cooperation, but also the problems and 
challenges that these aggregate figures do not revel. 
 The foreign trade volume of $ 136b in 2005, with India’s exports valued at $ 
7.67b and imports at $ 5.93b, is table for two reasons. First, China has typically 
permitted its smaller neighbors to enjoy a trade surplus with it, whereas China’s own 
largest trade surplus is with the United States. This approach, not unlike the US 
practice while aiding the recovery of Germany and Japan from their destruction 
during World War II helps China reinforce the image of its “peaceful rise” (helping 
jueqi) and enhance interdependence with these Asian economies. This is borne out in 
the recent Japanese and South Korean economic revival, with China displacing the 
United States as their largest trading partner. This is significant given that foreign 
trade comprises about 40 % of the GDP of these major world economies, and trade 
with China-especially for Japan-has curbed adverse policies despite their respective 
bitter memories of World War II. 
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 The second and somewhat related aspect of India’s minor trade surplus is the 
“irrational exuberance” that it generated about India’s ability to successfully compete 
with China. However, a simple review of the basket of commodities that comprise 
India’s exports to China reveals a more somber picture. Thus, iron, ore, slag, ash and 
steel account for over 60 % of India exports, followed by plastics, organic chemicals 
and cotton yarn. Further, the high earnings from iron and steel exports are buoyed by 
the current high international price of these items, fuelled in art by China’s booming 
demand, which now accounts for almost one-third of the global iron and steel 
demand. And while China’s infrastructure needs might sustain this demand and high 
prices for some years, India need to rapidly diversify its exports basket to sustain and 
increase its exports over the longer terms. On the other hand, India’s imports form 
China is dominated by electrical machinery and equipments, organic chemicals, 
machine tools and mineral fuels. The imports basket thus revels the clear cost 
advantage enjoyed by China in these higher value-added items over India. 
 Clearly, India risk becoming a supplier of minerals and semi-manufactured 
goods to China unless it rapidly steps up the production of higher value-added goods 
at internationally competitative prices and builds a more complicated issues of how 
India can successfully compete with China in increasing its exports of similar 
products and services globally, while also deepening trade and manufacturing ties 
with China. Public statements and policy signals emanating from New Delhi so far do 
not clarify how it seeks to resolve this Catch-22 situation or even whether it fully 
comprehends this dilemma. 
Government-Industry Collaboration: 
 The effort by the governments to deepen and widen economic cooperation 
became focused during 2000-2001 as India negotiated with China and then supported 
its entry into the World Trade Organization. From about the same time, Beijing has 
displayed a growing interest in harnessing India IT strength for its broader benefit. 
Thus, in mid-2000, the political leadership of Xinjiang province invited IT 
professional from India to help develop this backward region. Similarly, India’s IT 
prowess has piqued the interest of the Chinese armed forces (PLA), whose military 
modernization emphasizes greater use of IT in CSIR (command, control, 
communications, computers, software, intelligence and reconnaissance). While China 
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appears keen to exploit India’s IT and software strengths to integrate it with its 
hardware capabilities, corresponding Indian strategy-either to protect its commercial 
edge or secure a reciprocal bargain from China in another field-is not visible. 
 On a broader front, the Indian Navy has since 2000 undertaken a successful 
annual initiative called “Operation Milan” under which its ships make port calls in 
most countries through Southeast Asia and Japan, In 2004, Indian ships made their 
first-ever port call in Shanghais and the two countries plan to conduct a joint maritime 
exercise in the near term. Here too, while India pursuing a broader confidence-
building approach, China’s strategy-of developing close naval (military) ties with 
India response in the public domain. 
 In case, bilateral governmental efforts have generated a strong positive 
response from the business community, and greater synergies are beginning to 
emerge. The Confederation of Indian Industry (CII), India’s premier consortium of 
primarily high value-added manufacturing companies, has partnered with Indian 
diplomatic missions in Beijing and Shanghai to organize two successful “Made in 
India” road shows during 2003and 2004. In May 2005, it partnered with the China 
Council for the Promotion of International Trade to organize a conference, “China’s 
Miracle” attended by business majors and top commerce ministry officials from both 
countries. In addition, in recent years numerous business delegations, seminars and 
workshops at leading academic and policy institutions on each side have enriched the 
bilateral economic discourse and generated optimism about expanding commercial 
ties. 
 India’s private sector in the IT and related hi-tech fields enjoys certain 
advantages over China. The IT sector developed during the 1990 from a combination 
of entrepreneurial ingenuity and governmental inattention. Consequently, firms were 
forced to optimized operating costs and complete for large shares of the global off-
shoring and BPO market. Over time, they moved up the value chain to provide 
customized business solutions to global clients, created increasingly seanless division 
of lab our between local entities and their partners abroad, and have now accelerated 
global acquisitions to produce and supply to distant markets. 
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 By contrast, it was only in 1999 that China’s private firms were provided the 
same constitutional protection that was available to foreign business and the domestic 
public sector since the 1980s (Yasheng and Khanna, 2003).A related problem, 
stemming from China’s decision to direct FDI and domestic capital toward its 
inefficient SOEs is that most private firms remain strapped for cash. This “unfair 
treatment” in turn prevents them fro scaling up production to improve productivity, 
and consolidate operations by resorting to mergers and acquisitions in China or 
abroad (Srivastava, 2005; China Academic of Social Science, 2000). 
 By contrast, in spite of the remaining weakness in India, China’s IPR 
protection is comparatively much weaker. As a new entrant to the W.TO in 2001, 
China is obligated to improve its regulatory framework and enforcement mechanisms, 
and to curb the widespread patent infringement of foreign products and technology- 
from audio-visual to dual-use aerospace and nuclear items (March 2005). This is 
expected to take considerable time given the institutionalized form of corruption in 
the system, continued constraints on the operations of the private sector, and the sheer 
scale of the national industries that need training and supervision. This presents India 
with the opportunity to exploit its relative head-start and increase the share of its 
value-added exports to China. 
 Finally, India’s banking and financial services sectors are also more developed 
than China’s. Wit over 20 million shareholders, India has the third largest investor 
base in the world after the United States and Japan. The Indian capital market is 
significant in terms of development, volume of trading and growth potential. Its stock 
market capitalization of $ 41 trillion as of March 2005 was the highest amongst the 
emerging markets, compared to $ 450 billion in China. Clearly, India is in a position 
to assist in the development of China’s nascent stock market and its relatively weak 
and non-transparent banking sector. 
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Figure 4.2.1 Trends in India China Bilateral Trade 
 According to the Indian Commerce Ministry data, India’s imports from China 
rose from a partly $ 18 million in 1990-91 to approximately $ 5.3 billion in 2004-
05.India’s imports from China expanded equally rapidly, from $ 35 million to $ 6.8 
billion over the same period. So rapid has this expansion been that from an 
insignificant suppliers until the beginning of the 1990s.China trails the United States 
as India’s top source of imports by less than $ 100 million. In the last three years, 
India’s exports to China have grown at the annual rate of almost 80 percent. Its 
imports have grown almost 50 percent per annum over the same period. 
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Table 4.2.1 
India –China Bilateral Trade Growth (1992-2004) 
Pattern and rate of Bilateral Trade growth (1992-2004) 
         (Unit: $ million) 
Year 
Indian 
Imports 
Indian 
Exports 
Trade 
Balance 
Trade 
Volume 
1992 158.44 180.1 +21.66 338.54 
Growth 9.6% 49.6%  27.8% 
1993 259.16 416.57 +157.41 675.73 
Growth 63.5% 131.3%  99.6% 
1994 573.00 322.00 -251.00 894.00 
Growth 121% -22.75%  32% 
1995 765.00 398.00 -367.00 1,162.00 
Growth 34% 24%  29.9% 
1996 689.54 719.16 +29.62 1,406.00 
Growth -10.1% 80.9%  20.9% 
1997 933.06 897.26 -35.8 1,830.32 
Growth 36% 24.7%  30.2% 
1998 1,016.59 905.70 -110.89 1,922.30 
Growth 8.9% 0.9%  5% 
1999 1161.890 825.792 -336.098 1,987.68 
Growth 14.3% -8.8%  3.4% 
2000 1569.465 1350.414 -219.051 2,914.223 
Growth 34.3% 63.9%  46.6% 
2001 1896.268 1,699.966 -196.302 3,596.234 
Growth 21.5% 25.6%  23.4% 
2002 2671.728 2274.180 -397.548 4945.908 
Growth 40.8% 33.7%  37.5% 
2003 3344.993 4252.802 +908 (apprx) 7597.79 
Growth 25.1% 86.9%  53.6% 
2004 5927 7677 +1750 13604.1 
Growth 77.3% 80.6%  79.1% 
Source: China PRP 
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                      It can be observed from Table 4.2.1 that the bilateral trade between the 
two countries is steadily growing. India-China bilateral trade reached US $ 13.6 
billion in 2004 compared to US $ 7.6 billion in 2003, from a low base of US $ 338 
million in 1992. India ranked 20th as the top trading partner of China in 2003 and this 
position went up to 12 th in 2004. China is now the second largest trading partner of 
India after the USA. 
 Growth was witnessed both in exports and imports. According to the countries 
statistics, the balance of trade turned in India’s favor with a surplus of US $ 1750 
million in 2004. Bilateral trade recorded consistent growth of over 20 % since 1992, 
except in 1998 and 1999 when it was less then 5 %. The total bilateral volume 
between the two countries has reached US $ 13.6 billion in 2004, 79.1 percent higher 
than that in 2003, India’s Exports to China reached US $ 7.67 billion in 2004 up 80.6 
percent compared to 2003 and the imports accounted for US $ 5,927 billion up 77.3 
percent. 
Resumption of Border Trade: 
 Border trade, though small in volume, also plays a significant role in 
enhancing bilateral trade and economic cooperation.  Moreover, it contributes to 
generate opportunities for the export of the commodities across the bordering 
provinces/states of the two countries. 
a. Nathu La Pass: India and China have signed a historic agreement to resume 
border trade through the strategic Nathu La Pass from July 6 after 44 years of 
closure, a move that could also signal Beijing’s implicit recognition of Sikkim 
as part of India. The Nathu La Pass is 4,545 metres above sea level.  It is 460 
kilometers away from Lhasa and 550 kilometers from Calcutta.  The pass used 
to be an important trade passage between China and India and part of the 
fabled ‘Silk Route’. Currently China and India trade mostly by sea 
transportation.  
SINO-INDIA TRADING RELATION
 
 
China's Integration into Global Trading System and Its Implications for India 
179
 The reopening of the border trade route after 44 years since the Sino-India war 
of 1962 will give a major boost to the local economies of the land-locked 
mountainous regions of the two Asian giants. The reopening of Nathu La has 
implicitly signaled that the Chinese government has abandoned its policy of 
treating Sikkim as an independent nation “annexed” by India in ’75, the 
analysts said.  Trade through Nathu La Pass accounted for 80% of the total 
border trade volume between China and India in the early 1900s.  But the 
trade was suspended in ’62 after the India-China border conflict. 
 The agreement allows residents living on the border areas of the two countries 
to trade about 28 items mentioned in the border trade agreements of 1991 and 
1992 as well as 2003. The items that could be traded includes agricultural 
implements, blankets, food grains, agro-chemical products, dry fruits, 
beverages and canned food. “The resumption of (Sino-Indian) border trade is a 
great historic event, not only for enlarging trade, but also for greater relations 
between the two great countries”. With the reopening of Nathu La Pass, iron 
ore and livestock products from India and wool, herbs and electric appliances 
from China can be transported into the other country through the short cut, 
Hao said. 
b. Shipki La Pass: The border trade between India and China is conducted 
through Namgya Shipki-la village in Pooh sub-division of Kinnaur along the 
Namgya-Shipkila-Shipkl Jijubu land route. 
 The trade agreements between the two nations allowed residents of Tibet 
(China) and the Kinnaur district living along the border areas to import-export 
about 30 items only. The items allowed for export through Shipki la are 
agricultural implements, blankets, textiles, copper products, clothes, cycles, 
coffee, tea, barley, rice, flour, dry fruit, dry & fresh vegetables, vegetable oil, 
gur and misri tobacco snuff, cigarettes, canned food, agro-chemical, local 
herbs dyes spices, watchs, shoes, kerosene oil, stationery, utensils, wheat etc. 
On the other hand, major items of import from China via Tibet include raw 
silk, goats, sheep, China clay, wood, utensils, textiles (mostly readymade 
garments), shoes etc 
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4.3 INDIA’S EXPORT TO CHINA 
Table 4.3.1 
India’s top 15 exports to China (2003 and Jan-Nov 2004) 
Value 
(US $ million) 
% Share in India's 
total exports to china 
% Change in
04/03 
  2003 2004 2003 2004  
INDIA 3701.17 6928.4 1 1.36 87.2 
 Ores, slag, ash 1109.59 3894.82 29.98 56.22 251.02 
 Iron and steel 1007.45 543.05 27.22 7.84 -46.1 
 Plastic 292.2 362.1 7.9 5.23 23.92 
 Organic chemicals 245.51 319.12 6.63 4.61 29.98 
 Inorg Chem; rare earth mat 110.72 239.51 2.99 3.46 116.32 
Cotton +yarn fabric 104.93 227.93 2.84 3.29 117.22 
 Precious stones, metals 150.92 213.32 4.08 3.08 41.35 
 Salt; sulfur; earth, stone 130.60 184.68 3.53 2.67 41.41 
  Machinery 60.03 119.62 1.62 1.73 99.26 
  Hides and skins 58.37 95.13 1.58 1.37 62.98 
  Copper+articles there of 31.38 77.64 0.85 1.12 147.4 
   Electrical machinery 37.57 69.15 1.02 1 84.04 
   Aluminum 12.82 56.58 0.35 0.82 341.41 
   Artif flowers feathers 35.09 44.36 0.95 0.64 26.41 
  Optic, nt 8544; med instr 30.84 39.77 0.83 0.57 28.93 
Source: China PRP 
 It can be seen from Table 4.3.1 that substantial proportion of India’s exports 
are raw materials. 56 percent of exports from India in 2004 were iron ore, slag and 
ash. The main products in India’s export basket to China in 2006-07 were iron ore 
(US$ 3.3 bn), other ores & minerals (US$ 664.6 mn), raw cotton (US$ 655.9 mn), 
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non-ferrous metals (US$ 590.7 mn), plastic and linoleum products (US$ 318.9 mn), 
processed minerals (US$ 346.0 mn), primary & semi-finished iron & steel (US$ 354.5 
mn), and dyes intermediates & coal tar chemicals (US$ 221.9 mn).  
 China is the largest market for India’s exports of iron ore (86.4% share in 
total), raw cotton (62.8%), mica (32.5%), processed minerals (30.4%), and ferro 
alloys (20.8%). China is also the second largest market for India’s exports of guargum 
meal (12.2%), primary & semi finished iron & steel (11.5%), and 
inorganic/organic/agro- chemicals (10.7%).Composition of India’s export basket to 
China is skewed in favor of primary products. Key item of India’s exports to China 
in 2003-04 included ores, slag and ash; iron and steel; plastics; organic chemicals; 
cotton. India’s exports to China are highly concentrated as in 2003-04. 
 The momentum for increased bilateral trade is further reinforced by a high and 
sustained economic growth that is invariably accompanied by a higher and more 
broad-based propensity for consumption. India and China have revealed significant 
economic dynamism in the 1990s. The average GDP growth of China between 
1990and 2003 was as high as 9.3 %, and the annual GDP growth rate of India was 6.2 
% between 1994 and 2002. In the oil meal and iron and steel bar/ore have registered a 
growth of over 100 percent in this period. The share of primary and semi finished iron 
and steel, processed minerals and cotton yarn has however declined in total exports 
from India and China. Iron ore and iron and steel accounted for a major share (about 
47 %) of the total exports. Exports of other ores and minerals, marine products, 
inorganic/organic/agro chemicals registered a decline, both, in terms of percentage 
growth and as share of total exports from India and China in this period. 
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Table 4.3.2 
Commodity Structure of Indian Exports to China 
HS  Export 
Volume 
(2003) 
Percentage Export 
Volume 
(1995) 
%age 
26 Ores, scoria, and mineral 
ashes 
1,220,794,783 31.5 152,841,469 38.4 
72 Iron & Steel 1,074,909,828 25.5 17,508,166 4.4 
39 Plastic & plastic products 323,962,825 7.7 18,741,977 4.7 
29 Organic chemicals 
products 
273,293,830 6.5 21,220,758 5.3 
71 Jewelry, noble metals & 
their products; modeled 
jewelry; coined 
164,207,519 3.9 10,424,098 2.6 
25 Salt, sulfur, soil and stone 
material; limestone & 
cement 
144,580,172 3.4   
52 Cotton 126,845,770 3 24,401,789 6.1 
28 Inorganic reactor, boiler, 
machinery equipment and 
their spare parts 
127,216,583 3 17,666,368 4.4 
84 Nuclear reactor, boiler , 
machinery equipment & 
their spare parts 
78,361,988 1.9   
41 Peltry(furs excluded)& 
leather 
65,969,329 1.6 24,276,701 6.1 
15 Animal & plant oil, fat & 
wax; refined edible grease 
  28,688,752 7.2 
3 Fish & other aquatic 
invertebrate animal 
  26,338,666 6.6 
 Total 3,710,142,627 88 342,108,744 85.8 
Source: China PRP 
 According to Chinese statistics based on Table 4.3.2 shows that top 3 export 
items accounted for 70 % of total exports. Top 5 export items accounted for 70.1 % 
of total exports. Top 10 export item accounted for 83.9 % of total exports. And in 
the top 10 exports ore, slag and ash accounted for 35 % of the total exports. 
 Mineral ores have always enjoyed a predominant status in India exports to 
China . The percentage of ores has however, reduced from 38.4 % in 1995 to 31.5 % 
in 2003. The percentage of two primary products of cotton, peltry and leather has 
also decreased by large margin. In the same period, the percentage of manufacturing 
products has considerably increased. The percentage of iron $ steel rose by large 
margin from 4.4 % to 25.5 %, plastics and plastic products from 4.7 % to 7.7 % and 
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machinery equipments begin to rank among the top ten products in terms of total 
export volume recently. The percentage of organic and inorganic chemical products 
has remained around 10 % in total. 
4.4 INDIA’S IMPORTS FROM CHINA 
Table 4.4.1 
India’s top 15 imports from China (2003 and Jan – Nov 2004) 
Value 
(US $ million) 
% Share in India's 
total exports to china 
 
2003 2004 2003 2004 
% Change 
in 04/03 
INDIA 2960.32 5228.2 0.76 0.99 76.61 
 Electrical machinery 580.01 1219.56 19.59 23.33 110.27 
 Organic chemicals 561.9 727.23 18.98 13.91 29.42 
 Machinery 256.19 664.42 8.65 12.71 159.34 
 Mineral fuel, oil etc. 208.41 439.74 7.04 8.41 111 
 Silk; silk yarn, fabric 220.3 318.68 7.44 6.1 44.66 
 Impregnated text 
fabrics 
110.87 158.86 3.75 3.04 43.28 
 Manmadefilament, 
fabric 
91.34 144.31 3.09 2.76 58 
 Inorg chem;rare earth 
metals 
82.5 112.43 2.79 2.15 36.28 
 Plastic 50.31 103.74 1.7 1.98 106.21 
 Iron/steel products 49.86 101.68 1.68 1.95 103.93 
Optic, nt 8544; med 
instr 
57.56 72.2 1.94 1.38 25.44 
 Cotton+yarn, fabric 40.97 66.93 1.38 1.28 63.36 
 Iron and steel 20.24 64.76 0.68 1.24 219.89 
 Furniture and 
bedding 
39.4 58.63 1.33 1.12 48.8 
 Glass and glassware 29.68 58.26 1 1.11 96.27 
Source: China PRP 
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 Table 4.4.1 clearly reveals that composition of India’s imports from China 
presents a balanced picture with both resources based and manufactured products 
listed in the top 10 imports. Key items of India’s imports from China in 2003-04 
included electrical machinery and equipment; organic chemicals; nuclear reactors, 
boilers, machinery etc; silk; mineral fuels and oils. India’s imports from China are 
somewhat less concentrated vis-à-vis India’s exports as in 2003-04. Electronics goods 
and organic chemicals constitutes a major proportion (about 46 %) of China’s exports 
to India. India’s top ten imports from China in 2003-2004 have registered growth over 
the previous year. Items such as silk yarn and fabrics, machinery except elect, and 
electronic goods, inorganic chemicals have registered an increase in growth by over 
50 percent with silk yarn and fabrics having registered the maximum growth in this 
period. 
 Trade has been in favor of China between 1998-99 to 2003-2004. In 2003-
2004 India had a trade deficit of over US $ 1 billion with China. Trade between India 
and China has witnessed a transformation in recent years, both, in terms of volume 
and percentage growth. In 2003-2004 totals bilateral increased by over 45 
percentages. According to Chinese statistics, India had a trade surplus of US $ 0.91 
billion with China in 2003. 
  India’s major imports from China during 2006-07 included electronics goods 
(US$ 5.0 bn), non-electrical machinery (US$ 1.8 bn), iron & steel (US$ 1.5 bn), 
organic chemicals (US$ 1.3 bn), coal, coke & briquettes (US$ 1.1 bn), electrical 
machinery (US$ 544.6 mn), and medicinal & pharmaceutical products (US$ 469.4 
mn). China is the third largest market for exports of castor oil (15.2%), oil meals 
(12.8%), project goods (11.9%), plastic & linoleum goods (11.6%), non-ferrous 
metals (8.8%), and finished leather (5.5%).  
SINO-INDIA TRADING RELATION
 
 
China's Integration into Global Trading System and Its Implications for India 
185
Table 4.4.2 
Commodity Structure of India’s imports from China 
  Export 
Volume 2003
Percentage Export 
Volume 1995 
Percentage
Electric machinery, electronic 
& audio-video equipment & 
their spare parts 
657,817,747 19.9 47,981,998 6.3 
Organic chemicals products 630,571,494 19.1 181,807,913 23.8 
Nuclear reactor, boiler, 
machinery equipment and 
their spare parts 
292,087,577 8.8 68,254,973 8.9 
Mineral fuels, mineral oil& 
its products, asphaltum, etc 
235,635,480 7.1 107,594,604 14.1 
Silk 224,170,411 6.8 98,244,918 12.8 
Soaked, wrapped or 
laminated fabric industrial-
purpose fabrics 
125,560,779 3.8 … …. 
Chemical fiber thread 98,952,450 3 … …. 
Inorganic chemical products, 
compounds like noble metal 
91,066,972 2.8 57,334,705 7.5 
Optical, photographing and 
medical equipments and their 
spare parts 
65,686,470 2 … …. 
Iron and steel products 57,340,189 1.7 … …. 
Edible vegetables, roots and 
tubers 
….. ….. 20,999,805 2.7 
Paper and paper boards; pulp, 
paper or paper board products
….. …. 20,772,732 2.7 
Salt, sulfur, soil and stone 
materials; limestone and 
cement 
….. …. 20,727,168 2.7 
Iron and Steel ….. …. 16,444,748 2.1 
Total 2,478,889,56 75 640,163,564 83.6 
Source: China PRP.  
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 According to Chinese statistics based on Table 4.4.2 clearly indicates that 
top 3 import items accounted for 57.3 % of total imports. Top 5 import items 
accounted for 68.3 % of total imports. Top 10 import items accounted for 77.6 % of 
total imports As per the Chinese data, compared with the commodity structure of 
China’s exports to India in 1995, electric machinery, electronic and audio-video 
equipment has registered a sharp increase from 6 % to 20 % and, this has become 
the largest export category from China to India. The percentage of textiles, chemical 
fibers, optical photographing and medical equipment as well as iron and steel 
products have also increased considerably, ranking among the top ten products in 
terms of export volume recently. The percentages of mineral fuel and silk have 
fallen considerably from 14.1 % and 12.8 % to 7.1 % and 6.8 % respectively.  
4.5 JOINT VENTURES  
 Prominent Indian companies are expanding their operations in China- by 
setting up branch offices, joint ventures (JVs) or training facilities. In the 
pharmaceuticals and IT area, these include Ranbaxy, Aptech, Aurobindo 
Pharmaceuticals, Tata Consultany Services, and Dr. Reddy’s Laborites. Indian 
business majors that have established Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises (WFOEs) 
include Infosys, NITT, Orisia Industries Ltd, and Essel Packaging. The IT giant 
Infosys, which has 250 employees in its China operations, announced in August 2005 
that it will invest $ 65m to set up facilities in Shanghai and Hang Zhou that will train 
up to 1,000 Chinese engineers as well as house some of its back office and BPO tasks 
in China. This follows the lead of NIIT and TCS, each of whom have training 
facilities and business operation in several provinces of China, Sundram Fasteners Ltd 
has set up a factory in Haiyan Economic Development Zone in Zhejiang province to 
manufacture and sell up a Carbon Black plant to supply directly to the Chinese tyre 
manufactures, JK Tyres and Apollo Tyres have established technology transfer routes 
to produce from China primarily for third country exports but also to supply to the 
domestic market. In addition, Indian banking organizations including State Bank of 
India, Bank of India, Bank of Borada, Punjab National Bank and ICICI Bank have set 
up representative office in China. 
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 However, as Indian companies set up JVs and WFOEs in China, the US (and 
European) experience in dealing with China over the past decade might be instructive. 
It is well known that Deng Xiaoping’s reform policy started in 1979 has altered the 
economic landscape of China, making it the 7th largest economy (at $ 1.65t) and the 
third largest foreign trader (at $ 1.2t) in the world by 2005. But the share of high-tech 
items in China’s exports remains very low even today. That is why during the 1990’s 
the Chinese government promised tax breaks and access it its vast domestic market if 
US high-tech companies, particularly in IT and Telecommunications sectors, would 
set up JVs with indigenous Chinese companies. A related government expectation 
was that “technology transfer” from such JVs would improve China’s S& T base and 
over time, permit Chinese companies to competitively market their own products and 
software within the country and abroad. 
 The JV model required US companies to seek concurrence from their Chinese 
counterparts at each stage of business decision-making. Delays and disagreements 
hobbled progress, and the unsatisfactory JV model forced US companies to withhold 
larger investment of financial and intellectual capital into these collaborations. 
However, from Beijing’s standpoint, the JV model was a partial success because of 
the advanced domain knowledge and business model training it provided to several 
thousand Chinese high-tech workers. 
 However, the relative failure of this model persuaded the Chinese government 
to offer substantial incentives to “wholly foreign-owned enterprises” (WFOEs). Under 
this scheme, a WFOE would not be required to have a Chinese partner, and would be 
permitted greater latitude in negotiation how its IPRs are safeguard when Chinese 
employees hired and trained by the foreign company decide to leave the company. 
 While the WFOE model promises to be relatively successful in boosting 
China’s foreign trade, the scope for high technology transfer to Chinese entries has 
considerably diminished. It is a less appreciated fact that in spite of China’s booming 
exports that crested at $ 600b in 2004, the share of Chinese entities in the export isles 
than 40 5 and the majority of those are State owned enterprises (SOEs). Further, the 
share of the high technology in this export is estimated at less than 10 %. The import 
of these discussions is that until the Chinese government and its indigenous industry 
provides international standard protection to technology security and IPRs, 
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multinational companies will hesitate to enter into technology-embedded partnership 
with Chinese entities, instead electing to exploit price advantage by locating their 
production in China. 
 There is no publicly available information to confirm whether India’s 
government or its business majors have taken these factors into their consideration, or 
how they pan to negotiate any problems that might arise in later stages of their 
operations in China. 
4.6 FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
 Large and growing market opportunities in China and India are widely seen 
and understood as evidenced by the large flows of foreign direct investment to China, 
both for production for the domestic market, but also to use exports to the rest of the 
World, with China as a low cost export platform. Although India has attracted far less 
FDI, it is not because of the lack of potential opportunities in India, but largely 
because of policy hurdles and other constraints on investment. This restrictive 
environment is expected to change – recognition by policy makers of the need for 
change has resulted in the recently enacted legislation for the creation of Special 
Economic Zones in which the incentives for profitable investment are expected to be 
higher. Turning to implications for domestic policy in China and India, there are 
several studies documenting various barriers to greater integration in India. It is clear 
that one policy that has no merit is the so called “industrial policy” that ostensibly 
picks potential industries that will be winners in the global markets and targets policy 
support to ensure their success. Contrary to the continuing belief in “industrial policy” 
as the source of successful growth and development in Japan and other East Asian 
countries, the empirical evidence underlying this belief is not entirely persuasive 
(Noland and Pack, 2003). What is far more relevant is the general incentive structure 
or climate that is supportive of and not an impediment to innovation, risk taking and 
efficient resource allocation in the economy.  
 Various factors have hindered India’s integration. Despite substantial tariff 
reductions in recent years, India remains a relatively protected economy, with tariffs 
averaging 22 percent (18 percent in trade-weighted terms)-above the average 
emerging Asia and global tariff rates of 9 ½ percent and 11 ½ percent respectively-
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and significant non-trade barriers remain. Moreover, a range of structural; 
impediments-including restrictive labor laws and onerous red tape-have retarded the 
growth of manufacturing, which has been the main driver of export-oriented growth 
in Asia. Reflecting this, the contribution of industry to GDP and employment, at 27 
percent and 34 percent respectively, remains well below that of Asia as a whole. 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has been hindered by a difficult business climate as 
well as by caps on FDI in certain sectors (Jain-Chandra, 2005). And the growing 
inadequacy of 34 July 21, 2006 India’s infrastructure constitutes a major obstacle to 
private investment and export potential.  
 The World Bank collaborated in two investment surveys carried out by the 
Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) in 2000 and 2003. McKinsey Global Institute 
(MGI, 2001) came out with its report based on a fifteen-month long project on India’s 
economic performance. It examined 13 sectors in detail, two in agriculture, five in 
manufacturing and six in services, accounting in all for about a quarter of India’s 
GDP.  The World Bank (2004) report begins with the assertion that differences in 
investment climate explain variations in competitiveness, growth and prosperity 
across countries or across sub national units within countries. The constituents of 
investment climate are institutional and policy variables that have a crucial bearing on 
business performance, but on which firms have no control individually. 
 The report of the McKinsey Global Institute in many ways comes to a similar 
conclusion as the report of the World Bank. It finds that (MGI, 2001, pp.2-5):  
(i) Product market barriers and the rules and policies governing different 
sectors of the economy impede GDP growth by 2.3 percent a year.  
(ii) Particularly damaging features of the current regulatory regime are: 
inequitable and ill-conceived regulation, uneven enforcement, reservation 
of products for small-scale enterprises, restrictions on FDI, and licensing 
and quasi-licensing requirements.  
(iii) Unrecognized land market distortion accounts for close to 1.3 percent of 
lost growth per year. These distortions include unclear ownership, counter-
productive taxation, and inflexible zoning, rent and tenancy laws.  
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(iv) Government-controlled entities, accounting for 43% of capital stock and 
15% of employment outside agriculture have lower productivity of capital 
and labour compared to their private competitors. Their suppression of 
potential competition and productivity improvements result in the loss of 
0.7 percent GDP growth per year. 
(v) Contrary to common belief, inflexible labour laws and poor transport 
infrastructure are minor barriers to growth and together account for less 
than 0.5 percent of lost GDP growth.  
 Both China and India have been ranked among the top FDI destinations in the 
world. China hosted 54 billion USD FDI in 2003 and India hosted 4.3 billion USD. 
Outward FDI from the two countries has been increasing, as well. The relatively small 
amount of mutual investment between China and India reflects the great potential for 
future cooperation. Investment cooperation is an important field for the development 
of future bilateral economic relationship. 
China’s Policies on Inward FDI 
 China has been improved its investment climate to attract FDI since the end of 
1970s. There are three laws regulating FDI, which are The Law of Foreign Wholly 
Owned Enterprises of the People’s Republic of China, the Law of Chinese-Foreign 
Equity Joint Ventures of the People’s Republic of China, the Law of Chinese-Foreign 
Contractual Joint Ventures of the People’s Republic of China and Catalogue for the 
Guidance of Foreign Invested Industries. The government has also formulated 
industrial and regional guidance for FDI. The government provides preferential 
treatment toward FDI. All laws and regulations were revised after China’s WTO 
accession to meet the requirements of WTO rules and its commitments. 
 Industrial distribution of FDI is mainly guided by the Catalogue of Guidance 
for Foreign Investment Industries. The Catalogue classifies FDI projects into 4 kinds: 
“encouraged”, “allowed”, “limited” and “prohibited”. “Encouraged” projects include 
262 categories, “limited” 75 categories and “prohibited” 34 categories. The main 
fields where FDI is encouraged are: first, agriculture sector, such as renovating 
traditional agriculture, developing modern agriculture and promoting agricultural 
industrialization; second, infrastructure and basic industries like transportation, energy 
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and raw materials; third, high-tech industries like electronics and IT, biotechnology, 
new materials and aviation and spaceflight, and establishing R&D centers in China; 
fourth, to adopt advanced and appropriate technologies to renovate such traditional 
industries as machinery, light industry and textiles, and to realize the upgrading of 
equipments of the industries; fifth, such projects as comprehensive utilization of 
resources and recyclable resources, environment protection and municipal projects; 
sixth, investment in advantageous industries in western regions; and seventh, foreign 
investment in projects whose products all go for exports. FDI in western areas is 
guided by the Catalogue of Guidance for Foreign Investment Industries in Western 
Areas. Regional guidance for FDI has been in work ever since the beginning of 
China’s opening up. FDI is encouraged in special economic areas, Western areas and 
Northeastern industrial bases. There are various types of special economic areas in 
China, such as Special Economic Zones (SEZs), Economic and Technological 
Development Zones (ETDZs), Hightech Industries Development Zones (HIDZs), 
Bonded Areas and Export Processing Zones (EPZs), etc. 
India’s Policies on Inward FDI 
 The New Industrial Policy (NIP) announced on 24 July 1991 marked a major 
overhaul of the Indian FDI policy. Firstly, the industrial licensing (or approval) 
system in all industries has been abolished except where it is required for strategic or 
environmental grounds. In order to bring greater transparency in the FDI approval 
system and expedite their clearance, a system of automatic clearance was put into 
practice for FDI proposals fulfilling the conditions laid down, such as the ownership 
levels of 50 percent, 51 per cent, 74 per cent and 100 per cent foreign equity allowed 
in sectors specified for each limit. The cases other than those following the listed 
norms are subject to normal approval procedures. A new package for enterprises in 
EPZs and 100 per cent export-oriented units was announced including automatic 
clearance for proposals fulfilling specified parameters on capital goods imports, 
location and value addition etc. The guidelines have been laid down for this approval 
process as well. The Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA) of 1973 was amended 
in 1993 and restrictions placed on foreign companies by it were lifted. New sectors 
such as mining, banking, insurance, telecommunications, construction and 
management of ports, harbors, roads and highways, airlines, and defence equipment, 
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have since been thrown open to private, including foreign owned, companies. 
However, the extent of foreign ownership continues to be limited in some of these 
service sectors, e.g. 74 per cent in banking, 26 per cent in insurance, 51 per cent in 
non-banking finance companies, 49 per cent in telecommunications, 74 per cent in 
internet service providers, 49 per cent in domestic airlines, 74 per cent in shipping, 51 
per cent in export-oriented trading, 49 per cent in broadcasting, 74 per cent in 
advertising, 51 per cent in health and education services. Foreign ownership up to 100 
per cent is permitted in most manufacturing sectors – in some sectors even on 
automatic basis - except for defence equipment where it is limited to 26 per cent and 
for items reserved for production by small-scale industries where it is limited to 24 
per cent. However, FDI above 24 per cent is permitted in small-scale industries (SSI) 
reserved items subject to a mandatory export obligation of 50 per cent of annual 
production; this export obligation also applies similarly to a large domestic enterprise. 
The dividend balancing and the related export obligation conditions on foreign 
investors, which applied to 22 consumer goods industries, were withdrawn in 2000. 
The Indian FDI regime with progressive liberalization has been rated as ‘one of the 
most liberal in the world’3 by business consultancy services. In order to boost 
investor confidence and provide a catalytic push to bilateral investment flows, India 
has embarked upon the path of concluding Bilateral Investment Promotion and 
Protection Agreements (BIPA) with other countries. Currently, BIPAs are in place 
with 46 countries and another 11 are in the process of ratification. India is also a 
member of Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). For settlement of 
investment disputes, India though not a signatory to the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) convention does use the additional facility 
available for non signatory states for settlement of Investor-State disputes. However, 
India does subscribe to the Arbitration Rules of the United Nation Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) and has incorporated the spirit of the same in 
its Arbitration Law. 
China’s Policies on Outward Investment 
 As a developing country, China’s currency is not freely convertible under 
capital accounts and the government exercises control on outflow investments. 
However, with China’s increasing integration into the global economy as well as the 
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improvement of its balance of payments (BOP), Chinese government has gradually 
liberalized its policies on outflow investment since the late half of 1990s. In 2001, 
Chinese government proposed the “going out” strategy and adopted encouraging 
measures on outflow investments that confirm with the State’s foreign economic 
strategy. China has speeded up its steps in loosening the control on overseas 
investment in recent years. In 1999, China adopted encouraging measures on the 
investment of overseas processing trade4. Afterwards, China has gradually adopted a 
series of measures to loosen the control and enhanced its guidance on enterprise 
outflow investment, for example, in deregulating the authority of the governments to 
examine and approve outflow investments and abolishing profit remittance deposit 
requirement. In July 2004, Chinese government issued the Catalogue of Countries and 
Industries for Guiding Outflow Investment (NO. 1) for the first time, stipulating the 
countries and industries where the State encouraged outflow investment. The article 2 
of the Regulation on the Approval Matters of Outflow Investment and Establishing 
Enterprises stipulates that: “the State supports and encourages all kinds of enterprises 
of different ownership with comparative advantages to go out to invest and establish 
enterprises abroad.”  
India’s Policies on Outward Investment 
 The policy governing Overseas Direct Investment (ODI) has been liberalized 
since the early 1990s. The Guidelines for Indian Joint Ventures and Wholly Owned 
Subsidiaries Abroad as amended in October 1992, in May 1999 and July 2002 provide 
for the automatic approval of outward FDI proposals up to a certain limit that has 
been expanded progressively from US$ 2 million in 1992 to $ 100 million in July 
2002. In January 2004 the limit of $100 million has also been removed and Indian 
enterprises are now permitted to invest abroad in JV/WOS up to 100 per cent of their 
net worth on automatic basis. Indian companies are investing in an increasing number 
of projects over the past few years with actual investments exceeding a billion dollars 
annually. Manufacturing sector accounts for nearly 55 per cent of cumulative Indian 
Outward Direct Investments with about 40 per cent in services. Major areas of their 
operation are in pharmaceuticals, metal products, auto components, edible oil 
processing, fertilizers and chemicals, oil exploration, software services, among others. 
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Bilateral Investments between China and India 
Indian Investments in China 
 The presence of Indian companies in China has also increased significantly, 
especially in sectors such as iron and steel, textiles, chemicals, automobile 
components, and pharmaceuticals. Indian companies in China are active in services 
sector like restaurants, entertainment, culture and banking. According to the Indian 
Ministry of Finance, total Indian investments approved by the Government over 1996-
2004 (June) in China amount to US$ 96.5 million. According to the Chinese Ministry 
of Commerce, India had invested in 101 projects in China by the end of 2003 and the 
actual investment was US$ 79.1 million. In 2003, 30 new projects involving about 
US$ 15.9 million were undertaken. Among the Indian companies that have set up 
joint ventures or subsidiaries include pharmaceuticals companies like Ranbaxy, 
Aurobindo Pharmaceuticals, Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories, and IT software companies 
like Aptech, NIIT, Tata Consultancy Services, and Infosys. In manufacturing 
Sundram Fasteners Ltd. for high tensile fasteners, and Aditya Birla Group for carbon 
black production have also set up base in China. Many others have opened 
trade/representative offices in China and might deepen their presence in future. A 
number of Indian companies are also planning investments in various fields in China 
in the coming years. 
Chinese Investments in India 
 China is also emerging as an important source of FDI in Asia as both state 
owned and private Chinese companies are starting to invest abroad. According to 
statistics released by the Ministry of Commerce, China, Chinese companies invested 
$2.7 billion abroad in 2002. According to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 
Government of India, during the period January 1991 to March 2004, India has 
approved Chinese FDI of US$ 231.6 million. The approved investments, however, 
have been slow in materializing as actual inflow has been only to the order of US$ 
0.63 million. According to the statistics of the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, total 
quantum of Chinese investments in India till 2003 was about US$ 20.6 million 
covering 97 Chinese proposals for foreign collaborations mainly in the telecom, 
metallurgical, transportation, electrical equipment and financial sectors. Chinese 
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sources suggest that the official figures might underestimate the actual investment, as 
some Chinese companies tend to invest before they declare their investment to the 
government. Obviously there is need for reconciling the statistics of FDI inflows in 
India where Indian and Chinese sources diverge substantially. A part of the reason for 
discrepancy is the fact that some of the Chinese investments in India are routed 
through Hong Kong. Even after reconciliation of the figures, the existing bilateral 
investment flows between the two countries hardly represent the potential and 
synergies that exist between the two large and dynamic economies. 
Areas of Future Investment Cooperation 
 Sustainable efforts by the Chinese and Indian governments have improved 
their investment climate and made them top FDI destinations in the world. The huge 
domestic market, complementary characteristics of the two countries and improving 
political atmosphere between the two countries will provide great opportunities for 
bilateral investments. Chinese enterprises may find fruitful opportunities for 
investment in India, among other sectors, in power generation projects and other 
infrastructure sectors, manufacture of electronic hardware, food processing etc for 
which there is growing market in India. There may be fruitful opportunities for 
Chinese enterprises to manufacture garments in India for export to the EU as GSP 
benefits will be phased out for Chinese garment exports. Aiming to develop the 
bilateral economic and trade relations, Chinese government is encouraging Chinese 
enterprises to invest in India in fields such as crop planting, coal, iron ore, 
manufacturing of apparatus, meters and office equipment, electric power machines as 
high-press and low-press switch and dynamotor, mechanical manufacturing of 
refrigeration equipment and air conditioners etc., electric equipment such as TV sets, 
plastic products, pharmacy, trade, software, construction, transportation, tourism, 
infrastructure and generation and supply of electricity etc. Indian enterprises may also 
find attractive investment opportunities in China in the areas of pharmaceuticals, auto 
components, light engineering goods, automotives, financial services besides IT 
software and training. Chinese and Indian enterprises may find mutually rewarding 
opportunities of pooling their complementary strengths by building consortia for 
jointly undertaking third country projects and investments. Such opportunities may 
exist in design engineering and construction industry and other heavy industries. They 
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could also consider entering into strategic alliances or joint ventures for exploiting the 
synergies for mutual benefit. IT industry provides many such opportunities but there 
may be opportunities in other areas such as biotechnology, especially in applications 
relating to agriculture and health. 
Enhancing India-China Investment Cooperation 
 India and China have already signed an Agreement on the Avoidance of 
Double Taxation in July 1994. A Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection 
Agreement (BIPA) are currently under negotiation. The JSG feels that an early 
signing of BIPA will be an important step towards promotion of bilateral investments 
and boosting investor confidence. Investment dispute settlement mechanism should be 
improved. Companies should be encouraged to enhance coordination, communication 
and negotiation. Disputes should be resolved through mutually accepted international 
arbitration organizations.  
 The present study compares and contrasts the performance of India and China 
in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI). Both economies are large emerging 
markets that had rather similar profiles in 1978. Today, China ranks number one as 
the world’s preferred foreign investment destination. Closer examination of the FDI 
statistics suggests that India’s performance has been significantly understated while 
China’s performance continues to be overstated. However India still lags for a number 
of reasons. These include a high tariff regime, poor infrastructure (power, ports, roads 
and railways), a regulatory system that is too often not business-friendly, a policy of 
reservation of many potentially export-oriented sectors for small businesses and 
inflexible labour laws. The government’s large budget deficit is preventing 
investment in necessary physical infrastructure yet India needs to increase the rate of 
private investment to enhance the economic growth rate and reduce poverty. Based on 
China’s experience of promoting FDI, further economic devolution to state level is 
the best way forward. While this is likely to exacerbate inter-state income inequality 
in the short term, it does offer the possibility of redistribution in the longer term. 
 Over the last two decades the policy stance of governments in emerging 
markets towards foreign direct investment (FDI) has changed dramatically. This has 
been brought about by the mounting evidence of the positive association of FDI with 
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increased growth rates and in improvements in total factor productivity (TFP) {de 
Mello, 1997 & 1999 and Buckley et. al., 2002}. Notwithstanding calls for a nuanced 
assessment of the spillover benefits of FDI from some observers, 2 FDI is much 
sought after by governments seeking a catalyzing boost to economic growth through 
technology transfers, employment generation, and improved access to managerial 
expertise, global capital and product markets, and marketing and distribution 
networks. Multinational enterprises (MNE) seeking a global rate of profit are 
generally unsentimental about where it is achieved. A concomitant of the global trend 
towards increasingly liberal trade and investment regimes and fierce competition to 
attract investors is the need for serious investment and leadership by governments and 
their agents at many levels, to create and maintain the necessary business-friendly 
policy environment. 
 This study also examine why India and China that represent examples of very 
large emerging markets perform so markedly differently in attracting FDI despite the 
increase in the importance of global drivers behind FDI. Explanation will be sought in 
the way in which national and sub-national governments have gone about the task of 
promoting inward foreign direct investment. It will also consider how the 
governments of the two countries have faced the challenge of reconciling the many, 
often contradictory, interests of groups affected by economic liberalization and 
foreign investment in the domestic economy. 
 Conventional analysis of the drivers behind FDI focuses on the distinction 
between horizontal market-seeking investment and vertical cost-minimizing 
investment seeking a low cost production location (Shatz and Venables, 2000; Lim, 
2001). A large and growing market that permits economies of scale is particularly 
attractive to 1 Fieldwork was carried out in November 2001, May 2002 and May 2003 
in India and November 2002 in Western China. The author is grateful for the 
generous way in which people gave of their time to discuss the challenges of 
investment and export promotion in each country. It is hoped that those opinions are 
accurately reflected in this paper. However views expressed in this report are the 
responsibility of the author and do not imply endorsement by any Indian or Chinese 
authority, the Sichuan Academy of Social Sciences or UNIDO. For example, Rodrik 
(1999) argues that the effect of FDI on economic growth tends to be weak or even that 
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much of the superior economic performance is driven by favorable domestic factors to 
which foreign investors respond market-seeking investment. Market servicing costs 
that favor foreign direct investment over exporting include the presence of import 
tariffs, non-tariff barriers, transport costs and local competition offering customer 
responsiveness. Recent work by Albuquerque et al (2003) suggests that global factors 
have increased in importance in explaining FDI flows. They argue global drivers are 
increasing in importance, domestic drivers (growth in local productivity, trade 
openness, financial depth, low government burden and macroeconomic stability) still 
account for a sizeable amount of inter-country variation in foreign direct investment. 
The impact of FDI on growth is complex. First, growth occurs through capital 
accumulation and the introduction of newer technology, management systems and 
innovative products associated with FDI.4 Second, FDI improves the efficiency of 
locally-owned firms through contact and demonstration effects and exposure to 
increased competition. Third, FDI under the right economic conditions leads to 
technological progress through the introduction of new varieties of knowledge-based 
capital equipment. Fourth, the FDI ‘package’ proceeds through specific productivity 
enhancing management development and skills training programms. Fifth, just as 
local firms learn from contact with FDI so do governments, institutions and public 
service providers. 
Comparing the economic performance of India and China 
 China is a natural comparator for India for obvious geopolitical, economic and 
demographic reasons. They both have populations in excess of one billion China at 
1.27 billion and India with 1.03 billion people in 2001. According to the World Bank 
(2003), on a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis, they are respectively the second 
and fourth largest economies in the world. In A T Kearney’s September 2002 survey 
of the leaders of the world’s 1000 largest corporation’s anticipated FDI intentions and 
preferences; China was ranked first, ahead of the USA for the first time, as the most 
attractive investment destination in the world. India was ranked fifteenth, down from 
seventh in 2001. It is when changes in the participation of India and China in world 
trade are compared that one of the sharpest differences between the two countries is 
apparent. In 1978 external trade represented around 12 per cent of GDP for India and 
10 per cent for China. By 2001, India’s merchandise trade amounted to 19.7 per cent 
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of GDP and China’s trade had expanded to 44 per cent of GDP reflecting China’s 
emergence as one of the world’s major trading powers. In 2000, China generated 4 
per cent of world merchandise exports compared to 0.7 per cent from India. In terms 
of merchandise trade, China ranked as the seventh largest exporter and eighth largest 
importer in the world in 2002. A major difference in the composition of the output of 
each country is the relative importance of the contribution of the service sector, 
particularly computer software, in India. When trade in services is included, India’s 
relative openness to trade improves significantly. Trade in goods and services 
amounted to 28.6 per cent of GDP in the case of India and 47.1 per cent of GDP in 
China. Even so, in 2001, China was a bigger exporter of commercial services ranking 
as the world’s twelfth largest exporter while India was nineteenth. One of the most 
obvious differences in the trade regimes of the two countries is the tariff regime. The 
average Most Favored Nation (MFN) tariff rate in China has fallen from well over 50 
per cent in the early 1980s to 15.3 per cent in 2001(Tseng and Zebregs, 2002). India’s 
standard applied MFN tariff averaged 32.3 per cent in 2001/2002 and is amongst the 
highest in the world (WTO, 2002, p.31). In addition, there is a Special Additional 
Duty (SAD) which is estimated to raise the un-weighted average customs duty on all 
goods to 35 per cent in 2002/03 (World Bank, 2003, p. 53). The government’s stated 
aim is to reduce the simple average applied MFN tariff rate to ASEAN country levels 
of less than 15 per cent (WTO, 2002, p.5). However this poses a major problem for 
the government because of its heavy reliance on customs tariffs for tax revenue – 30 
per cent of net tax revenue was derived from import tariffs in 2001/2002. By contrast, 
the Chinese central government only raised around 7.4 per cent of its revenue from 
import duties in the period 1995-98 (IMF, 2002). The potential benefits for India of 
liberalizing trade in manufactures are clear. Wood and Calandrino (2000) estimate 
using China as a benchmark that was India to reduce its existing barriers to trade, 
especially to exports, to Chinese levels it could double its per capita income and 
increase exports five fold within two decades. Tariff reform would be a lot easier to 
implement in India were it not for the size and continuing deterioration of the fiscal 
deficit.  
 The Central Government’s deficit has risen from 4.2 per cent of GDP in 
1995/96 to 5.7 per cent of GDP in 2001/2002, while the overall public sector deficit 
(which includes the deficits of the Centre, of States, central public sector enterprises 
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and the oil pool account) was 10.6 per cent of GDP in 2001/2002. The overall revenue 
deficit was estimated at 6.9 per cent of GDP in 2002/03 (World Bank, 2003, p.16). 
This is larger than the crisis level of 1991 and is projected to go higher still in 
2003/04. Partly this is because agriculture and the services sector, which make up 
more than three-quarters of Indian GDP, go virtually untaxed unlike in China. It is 
certainly a difficult task to separate and quantify the complex package of resources 
that FDI confer to the host country. There have been a number of macro studies 
attempting to determine the nexus between FDI and growth. By and large, studies 
have found a positive links between FDI and growth, though FDI appears less positive 
in least developed economies, suggesting the existence of “threshold level of 
development” (Blomström and Kokko, 2003 and Blomström et al., 1994).      
Table 4.6.1 
Comparative Inward FDI 
Year 
FDI 
( percent of GDP) 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
India 0.7 0.8 0.8 1.9 1.7 1.8 2.0 2.1 
China 2.9 2.8 3.4 2.8 2.9 2.1 1.8 1.6 
FDI 
(percentage of gross fixed investment)
        
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
India 2.9 3.2 2.9 6.4 5.2 5.5 5.9 6 
China 7.3 7 8.4 6.9 7 5 4.3 3.8 
FDI per head 
(US$) 
        
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
India 4 5 6 16 16 16 18 19 
China 37 43 61 60 60 64 65 68 
Source: EIU (2007) 
Note: Data from 2007 on are estimates for India and China 2008-2010 are projections. 
 A close look at Table 4.6.1 clearly reveals that according to UNCTAD (2007), 
India has emerged as the second most attractive destination for FDI after China and 
ahead of the US, Russia and Brazil. While India has experienced a marked rise in FDI 
inflows in the last few years (doubling from an average of US$5-6 billion the previous 
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three years to around US$ 19 billion in 2006-07) it still receives far less FDI flows 
than China or much smaller economies in Asia like Hong Kong and Singapore was 
ahead of India. Not surprisingly India’s growth strategy has depended predominantly 
on domestic enterprises and domestic demand as opposed to FDI and export 
demand.1 For instance, India’s FDI as a share of GDP in 2007 represented only about 
1.7 percent compared to 2.8 percent in China, and its share of gross fixed investment 
is 5.2 percent compared to 7.0 in China. FDI has been a relatively limited source of 
external financing and reserve buildup in India. 
 China is one of the world’s largest recipients of FDI. Although FDI inflows 
actually fell slightly in 2006, to US$78.1bn, this was still one of the highest totals in 
the world. Despite concerns about rising cost pressures, China remains a favored base 
for foreign companies wishing to reduce production costs. Nevertheless, companies 
wishing to sell into the domestic market still find the country’s business environment 
a difficult one in which to operate. Despite improvements in recent years, the Chinese 
market is characterized by intense competition, bureaucratic hurdles and an opaque 
legal system. Nevertheless, many foreign companies are now starting to make good 
profits (even if there are significant variations across sectors). China is also becoming 
an important outward investor, and this trend will continue. Owing to its rising stock 
of foreign-exchange reserves, as well as booming demand for natural resources, in 
particular oil, China will become an increasingly important source of investment for 
many resource-rich countries in Africa, Central Asia and Latin America over the 
forecast period. Overall, these countries have given a cautious welcome to Chinese 
investment. 
 Recognizing that the Indian economy could easily absorb a much higher level 
of FDI, the government is progressively raising its annual FDI target; it stands at an 
ambitious US$25bn for fiscal year 2007/08 (April-March)—although continued 
problems of the business environment are likely to keep actual inflows below these 
targets. Foreign investors will be attracted by major new opportunities in 
infrastructure projects. Telecommunications and energy are likely to emerge as other 
high-potential industries for FDI.       
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Table 4.6.2 
A comparative analysis of FDI into China and India 
(Unit:  $billion) 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Population (m)         
China 1299.9 1307.6 1314.5 1323.1 1331.1 1336.7 1342.5 1351.0 
India 1065.1 1080.3 1095.4 1110.4 1125.4 1140.2 1155.0 1169.7 
GDP (US$bn at market exchange rate)         
China 1936.5 2278.3 2720.2 3250.2 3832.6 4481.9 5232.0 6080.6 
India 692.7 805.6 922.9 1131.9 1329.1 1512.4 1719.4 1955.2 
GDP (US $ bn at PPP)         
China 7642.3 8692.3 9903.8 11192.9 12587.2 13993.8 15453.8 16970.8 
India 3389.7 3814.6 4293.8 4765.5 5283.6 5834.0 6438.1 7096.5 
GDP(% real change)         
China 10.1 10.4 10.7 9.9 9.3 9.0 8.4 9.4 
India 8.3 9.2 9.4 8.5 8.0 7.5 7.5 7.5 
Foreign direct investment inflows (US$ bn)         
China 54.9 79.1 78.1 79.5 84.1 86.5 90.9 92.9 
India 5.8 6.7 17.5 17.0 18.0 20.0 22.0 25.0 
%  of  GDP         
China 2.8 3.5 2.9 2.4 2.2 1.9 1.7 1.5 
India 0.8 0.8 1.9 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 
% of gross fixed investment         
China 7.0 8.4 6.8 5.7 5.0 4.3 3.8 3.3 
India 3.2 2.9 6.4 4.8 4.2 4.0 3.8 3.7 
Inward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn)         
China 542.3 621.4 699.5 779.0 863.1 949.5 1040.4 1133.4 
India 43.6 50.3 67.7 84.7 102.7 122.7 144.7 169.7 
% of GDP         
China 28 27.3 25.7 24 22.5 21.2 19.9 18.6 
India 6.3 6.2 7.3 7.5 7.7 8.1 8.4 8.7 
Foreign direct investment outflows (US$ bn)         
China 1.8 11.3 17.8 26.0 37.0 48.0 65.0 72.0 
India 2.2 2.5 9.0 10.0 12.0 14.0 14.5 16.0 
Outward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn)         
China 52.7 64.5 82.3 108.3 145.3 193.3 258.3 330.3 
India 10.1 12.1 21.1 31.1 43.1 57.1 71.6 87.6 
% of GDP         
China 2.7 2.8 3.0 3.3 3.8 4.3 4.9 5.4 
India 1.5 1.5 2.3 2.7 3.2 3.8 4.2 4.5 
Sources: Economic Intelligence Unit 2007. 
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 On the basis of data from Table 4.6.2 the following inferences can be drawn 
from various dimensions of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI): 
1. Stocks and flows: 
 In absolute terms at least, China is one of the world’s largest hosts of FDI. In 
2006 FDI inflows totaled US$78.1bn (in balance-of-payments terms). FDI inflows 
into China have generally been increasing over the past two decades, with annual 
average inflows rising from US$3.9bn (again in balance-of-payments terms) in 1985-
92 to US$37.8bn in 1993-2000 and US$59bn for 2001-06. FDI inflows are forecast to 
remain high and to increase gradually throughout the forecast period, averaging 
US$87bn in 2007-11. The stock of inward FDI reached US$699.5bn by end- 2006, 
although it has actually been falling as a share of GDP in recent years (largely 
because the economy has been growing faster than FDI inflows). FDI data for China 
should, however, is treated with caution. FDI inflows are inflated by “round tripping”, 
whereby domestic investment from the mainland is taken offshore, usually to Hong 
Kong, and then returned to the mainland to take advantage of the preferential tax rates 
offered to foreign investors. The World Bank has estimated that round-tripping could 
account for up to 25% of total FDI into China. FDI into India is rising rapidly. FDI 
inflows totaled US$17.5bn in 2006, compared with US$6.7bn in 2005 and US$2bn-
3bn for most of the 1990s (although these figures are not strictly comparable, since in 
2000/01 the government changed the means by which it measures FDI to include, for 
example, reinvested earnings). However, inflows of FDI into India are low by global 
standards (equivalent to 1.9% of GDP in 2006), as is the stock of inward FDI, at 
around US$68bn in 2006 (equivalent to 7.3% of GDP, or US$62 per head). This is 
below the figure for Pakistan (US$91 per head), and a fraction of the level in China 
(US$532 per head). 
2. Origin and distribution: 
 The major investors in China are Hong Kong, South Korea, Japan and the US. 
Most investment goes to the coastal provinces and provincial-level cities, despite 
attempts to attract investors inland. The three most important investment locations can 
be described as “greater Guangdong” (which comprises Guangdong, Fujian and 
Hainan provinces), “greater Shanghai” (Shanghai, Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces) 
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and “greater Beijing” (comprising the capital, together with Tianjin municipality and 
Hebei province). According to the Secretariat for Industrial Assistance, the largest 
source of FDI in 2006/07 was Mauritius, which accounted for 40% of total inflows. 
Many companies incorporate in Mauritius to invest in India because of tax benefits. 
The UK was the second most important foreign investor, with 11.9% of the total, 
followed by the US (5.4%), the Netherlands (4%), Singapore (3.7%) and Germany 
(0.8%). Historically the electrical equipment sector, which includes India’s highly 
successful computer software industry, has attracted the most FDI, but in 2006/07 it 
was overtaken by the services sector. Financial and non-financial services drew in 
US$4.7bn in investment, well above the US$2.7bn garnered by electrical equipment. 
The next most important sectors for FDI were construction activities (US$985m), 
telecommunications (US$521m) and transportation (US$466m). Foreign investment 
has been concentrated in the southern and western states, where more reform-minded 
administrations are in power. The top five destination states for FDI in recent years 
have been Maharashtra, Delhi, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh. FDI 
accounted for 6.4% of gross fixed investment in 2006, up sharply from 2.9% in 2005. 
3. Determinants 
 Most foreign investors have been attracted by China’s vast domestic market 
and low labour costs. Early arrivals, however, were largely disappointed with the 
initial results of their China operations, and either lived with losses or left the market. 
However, an increasing number of foreign-invested companies are now in profit, and 
the outlook for the economy is healthy, which suggests that there will be continued 
strong interest from foreign companies. Lingering barriers to trade are coming down, 
but high non-wage costs remain a concern. Problems of overcapacity, and strong 
competition from domestic companies, will continue to cause problems for many 
foreign firms. India’s skilled, English-speaking workforce has been a significant 
attraction for FDI, particularly in the information technology (IT) sector. Caps on FDI 
in protected industries have been steadily lifted: in January 2004 the limits on foreign 
investment in oil production and oil refining were abolished, and in private banking 
the limit was raised to 74%. In October 2004 the sectoral caps were raised in 
insurance (to 26%), civil aviation (to 49%) and telecoms (to 49%). The limit for some 
telecoms services, for example Internet service providers (ISPs), was subsequently 
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raised to 74% in February 2005, and all basic, mobile, and value-added telecoms 
services were moved under the 74% limit in November 2005. In February 2006 FDI 
up to 51% was permitted for retail trading of “single brand” products. However, fuller 
liberalization of the retail sector has been held up by political opposition, and some 
sectors, such as agriculture, remain off-limits to foreign investment. The approval 
process is gradually being simplified, and the government is expanding the number of 
industries that are subject to automatic approval. However, state-level impediments 
can be severe, and companies have been known to abandon FDI projects mid-way 
through the implementation stage. 
4. Impact: 
 FDI has had a profound impact both on the overall level of industrial 
development in China and on its geographical distribution. The coastal provinces have 
seen the greatest transformation, with central and western provinces left on the 
sidelines. There is growing concern among some policymakers in China that the 
economy, and in particular the export sector, is becoming overly dependent on foreign 
investment. In 2006 foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) accounted for over 50% of 
China’s total exports, and FIEs will remain a key driver of China’s export dynamism 
for years to come. FDI has had the greatest impact on India’s software industry and on 
IT enabled services. Call centers and other forms of back-office administration have 
become important industries. The pharmaceutical, telecoms and power sectors have 
also been influenced significantly by FDI. 
5. Potential: 
 China has been attracting sizeable amounts of FDI for some years, and FDI 
inflows are forecast to remain high during the forecast period. China is still ranked by 
many international firms as their preferred investment destination. The stock of 
inward FDI accounts for a high share of GDP (at 25.7% in 2006), but remains small 
per head of population. This suggests that China has the potential to absorb 
considerable additional FDI. China is committed to meeting its World Trade 
Organization (WTO) obligations, which should boost FDI. The gradual opening up of 
sectors such as domestic commerce, financial services, insurance and tourism is under 
way. Geographical restrictions on where foreign companies are allowed to set up 
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operations will also be relaxed in 2007-11. But the government is becoming more 
choosy about approving certain investment projects, and increasingly priority will be 
given to projects in the interior of the country or those that promise a greater degree of 
technology transfer. However, if the government’s plan to encourage more FDI in the 
interior is to be successful, the region will need better transport connections to 
international markets. India’s potential to attract increased FDI inflows is vast, 
although poor infrastructure, excessive bureaucracy and interdepartmental wrangling 
will slow the pace of opening in many sectors. The infrastructure, energy, telecoms, 
IT and insurance sectors are likely to be the main magnets for FDI. Producers and 
assemblers of cars and automotive components are also re-evaluating India’s 
potential, as are biotechnology firms. The establishment of special economic zones, in 
which 100% foreign ownership is allowed, in order to promote exports should attract 
increased FDI inflows into export-oriented industries. India’s privatization 
programmed accelerated in 2003/04 with the sale of shares in major car and oil 
companies, but since then has stalled owing to opposition from the Left Front, on the 
support of which the government relies. 
Table 4.6.3 
FDI Overview-India and China 
(Unit: $ million) 
 INDIA CHINA 
Year  FDI inflow 
(millions US $)
FDI inflow as 
percent of 
GFKL  
FDI inflow 
(million US$) 
FDI inflow as 
percent of 
GFKL 
1985-1995 
(annual average) 
452 1.9 11,715 6 
2001-2002 3,403 3.2 46,878 10.5 
2002-2003 3,449 3 52,743 10.4 
2003-2004 4,269 3.2 53,505 8.6 
2004-2005 5,335 3.4 60,030 8.2 
Note: Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFKF) 
Sources: UNCTAD World Investment Report, 2006 
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Table 4.6.4 
FDI Overview-India and China 
(Unit: $million) 
INDIA CHINA Year  
FDI inflow 
(millions US $) 
FDI inflow 
as per cent  
of GFKF 
FDI inflow 
(million US $) 
FDI inflow 
as per cent  
of GFKF 
1980-1981 452 0.2 1,074 0.5 
1990-1991 1,657 0.5 20,691 5.8 
2000-2001 17,517 3.7 193,348 17.9 
2002-2003 30,827 5.2 228,371 16.2 
2004-2005 38,676 5.9 245,467 14.9 
Note: Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFKF)  
Sources: UNCTAD World Investment Report, 2006 
                      An analysis of data from Table 4.6.3 and Table 4.6.4 indicates that India 
that is known for the heterogeneity of its society-the diversity of its language, 
religion and geophysical attributes. Its democratic political system, western-style 
financial and legal institutions and the felicity of its business should provide India a 
niche in international markets for goods, services and foreign capital. However, 
India ranks well below China on exports and inflows of Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI.). It is the relatively low level of FDI in India, barely one-tenth of the inflows 
into China. Which has attracted much attention? A variety of explanations have 
been offered for the low levels of FDI in India. Although India could do with much 
larger volumes of FDI than that it attracts now, the concern that it is well below the 
levels of FDI is misplaced. Given the structure, composition and factor endowments 
of her economy which are significantly different from that of China, India may not 
need larger volumes of FDI, in any case, not the scale that China attracts. 
 It is often said that if India were to shed its inhibitions about foreign direct 
investment and flow in the footsteps of China, India would be in a position to realize 
her full potential. This misses out the true significance of the Chinese experience. 
China’s FDI saga has been a textbook replay of what institutional economists would 
call “adaptive efficiency” on the part of its political regime. The country made 
courageous but careful choices in difficult circumstances, signaling radical departures 
from the belief system it had been accustomed to for decades. 
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4.7 CONCLUSION 
 China and India have a unique advantage of being able to view their ties in a 
long term perspective spanning centuries. It was not until the late 19th century that 
British Indian and Chinese empire came face to face and the British expeditions to 
Tibet introduced an imperial orientation into China-India ties. Before this, it was only 
pilgrims and traders who had ventured into interiors of each other. Even the 1962 
China- India war has come under revision with both sides coming to more candid 
conclusions about their mistakes. However, the influence of that period remains 
decisive nevertheless and should provide lessons. By the time the China and India 
liberated themselves from their colonial subjugation the two had come vary far and 
moved in different directions which were to complicate their efforts at evolving their 
political equations and especially their bilateral economic interactions. Especially, as 
both these most dynamic Asian societies now prepare to face the 21st century world 
order, increasing economic cooperation has become all the more imperative – and 
indeed the most potent tool – for materializing their visions of peace and prosperity 
between themselves and by extension in this larger region. But there is also a lot that 
remains in their control and results of this have been visible in recent past. There is 
definitely a far stronger need today to encourage such fresh thinking in their mutual 
policy initiatives. In this their bilateral trade and commerce has been one area where 
this new thinking has been most effective. Therefore, it is only imperative that one 
must let their economic engagement provide the lead to their mutual interactions and 
policies. And there is still greater need then to rectify imbalances and to help promote 
each others role and contribution in building sustainable peace and prosperity for 
themselves and for the larger region. 
 India and China are the economic powerhouses of the Asian region. Both 
countries are growing at a faster rate. The bilateral trade between the two economies 
is increasing at rapid rate and Indo-China two-way trade has crossed $13.6 billion in 
2004. India’s exports to China touching $7.7 billion and imports from China reaching 
$5.9 billion are the pointers. The leaders of both the countries have set a target of $20 
billion for 2008 and $30 billion for 2010. This target appears very much achievable in 
the context of present growth scenario. Rapidly increasing bilateral trade between 
India and China suggest that the trade target set up by the two governments is 
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achievable. China has become an important trade partner for India but same can not 
be said for India. The product diversification is high in case of Chinese export to India 
but it is not so in case of India. Of late, Indian exports also diversified, however, it 
needs more. In Chinese export basket to India, medium and high-tech products 
dominate but Indian export basket to China is dominated by primary and resource 
based products, from this angle, Chinese exports to India are more sustainable than 
India’s exports to China. Increase in Indian export to China is due to competitive 
factors. Similar is the case for rise in Chinese exports to India. In Indo-China bilateral 
trade inter-industry trade plays a significant role. The intra-industry trade is not major 
factor. To enhance trade complementarities India needs to diversify into medium and 
high-tech products. The Chinese products are more competitive in Indian market due 
to lower prices and acceptable quality. China has an edge over India in third country 
markets due to its competitive power, this is more so in the case of labor-intensive 
products. The FDI has played significant role in enhancing Chinese exports but this 
not the case with India. Both India and China joining the ASEAN led Free Trade Area 
would help to expand inter-sea trade between the two countries. 
 Certain bottlenecks (such as, poor physical infrastructure) and policy induced 
rigidities in the factor markets (such as those in the organized labor market) stand in 
the way of resource reallocation process and export activities in India. The exports 
(and imports) of the large majority of the products have expanded since the 1990s 
from India. China’s gain of market share (or comparative advantage) in a given 
product does not necessarily mean India’s lose of market share) in the same product 
and vice versa. The two countries have been expanding their exports by specializing 
in different product lines within each of the product categories. Findings indicate the 
growing significance of intra-industry specialization under trade liberalization in both 
the countries. The apprehension that import liberalization would lead to a large-scale 
demise of domestic industries is unwarranted. The policy changes are necessary also 
to induce the multinationals to conduct FDI of the “vertical type” and hence to 
augment the process of integrating the Indian industry with the fragmented structure 
of global production activities. Needless to say, the policy environment should be 
neutral for the domestic and foreign enterprises unlike in China where domestic 
private entrepreneurs have been discriminated against for various reasons, as 
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elaborated in Huang (2002). It is important not to borrow the wrong aspects of the 
policies from China as much as it is important to borrow the right aspects. 
 A contentious policy issue in India is the liberalization of merger and 
acquisition (M & A) activity and, by implication, removal of exit barriers for foreign 
investors. The Planning Commission Report (2002, pp. 35-46) makes some very 
important recommendations in this regard by proposing the removal of most of the 
remaining sectoral equity caps on foreign investment and the deletion of almost all 
exit barriers. One of the characteristics of contemporary corporate strategy is the 
constant search for new high margin business opportunities that fit with an 
enterprise’s core competencies and its global positioning. This means that MNEs are 
constantly taking on new activities and shedding old ones. India’s market for 
corporate control has recently risen sharply so that in the period 1999-2000 around 
half of all FDI inflows have been in the form of mergers or acquisitions (UNCTAD, 
2001). Many MNEs have been taking advantage of the relaxation of sectoral equity 
caps to buy out minority Indian shareholders in order to exit from the local stock 
market. The increasing competitive pressures on large Indian business houses have 
encouraged several to quit joint ventures. There are a few examples of the reverse 
process. For example, Toyota sold 10 per cent of its equity to Kirloskar, raising its 
Indian joint venture partner’s share to 11 per cent in 2003. More usually the high 
capital requirements have ensured foreign partners have typically held most of the 
equity in vehicle manufacturing ventures. Similar arrangements either continue to 
favor the foreign party or have been abandoned. Famously, TVS, a south Indian 
scooter maker, broke off with its partner, Suzuki, after rows over sharing of 
technology to go it alone. Unsurprisingly, increased M&A activity has raised 
concerns about competition in consumer goods markets (Nagaraj, 2003, Chalapati 
Rao, et al., 1999). 
 Investors need to be able to enter or exit new or existing undertakings with a 
minimum of transaction costs. Nowhere is this more important than with respect to 
joint ventures where the foreign partner normally uses a joint venture as a way of 
testing the market. Equity caps have undoubtedly distorted and sometimes deterred 26 
the only significant barrier not included in the list recommended for deletion is the 
prohibition on local borrowing by foreign investors to fund purchases of shares 
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market-testing investments in some sectors in India. At a certain point, one partner is 
likely to want to exit the venture yet it apparently takes on average nine years for the 
foreign partner to exit from India with the agreed sale proceeds. Clearly this puts the 
foreign partner at a disadvantage in negotiating with the local partner over the sale 
price. Of course, liberalization of the capital repatriation processes introduces an 
element of volatility but this also creates opportunities for domestic enterprises with 
lower cost profiles than MNEs to acquire new assets often at a discount on a willing 
seller- willing-buyer basis. The Planning Commission’s recommendations to remove 
equity caps and exit barriers are important because they increase the range of strategic 
options available to foreign investors appraising the Indian economy.  
 China is a large recipient of FDI and it is successful in attracting huge export-
oriented FDI. Foreign Invested enterprises played a significant role in export 
expansion of China. Share of MNC’s is over 50 per cent in case of China as compared 
to mere 3 per cent for India. The Chinese government assured certain key conditions 
for profitability such as low taxes, reliable infrastructure, adequate power, and decent 
logistics for imports and exports, besides reducing tariffs and removal of non-tariff 
barriers. In contrast, India focused on infrastructure, power, capital goods and food 
processing. Among these sectors, many of them do not fall under export activities. In 
late 1990s over 40 per cent of FDI has taken the route of acquisitions rather than 
green field ventures. As opposed to this, FDI is concentrated in export-oriented and 
high technology manufacturing industry in China. Further, import duties are also high 
in India as compared to China. To some extent, the export-oriented production model 
is replicated in India in service sector, particularly in software development and 
business processes. The FDI in India has hardly entered export-oriented industries and 
has been domestic market-oriented and not efficiency seeking. The Special Economic 
Zones have contributed in a large measure to China’s exports; however, it has not 
been the case with India. India and China have begun to invest in each other’s 
economies. The current investment hardly represents the potential that exists between 
the two large economies. 
 Inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) into India (equity capital 
components only) during the first quarter of the current financial year 2006-07 (April-
June), was US $ 1.74 billion compared to US $ 1.18 billion in the same quarter of 
SINO-INDIA TRADING RELATION
 
 
China's Integration into Global Trading System and Its Implications for India 
212
2005-06. China and India are rivaling one another and aggressively challenging the 
US for the spot of most favored FDI destination. China still maintains the No. 1 
position, but India ascended from No. 6 to No. 3, just behind the US. India and China 
may be similar in many ways but the main difference is that while China is viewed as 
the “Factory of the world”, India is being recognized as the “Brain of the World”. 
China’s FDI inflows are larger and primarily capital-intensive, while Indian FDI 
inflows are smaller and skill-intensive, in IT areas.  The policy changes are necessary 
also to induce the multinationals to conduct FDI of the “vertical type” and hence to 
augment the process of integrating the Indian industry with the fragmented structure 
of global production activities. Needless to say, the policy environment should be 
neutral for the domestic and foreign enterprises unlike in China where domestic 
private entrepreneurs have been discriminated against for various reasons, as 
elaborated in Huang (2002). It is important not to borrow the wrong aspects of the 
policies from China as much as it is important to borrow the right aspects. 
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Chapter 5.0 
IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA 
 Over the past 20 years China has emerged from isolation to become the 
world’s sixth largest trader. Its increasingly outward orientation of the economy along 
with the surge in inward flows of FDI shows China is integrating into the world 
economy in terms of increased trade and financial links. However, in 1990 the ratio of 
GDP of total trade in goods and services in both India and China stood at about 15 %. 
By 2001, this ratio had more than triple to about 50 % in China, while India it had 
raised to around 25%. A variety of reasons like implementation of economic reforms 
with bold initiatives, better infrastructure facilities, inflows of FDI in large size, 
attractive tax structure, etc are cited for remarkable success in China. It reveals that 
India could learn a lot lessons from the Chinese success in its economic performance. 
It is widely believed that the Indian Diasporas should play a key role in bringing FDI 
rather just deepen on MNCs. The same happened in China after the Chinese 
government offered special sops to the overseas Chinese community. This will deter 
growth of certain selected areas and boost the over-all economy. 
 The key to explain why India nevertheless continues to lag behind China is the 
slow growth of the conventional industry. The policy implication is that India must 
free the industry of continuing restraints if it is to maximize the benefits of what has 
been done to-date. Gives a virtual ban on exit and retrenchment and reassignment of 
workers, continuing reservation of most of the labour-intensive industries for small-
scale firms, the absence of effective bankruptcy laws and continuing high protection, 
India industry cannot match the performance of its Chinese counterpart. In some 
ways, given the advantage India enjoys in the information technology sector over 
China, its overall prospects for growth are even better than those of China but only if 
the conventional industry is given a fair chance. 
 Assuming stable policies, how these macroeconomic and sectoral ‘growth 
factors’ will play out in the next few years is hard to say. Sustaining IT’s growth rates 
will be hard, but it has its proportion to GDP increases, smaller growth has greater 
impact. Absent a fiscal crisis, consumer demand should continue to fuel consumer 
durable and housing development. The end of the Multifiber Agreement-under which 
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international textile and apparel trading has been governed for decades by country 
quotas-should cause some concern among garment exporters, but may ultimately have 
little positive effect on India. A buoyant international economy will obviously help. 
How much further reform or ‘de-reform’ will occur and what its productive impact 
will be is hard to say as well-though the McKinsey report is certainly confident on 
that score. It promises us a 4 to 5 percent jump in the rate of economic growth-or at 
least a one-time 8 percent growth in labour productivity-if 13 easy reforms are 
adopted. They are confident that the new investment will occur and that other factors 
will not cause decreasing returns. The ultimate challenge, not for forecast of the future 
but for Indian entrepreneurs is to identify growth sectors of the next period-perhaps 
agriculture, biotechnology, more IT, tourism, or education and health. 
 There are many aspects of trade reform including further liberalization of 
industrial goods, agriculture and services: restraining the use of antidumping: opening 
sector such as retail trade to the FDI in India and bilateral and multilateral 
negotiations that diverse further attention. Currently, the Doha Round is at an 
impasse. Both India and China have large stakes in the reveal of the negotiations and 
eventual conclusion of the round they both stand to benefit from further liberalization 
of their own and of their trading partners. Peak tariffs in the developed countries 
apply to products in which these countries have a comparative advantage. Both can 
also emerge as competitive in many agricultural sectors once the protection and 
subsidies in the rich countries are ended. Equally important there is also some danger 
that a failure to complete the Doha Round will weaken the multilateral system and 
may encourage protectionist lobbies around the world to push their favorite agendas 
more aggressively. In the negotiation to-date, subdued by the challenge it faces from 
the United States on the exchange rate and imbalance in global flows. China has taken 
a backseat. India has been more active but less forthcoming with proposals of its own 
that would help move the process forward. 
 The impact of sect oral growth rates is reflected in the job creation patterns for 
the two nations. Today China’s workforce is 705 million (1999). About half of this 
workforce or 353 million is employed in agriculture, 28 percent or 190 million in 
services, and 22 percent or 162 million in industry. By contrast India’s total 
workforce is 397 million (1999). The major employer is still the agricultural sector 
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with 60.5 percent or 240 million, industry is a relatively small 16.8 percent or 67 
million, services seems rising but employs only 22.7 percent or 90 million (of this 
government alone accounts for 19.42 millions). Quite clearly in terms of employment 
we are still an agrarian society. But there is something else we must also understand 
here. China’s population in terms of age break-up is passing through a phase of great 
demographic advantage. The cohort in the productive phase (15-60 years) of the life 
cycle is at its peak, whereas the dependency ratio in India is, relatively speaking, 
somewhat adverse. While 64 percent of China’s population currently falls in the 
productive cohort, the corresponding figure for India is 59 percent. However in 20 
years from now, while China’s productive population will stagnate at 64 percent and 
hence catch up with China. That entails that India tool up to create amore productive 
and able workforce, stimulate investments and create a much bigger market for goods 
and services. 
 The important agreement was on trade with the two sides agreeing to boost 
bilateral trade, to $ 20 billion by 2008. Currently it stands at $ 13.7 billion, which is 
only 1 percent of India’s China’s global trade and 9 percent of India’s. China’s trade 
with Japan, South Korea and Taiwan is on a much larger scale and is expected to 
grow faster in the target of a $ 20 billion turnover in bilateral trade as a modest one. 
The Chinese Premier observed the “complementaries” of the two economies. He said 
in Banglore that with India’s expertise in software and the Chinese mastery over 
hardware, together the two countries could make great strides. The Indian Foreign 
Secretary mentioned biotechnology, nanotechnology and space as some of the areas in 
which the two countries could cooperate. New Delhi seems to be a little worry of 
creating a free trade zone between the two countries. Indian industries give the 
impression of being overawed by the competition form China at this juncture. A 
“report of India-China Joint Study Group on Comprehensive Trade and Economic 
Cooperation” (JSG), jointly prepared by the Indian and Chinese Commerce 
Ministries, stressed the need to take further “comprehensive measures” to expand 
trade and economic cooperation between the two countries. The JSG Report also talks 
about the benefits of a regional trading arrangement between India and China. Since 
the Doha Round of the World Trade Organization talks, the two countries have been 
coordinating their negotiating position on agriculture, intellectual property rights, 
investment and related issues. 
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 After Wen Jiabo’s visit, India and China signaled that they intend to cooperate 
more closely in the international energy sector. A small beginning has been made in 
Sudan where Indian, Chinese and Malaysian companies have packed up a joint stake 
in a big petroleum venture. The Energy Ministers of the two countries have appointed 
a joint task force to work out the details of cooperation. The leaders of the two 
countries have indicated that they will take up joint projects in the hydrocarbon sector 
in Central Asia. There is a proposal from the Indian side to have China as an end-user 
for gas from Iran and Central Asia. Both Turkmenistan and Iran want to build gas 
pipeline to India. These pipelines could be extended to China through Myanmar. 
 There is the suggestion that in India, at present, it is not FDI which promotes 
growth but it is growth which attracts foreign firms. This may be so but FDI could 
accentuate the growth process in progress. FDI is a catalyst in the growth process. It 
enhances the efficiency of other inputs in the growth process through this well 
known role as a supplier of technology and know-how. The efficiency of FDI as a 
catalyst depends on the extent to which the technology and know-how it contributes 
are assimilated and dispersed in the economy. Effective assimilation of imported 
know-how requires the adaptation of the imported by know-how to suit local lab our 
and factor markets. Equally essential for the efficient utilization of FDI is the 
dissemination of imported technology and know-how to locally owned economic 
units. In other words, technology and knowledge imparted by FDI should spillover 
into contiguous areas of economic activity and enhance their productivity. Such 
spillover of technology constitutes an important source of externalities from FDI. 
The training and work experience gained by lab our employed in foreign firms are 
also often disseminated to locally owned firms or set up their own establishments. 
The larger extent of these sorts of externalities from FDI, higher would be the social 
rate of return to the host country from a unit of FDI. 
 The empirical work on spillovers from FDI yields mixed results, some report 
negative spillovers. Those that report positive spillovers identify availability of 
skilled labour, high level of technological capabilities on the part of host firms and 
quality of infrastructure as key factors that report promote spillovers. India may be 
much better endowed with these ingredients than China. The Kearney report (2004) 
on the opinion of businessmen on the sort of investment incentives China and India 
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provide is instructive: “Investors favor China and India for its market size, access to 
export markets, government incentive, favorable cost structured and macro 
economic climate” and “These same investors cite India’s highly educated labour 
force, management talent, transparency, cultural affinity and regulatory environment 
as more favorable than what China provides. 
 As a confident India Inc has started bidding for more and bigger deals abroad, 
in 2007-08 overseas investment from India will be around $15 billion-surpassing 
foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows in the country. The bulk of outward FDI flow 
will be driven mainly by India's booming manufacturing sector. Indian companies' 
preferred investment destinations are the European countries and the US, as also 
Africa taking advantage of its cost competitiveness. 
 Further, in a 2005 report entitled “India-China: The Road Ahead” the CII has 
recommended several areas where India’s merchandise exports to China have bright 
prospects: a range of grains, fruits and marine products, granite, cement and plastering 
materials, chemicals and pharmaceutical and cotton-based fabrics. There is significant 
potential for growth in the services and knowledge-intensive sectors as well, 
particularly biotechnology, IT and ITES, health, education tourism and the financial 
sector, although here too governmental activities will be critical to harness mutual 
complementary. 
 Sectors such as pharmacy and automobiles will give a major thrust to the FDI 
outflow, though IT will continue to dominate the scene. 'Riding on strong balance 
sheets, good credit ratings and confidence shown by global business community, 
Indian manufacturing is leading India Inc.'s global quest,’ The main factors fuelling 
the growing hunger for mergers and acquisitions (M and A) among Indian companies 
are huge fund supply, globally competitive business practices and favorable 
regulatory environment, besides higher margins, revenue, volumes and growth 
prospects. 'The number of outbound M and A deals has increased sharply over the 
past six years from about 37 in 2001 to more than 170 in 2006. The transactions 
gathered tremendous momentum in 2005'. 'The total number of deals actually doubled 
in 2005 from 2004 to reach a figure of close to 150 from 70 in previous year.' 
According to an investigation, the Indian conglomerates that are upbeat on inorganic 
growth are the Tata group, Bharat Forge, Ranbaxy, ONGC, Infosys and Wipro. 'The 
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sectors attracting investments by Corporate India include a whole gamut of sectors - 
metal, pharmaceuticals, industrial goods, automotive components, beverages, 
cosmetics and energy in manufacturing; and mobile communications, software and 
financial services in services'. 
 More critical is the problem of excessive labour regulations, which China 
eliminated first in special economic zones and then national wide. This is the key to 
raising productivity and income-at present, the roughly 60 % of the population 
engaged in agriculture produces just 22 % of GDP, and output is growing at less than 
2 %. A close second is opening up retail sector fully to foreign competition, and here 
again India could learn from its neighbor. By allowing in firms like Wal-Mart and 
Carrefour, China has benefited consumers, stimulated demand, helped to develop a 
host of other industries and fostered the creation of distribution networks. Until now, 
both moves have been blocked by leftwing parties in the ruling coalition. 
Nevertheless, the incremental steps being made show that these changes are within 
reach. For more than a decade, China has been the darling of the global business 
community, which falls over its “miraculous” growth. Now India is poised not only to 
shine, but even to eclipse China. 
 There is an imminent possibility in medium-term that Chinese currency Yuan 
will be revalued upwards. So that Chinese exports will prove costly. In other words, 
Indian products will be attractive to the foreigners. This will give impetus to Indian 
exports and its outsourcing activities. In India, a gradual weakening of the US dollar 
against other major currencies including Yuan has also influenced the rupee-dollar 
rates through cross-currency volatility. In fact, a large portion of India’s external 
trade is invoiced in dollar. This has made exports costlier and imports cheaper in 
India. The appreciation in rupee was also largely driven by surge in foreign capital 
in India stock and debt market Srivastava, 2005. A direct implication of the 
revaluation was that the cost to manufacturing in China would increase, but the 
domestic needs of China could offset this. There is a shortage of workers, 
electricity, steel and oil in China and revaluating the Yuan may make the import of 
raw materials cheaper. At the same time India exporters would get some relief for 
time being due to Yuan revaluation. The move may enhance the competitiveness of 
Indian products vis-à-vis China in the world markets. There are apprehensions that 
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China which is one of the world’s largest importers of raw materials might lose 
appetite to import it. China is a major importer of steel and iron ore from India. 
There could be slow down in Indian exports to China Srivastava, 2005.  
 The Chinese success could be attributed to investment in the export-oriented 
sectors. Investments have flown mainly in labor intensive industries such as textiles 
and toys. FDI has increased the productivity across the industries. Chinese 
government provides financial incentives such as tax incentives and a lower duty 
coupled with the huge domestic economy has resulted in low cost products. There is 
a lot of scope for attracting FDI into Small Scale Industries (SSIs) (Chnniah, 2006). 
 Chinese performances in infrastructure sector have been remarkable and it 
should be looked into. Its success in manufacturing sector main drawbacks in 
India’s economic development is lack of infrastructure facilities like power, roads, 
railways, oil and gas, aviation, telecomm nations, etc. Though some developments 
have been made in operational levels but a lot of initiatives are still required. China 
opened up FDI in retail sector in 1992 through joint venture route. Its success in 
retail can be replicate in India. But in India a consensus has not been yet developed 
for opening up retail sector for FDI. All new companies in China have the flexible 
to retrench workers and to pay productivity-based wages. In India entrepreneurs are 
forced to choose lab our savings techniques due to its archaic labour laws. 
Therefore, there is a need to overhaul Indian labour laws. 
 One of China’s biggest achievements has been in the area of primary and 
secondary education. Having implemented free, compulsory nine-year education in 
1986, China reduced its illiteracy rate from 23 percent in the 1980s to just over 6 
percent in 2000, China has higher enrolment ratio (94.6 vs. 87.5) and better 
pupil/teacher ratio (21) compared to India (41). Another spectacular success of 
China has been in the area of gender equality. The gender Related development 
Index ranks China at 65th while India is placed 98th. But beyond the ranks, it is the 
underlying statistics that make the picture starker. Female life expectancy is 73.5 
years in China (India-65). China has a significant edge over India female literacy 
(86.5 percent vs. 47.8 percent) and female employment levels (2.4 percent vs. 42.5 
percent). Among reasons for extraordinary success has been the decentralization of 
central government’s control over foreign trade and foreign exchange has been 
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central to China’s trade reforms. China turned from a net importer to a net exporter 
of grain. China created a liberal and flexible economic environment through the 
setting up of Special Economic Zones (SEZs). These zones served as focal point for 
investment. By the 90s, the SEZs and open cities accounted for over 50 percent of 
total realized investment and more than half of total exports. 
 India is still considered by foreign investors as a high cost, un-competitive 
manufacturer. It should take bold steps towards a modern and efficient tax system 
that incorporates the international best practices. 
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Chapter-6 
AN ALTERNATIVE STRATEGY FOR INDIA 
 Does India’s indeed have any overarching strategy? On the surface, the 
answer may be negative. A deeper analysis, however, suggests that there is indeed a 
unifying theme underlying the Indian development paradigm. This theme can be 
summarized as openness to ideas, private initiative and reduced role for government. 
While the later has been a result of deliberate action, the first two have been 
ingrained into the Indian psyche over thousands of years and are highly path 
dependent. While it would be difficult to replicate them, the Chinese should strive to 
create an atmosphere for their development. In conclusion, the world today offers 
immense opportunities to both India and China . While the two countries have 
succeeded in exploiting some of them, they could accelerate the process by learning 
from each other. Through contextual differences might need changes in some 
policies and strategies, there is very little doubt that the two countries would 
ultimately benefit from this learning process. 
 It is important, however, to recognize that India’s choice of placing political 
freedom ahead of economic liberalization puts a cap on the pace of development. 
Democracy, poverty, and large agriculture-based voter base have caused Indian 
governments to massively subsidies agricultural sectors at the expense of 
industrialization. Indian policy-makers have to balance between long-term social 
benefits-China is less constrained in this regard. China’s emphasis on economic 
freedom before political freedom has served it well in some areas, especially in the 
context of delivering sustained and methodical growth. Is such a trade-off between 
political freedom and economic development worthwhile for developing countries? 
This is a question with no easy answer. 
 Without a well-articulated strategy for balanced economic development, India 
is destined to fall farther behind China even as it celebrates its shining success in the 
Software and Information Technology Services (SITS) sector. India’s growth has 
been sporadic and opportunistic, with no strong central guiding policy. India’s leaders 
need the vision for an economic agenda that recognizes democracy, sustainability, and 
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widespread socio-economic development. There is something useful for India to be 
learned by other developing nations from the experiences of China. 
 From the inter-sectoral picture it is quite clear that China is a fast 
industrializing country whereas India seems to be entering the post-
industrial phase without having industrialized. We need to reverse this 
trend by stimulating industrialization, especially since it creates more jobs 
and has great multiplier effects on the economy. 
 The challenge ahead of us is not catching with China’s growth rate, 
which inevitably must slow down. When nations compete, growth rates 
matter little if one is already well ahead. Can we do what China did to us in 
1986? To do that in 2020 we need to grow at 11.6 percent and to do that 
long after most of us are gone in 2050. India must grow at 8.9 percent every 
year. Catching up with growth rates is not good enough. If that were the 
game we are already doing much better than the US, Europe and Japan. So 
if Montek Singh Ahluwalia says we will do 7 percent, that’s very good. But 
that’s just one swallow and that doesn’t mean that our season in the sun is 
at hand. 
 The quantum of receipts and number of companies in India so far by way of 
disinvestment of PSUs is less than target (Economic Survey, 2002-03). In addition, 
reforms in State sector undertakings are much worst, i.e. at non-starter level. In this 
context Chinese experience is very useful and can break the ice. Many of the large 
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China have been reformed in a number of different 
ways including mergers and conglomerations to take advantage of economies of scale, 
corporation to induce private sector like management and scale to private hands 
through Initial Public Offerings (IPOs). Whereas the focus was on privatizing the 
small and medium SOEs, the diversification of ownership in large SOEs has had a 
wide-raging impact. 
 Typically, under liberal trade policies, developing countries are much more 
likely to be able to expand exports and imports if a large proportion of their output 
originates in industry. Not only is the scope for expanding labour intensive 
manufactures greater, a larger industrial sector also requires imported inputs there by 
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offering greater scope for the expansion of imports. In India, the response of imports 
has been just as muted as that of exports. Imports have simply failed to absorb the 
foreign exchange generated by remittances and relatively modest foreign investment 
flows. 
 This same factor is also at work in explaining the relatively modest response 
of FDI to liberal policies. Investment into industry, whether domestic or foreign, has 
been sluggish. Foreign investors have been hesitant to invest in the industry for much 
the same reasons as the domestic investors. At the same time, the capacity of the 
formal services sector to absorb foreign investment is limited. The information 
technology sector has shown promise but its base is still small. Moreover, this sector 
is more intensive in skilled labour than physical capital. 
 Therefore, the solution to both trade and FDI expansion in India lays in 
stimulating growth in industry. The necessary steps are now common knowledge: 
bring all tariffs down to 10 percent or less, abolish the small-scale industries 
reservation, institute an exit policy and bankruptcy laws and privatize all public sector 
undertaking. In India entrepreneurs are forced to choose lab our saving techniques due 
to our archaic labour laws. Whereas all the new companies in China have the 
flexibility to retrench workers and to pay productivity-based wages. 
 The optimum level of FDI could be defined as that level of FDI which 
maximizes social rate of return. Social rates of return to FDI would be a function of 
not only the quality of FDI, signified by the nature and extend of ownership 
advantages possessed by the foreign firms but also the ability of local management 
and labour to assimilate the technology and know-how imparted by foreign firms. 
Prerequisites for the effective assimilation of imported technology and know-how 
include the presence of research and development facilities which would facilate 
adaptation of imported technologies, skilled labour which is adapt at learning by 
doing and adequate communication networks. 
 FDI inflows into China can provide a stimulus for India and other 
developing countries. Its success is clearly in terms of benefits gained from FDI 
inflows. The four major constraints which appear to play a dominant role in 
influencing FDI inflows into India are: (a) lack of policy initiatives, (b) inadequate 
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infrastructure facilities (c) rigidities in lab our laws, (d) high fiscal deficit. A strong 
surge of FDI inflows into India may come true if these bottlenecks are removed. 
 Chinese experience in FDI is an eye opener to the Indian policy-makers that 
how it has attracted more FDI than the US, making it the largest FDI recipient in the 
world. China’s FDI procedures are easier and decisions can be taken rapidly. The 
government provides infrastructure at affordable rates and foreign investment 
approvals are cleared by the local administration very quickly (Srivastava, 2005). 
 India is still considered by foreign investors as a high-cost, uncompetitive 
manufacturer despite some tax reforms. The ingredients of China’s success in the 
global markets are very clear: low to zero duties on industrial inputs and capital 
goods, reasonable prices for power and capital, better infrastructure and lab our 
flexibility. India should take bold steps towards a modern and efficient tax system that 
incorporates the international best practices.  
 The distinctive features have contributed to the success of Chinese SEZs. 
They include FDI from non-resident Chinese, attractive incentives, low indirect 
taxes, other tax benefits, flexible lab our laws, liberal customs procedure, 
decentralization of power to local authorities, etc. India is creating SEZs on a large 
scale. Indian debate on SEZs is centered on tax breaks and land grabs. But there is a 
need to replicate Hong Kong like procedures in India (Aiyer, 2006). 
 The government is considering a proposal to increase the foreign direct 
investment (FDI) limit in schedule domestic carriers to 74 % from 49%. The idea is 
being mooted to increase the funding options for domestic airlines, which have 
drawn up huge expansion plans. Various foreign private equity firms, institutional 
investors and NRI’s have been increasing their stakes in Indian carriers. Foreign 
stake in Spice Jet and Air Deccan has already reached closer to 40 %. Analysts are 
of the view that a higher FDI cap would help bring in foreign investments in this 
sector which will go a long way in funding the fleet and operation expansion plans 
of the airlines companies. FDI in airports and airlines is considered important for 
government to achieve its long-term plan of creating an aviation grid across the 
country by developing 400 airports and airstrips. The government has already 
allowed 100 % FDI is lowered in airports through the automatic route. 
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 The benefits of Software and Information Technology Services (SITS) sector 
in India have been constrained to educated elite and to urban areas. On contrary, with 
its focus on manufacturing, China has achieved a growth pattern that is more robust 
and balanced than that of India, and has created employment opportunities to absorb 
large agricultural workforce in industrial sector. 
 How has India fared on the manufacturing front? Despite a serious lack of 
world class infrastructure, the manufacturing sector is evolving in India. Large 
industrial house from South Korea, such as LG and Hyundai, are expanding their 
Indian manufacturing operations at a rapid pace to serve not just the Indian markets, 
but to use. 
 India as a base for export to Latin America, Asia, Eastern Europe, and Africa. 
Indian companies such as Tata Motors, Bajaj Auto Ltd, Mahendra and Mahendra, and 
Sundaram Clayton Ltd, have begun to venture into global markets. Unfortunately, 
while much needs to be done in terms of empowering the manufacturing sector with 
skilled workers and better infrastructure. This sector has not received the same 
attention and is hounded by numerous regulatory burdens that are waived for the SITS 
sector. 
 The main hindrance in India’s economic development is lack of infrastructure 
facilities like power, roads, railways, oil and gas, aviation, telecommunication, etc. In 
this context Chinese performances have been remarkable and it should be looked into 
it. Its super success in manufacturing sector is mainly because of its world-class 
infrastructure facilities.  
 Unless the Central and State governments in India vigorously work to improve 
the basic infrastructure related to power, water, communication, and transportation, 
the manufacturing sector will not grow at a rapid clip. Yet, as China’s experience 
suggests, for a relatively poor nation with a burgeoning population, rapid growth in 
manufacturing is the stairway out of the basement of poverty. India’s development 
policies do not determinedly point in this direction at the moment. 
 Recently China has declared to adopt a managed floating exchange rate 
regime with reference to a basket of currencies. Consequently, Yuan has appreciated 
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against dollar by 2.1 %. It could move at the most by 0.3 % against the dollar, its 
implications are very crucial from the point of performance of external sector of the 
Indian economy. This is primarily due to China in recent years has emerged as a big 
trade partner of India. 
 A revaluation is likely to affect China’s relative attractiveness for investments 
will increase for investor while price competitiveness products will decline in export 
markets. Hence, it is likely the Multinational Corporations (MNCs) may begin to 
diversify the location of investments away from China to spread risks especially since 
the Yuan may tend to appreciate in future to find its correct value. This may help 
India that is increasingly seen by the MNCs as an emerging destination for such 
investments. 
 Indian currency regime is already market determined and there is future. 
Therefore, India is likely to receive greater attention from MNCs as a platform for 
export oriented investments and for sourcing of products in the coming years. So the 
Chinese move is good news for India as far as the potential of FDI inflows and 
exports is concerned. However, to able to exploit the full potential of the emerging 
opportunities, we will need to fix the infrastructure and other bottlenecks and 
efficiently (Kumar, 2005). 
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Chapter 7 
CONCLUSION 
On the basis of analysis and interpretation of data the following conclusions have 
been drawn:  
(1) The comprehensive reform program launched in 1994 by China reflects the 
authorities' recognition of the numerous basic deficiencies in the economy, 
requiring correction. In the last two years, considerable progress has been 
made in foreign trade and foreign exchange liberalization, the development of 
a modern tax code and revenue-sharing arrangements, as well as in social and 
economic legislation. However, despite these impressive achievements, 
enormous difficulties continue to confront enterprise reform, housing and 
social welfare, tax administration, financial reform, and law enforcement. 
Here, China’s economy has transformed from a centrally planned economy 
dominated by the state sector to a market-oriented economy consisted of 
firms with various ownership form.  
(2) One direct outcome of China’s economic reform is the expansion of China’s 
trade with the rest of the world. External trade has become a very important 
element of China’s economy. During the past 20 years, China’s total trade 
increased from US$ 38 billion in 1980 to more than US$ 474 billion in 2000. 
In 1980, China’s export and import account for 0.9% and 1% of world total in 
1980. In 2000, the figures are 3.9% and 3.5% of world trade, respectively.  
The importance of China’s as a large trading nations had been growing 
steadily. China is the world number 7 largest exporter in 2000, up from 
number 26 in 1980. At the same time, trade also becomes increasing 
important as a percentage of China’s GDP. In 1980, the ratios of export and 
import in GDP are 6.0% and 6.6% respectively. In 2000, they increased to 
23.1% and 20.8%.  
(3) After 17 years of successful reform, the authorities still retain some remnants 
of distrust of the price mechanism. As stated, most of the prices have already 
been freed of government controls. But, it is in the remaining areas deemed 
by the authorities to be of critical importance to the national economy that 
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price controls still remain. These areas include basic materials, such as steel 
and cotton; energy, such as coal and electricity; transportation, such as 
railroad; staple food, such as grains and edible oil. Policies designed to ensure 
their plentiful supply at low prices are precisely those that retard production, 
contribute to shortages, and add to the burden of budgetary subsidies. 
Administered interest rate is another example of misconceived policy that 
distorts credit allocation and thwarts the development of money and capital 
markets in China. 
(4) Following the communist party take over of Mainland China in 1949, the 
national trade policy was based on self-reliance, where the economy was 
mainly controlled and planned by the central government. Almost 90 % of 
China’s population were rural and employed in the agriculture sector, which 
contributed 70 % of the national income. The central government ruled all 
aspects associated with the development of the economy. It made decisions 
on macro-economic activities and monopolized purchasing, marketing of 
commodities and the supply and allocation of materials. Moreover, all 
production processes and products manufactured were determined according 
to the state plan and all profits generated by enterprises and local government  
and to be handed over to the state government. During the continuous 
development stages, the state extended its open-door policy towards more 
provinces. A noticeable inflow of foreign capital surged into China in the 
period of high growth. The central government started lifting its ban on 
foreigners from having joint ventures. The open policy in the 1990s shifted 
from costal regions to the western inland area. The Chinese government 
begins to open more inland cities and region investment. In the late 90s, 
China continued to open up more markets and reduce barriers to foreign 
investors in an effort to enter World Trade Organization (WTO). 
(5) From 1978-2006 China has maintained its strong growth momentum and 
continued its integration into the global economy. Despite the difficult world 
economic environment and domestic uncertainties, China’s GDP growth has 
remained above 7.50 percentages in recent years, supported by appropriate 
macroeconomic policies and structural reforms. Spurred by accession to the 
WTO in December 2001, China’s exports have expanded rapidly, at the same 
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time, robust domestic demand and further market opening under China’s 
WTO commitments have also led to strong import growth. Real GDP grew 
by 8 percent in 2002, underpinned by the strength of exports fixed 
investment, which registered growth rates of 22 percent and 17 percent, 
respectively. In 2003, the outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
(SARC) in the second quarter temporarily dampened GDP growth as activity 
in the services sector weakened. However, external trade continued to expand 
rapidly, and the services sector appears to have made a quick rebound in the 
first three quarters of 2003, GDP grew by 8.50 percent (year -on -year), led 
by strong fixed investment. Deflationary pressure has been casing. After 
declining by 0.8 percent in 2002, consumer prices increased by 0.7 percent in 
the first nine months of 2003. Despite the strong GDP growth, unemployment 
continues to rise: registered unemployment in the urban areas increased to 4 
percent in 2002, up 0.4 percentage points from 2001. The level of surplus 
labor in the agricultural sector is estimated to be larger, and rural-urban 
income disparities have continued to widen. 
(6) China’s overall external position has strengthened further. The current 
account surplus rose from 1.5 percent of GDP in 2001 to 2.75 percent in 
2002, mainly on account of increase in the trade surplus and private transfers. 
The financial account posted another large surplus in 2002, as foreign direct 
investment (FDI) inflows amounted to $ 53 billion and there was a 
repatriation of other capital from abroad. Official reserves increased by 4 76 
billion in 2002. In the first 9 months of 2003, the trade surplus decline 
sharply as imports surged by 41 percent, while exports grew by 32 percent. 
However, official reserve rose by $ 98 billion, reaching $ 393 billion by end-
September (equivalent to around 10.50 months of import). While FDI inflows 
have remained strong, the pickup in the pace of reserve accumulation in 2003 
mostly reflects other capital inflows. 
(7) In the coastal region of China, which possesses a pool of intelligent educated 
R&D staff and skilled labor and hosts most of China’s R&D activities and top 
universities and research institutes and where inward FDI has evolved from 
labour-intensive processing activities to more strategic asset-seeking type 
FDI by major MNEs, FDI has played a significant role in promoting regional 
CONCLUSION
 
 
China's Integration into Global Trading System and Its Implications for India 
234
innovation capacity as well as regional innovation efficiency over the 2000-
2004 period. 
(8) China finds a better governance to serve its goal of growth. And during the 
early phase of economic development, when the average income of 
population is much lower, the growth target is easier to be placed on the top 
of government agenda. China did so and what China did better than India is 
because it is much easier to make out an effective governance of growth 
under China’s political system than under federalism India. What challenges 
China in the future is how Chinese system responds effectively to diversified 
interests of society and how Chinese government enforces its cohesion when 
growth target is no longer on consensus. For instance, China’s rapid growth 
from below has increasingly enlarged the regional income disparity and 
social income gap in the past decade. These problems threat social and 
political stability in China. China needs to manage these social problems. 
Recent experience has indicated that China is on the crossroad between 
implementation of growth target and moving towards to more distributional 
policies. 
(9) China's output growth is sustainable into the next century, say, to 2010, if and 
only if it succeeds in implementing its current comprehensive reform 
program. Predictions of China's becoming a great economic power by the 
year 2010 are greatly exaggerated. At best, it could become another newly 
industrialized country. Nevertheless, because of its sheer size China remains 
an attractive market for businesses that are experienced in trading with or 
investing in developing economies.  
(10) China’s export competitiveness hinges on the coincidence of several factors: 
the favorable exchange rate, low wages and available supplies of unskilled 
labor, the reduced cost of communication and transportation, the flow of 
foreign direct investment and foreign management and its implications for 
China’s productive abilities, the large scale of the potential Chinese domestic 
market, the opening of world markets, and the encouragement of Chinese 
foreign trade policy. On the other hand, certain considerations have special 
importance. For example, Chinese export growth is more than a matter of low 
wages and an undervalued exchange rate. Chinese producers have become 
CONCLUSION
 
 
China's Integration into Global Trading System and Its Implications for India 
235
greatly more proficient at meeting world requirements for quality and product 
design. The large inflow of foreign direct investment and entrepreneurship, 
which is responsible for much of the export flow, has facilitated this process, 
and, in turn, reflects the favorable economics of export production in China. 
The shift of Chinese production toward more advanced products with 
technological content is also notable. 
(11) Chinese producers have become greatly more proficient at meeting world 
requirements for quality and product design. The large inflow of foreign 
direct investment and entrepreneurship, which is responsible for much of the 
export flow, has facilitated this process, and , in turn, reflects the favorable 
economics of export production in China. The shift of Chinese production 
toward more advanced products with technological content is also notable. 
On one hand, this represents competition with other East Asian countries. On 
the other, it reflects a collaborative symbiotic relationship with South Korea, 
Singapore, and Taiwan whose cost structure has outgrown the simpler high 
technology goods that supported earlier phases of their industrialization. 
China’s competitive ace in the hole continues to be its large and potentially 
mammoth domestic market. Foreign firms seek entry to China not only to 
take advantage of low cost export platforms, but also as a way to position 
themselves for future local sales. Aside perhaps for India, there is simply no 
other developing economy with such promise as a market percent of their 
products on the domestic market. 
(12) The Chinese government currently faces a number of major policy choices 
relating to the foreign investment policy framework. Its priorities are: 
• To continue to attract high-technology, large ticket investment, in 
order to pursue industrial restructuring and to foster import-substituting 
investment; 
• To attract large sums of FDI into infrastructure, where expenditure of 
over nearly $750bn is expected to be needed between 1995 and 2004; 
• To attract investment into the interior provinces, consonant with the 
aim, enshrined in the current ninth Five Year Plan, of spreading 
development inland; 
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• To design an investment regime which, while it does not conflict with 
the demands of membership of the World Trade Organisation, also 
allows for the pursuit of industrial reform at a measured pace; 
• To open the domestic market to foreign investment across a broader 
spectrum. 
(13) In the early years after China’s opening, FDI is mostly in the form of 
contractual joint ventures, where the risks of foreign participants are lower. 
As the reform deepened and the business environment improved 
significantly, equity joint ventures increased in their importance. In recent 
years, wholly foreign owned enterprises become increasingly important. 
Foreign-invested firms have become a very important part of the Chinese 
economy.  
(14) From 1978 to 2000, China's GDP grew by 9.5% annually on average from 
RMB 36 billion to RMB 882 billion. GDP per capita also increase 
dramatically at an annual rate of 8.3% from RMB 379 to RMB 7,078. FDI 
increase from a very level in the late 1970s to more than US$ 40 billion a 
year the in the late 1990s. FDI and FIEs formed an important element in 
China's economic growth in both the national level as well as regional level.  
(15) After more than two decades of China’s economic reform and open-door 
policy, enterprises funded by external investment have become an important 
and the most dynamic part of the economy. This is particularly true for the 
eastern part of the country. FDI from Hong Kong, Taiwan and other 
neighboring economies make up the bulk of the investment. These 
investments concentrated primarily in the two southeastern provinces of 
Guangdong and Fujian. Since 1992, FDI have increased dramatically. FDI 
from industrial countries, in particular, have increased significantly in both 
the total amount and the relative importance in total FDI. These investments 
are also more geared towards the domestic Chinese market.  
(16) Adding to total industrial output and value-added is not FIEs. Increasing the 
number of FIEs intensifies competition in the domestic market and forces 
domestic SOEs and non-SOEs to respond more quickly to market signals. 
More and more interaction between FIEs and local government official as 
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well as local businesses also help facilitate the development and adoption of 
rules and the laws suitable for a market-oriented economy.  
(17) Like in many other development countries, Chinese authorities encourage 
technology transfer through various forms of foreign investment in the 
economy. China's FDI policies since the reform have been formulated to 
reflect those objectives.  In recent years, FDI in China increased significantly 
and, at the same time, more and more projects are in industries.  In 1995, 
about 30% of all the firms in Garment and other fiber products are FIEs. They 
produce 50% of the industry's total output and value-added. In 2000, FIEs. 
contribution to output and valued-added decreased slightly. In textile, FIEs 
are not as important but still account for about 20% of the industry's total in 
number of firms, in output, and in value-added.  
(18) FIEs have increased their share in industries with relatively high technology 
sophistication in recent years. These FIEs produce 72% of the industry's total 
output, and generate 65% of the industries total value-added. In 2000, China 
exports 4.7% of the world total in manufacturing export and ranked number 6 
among countries. In 2000, China is among the top 15 exporters in all sub-
categories of manufactures except automotive products. This suggests that 
FDI in China has played an important role in helping China move up the 
technology ladder and to industrial restructuring. The initial pattern of export 
promotion in low-tech, labor-intensive industries has been augmented with 
more and more FDI in more advanced industries with higher technology 
requirement.  
(19) China’s growing foreign exchange reserves do not imply wealth that is 
disposable at any time, but rather a sizeable indirect debt. In 2005, only half 
of China’s accumulated foreign exchange reserves was consistent with its 
wealth, which allowed Beijing to fulfill international payment obligations. 
The remaining capital inflows (FDI and short term capital inflows) could be 
interpreted as implied debts (long run and short term foreign borrowings) that 
China would have to pay back eventually. In particular, the 22% short term 
capital inflows could easily reverse. Asian and Latin American experiences 
show that financial crises have often been triggered by such hot money flows. 
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(20) There is little solid evidence that China’s currency is undervalued and even if 
it were, given the variation in equilibrium exchange rate estimates offered by 
economists, reluctance on the part of China’s policymakers to significantly 
revalue the RMB is unsurprising. Many of the benefits currently accruing to 
China as a result of a stable exchange rate also appear insufficiently 
recognized and similarly many of the costs involved in moving to a flexible 
regime. Perhaps the most prominent shortcoming of the consensus position is 
that it fails to convincingly demonstrate how exchange rate stability is at the 
root of problems in China’s economy today. China’s economic performance 
over the past decade suggests that it has not been hopelessly trying to 
reconcile the "irreconcilable trilemma" from macroeconomic theory, which 
states that a country cannot simultaneously pursue free capital mobility, a 
fixed exchange rate and an independent monetary policy. While its capital 
controls are certainly porous to a degree, when combined with partial 
sterilization and monetary policy in which administrative tools remain 
effective, China has been able to maintain both macroeconomic stability and 
a stable exchange rate. 
(21) New parts of the world, long considered underdeveloped backwaters, are now 
taking center stage in the global economy. Rapid ascendancy of China’s 
economy is much publicized as it transformed into a major venue for 
manufacturing of cheaper goods sought after by global consumers. India also 
is exhibiting a vigorously growing economy partially fueled by companies 
around the world trying to reduce their costs by outsourcing some of their 
operations to India. The first sign that something was up came around the late 
1990s, stories began to appear in the international media that India was 
“stealing” jobs from the U S and other wealthy nations. These were not just 
industrial jobs like those that migrated to China, but many white-collar jobs 
of well-educated people. Today everyone knows that the small trickle of jobs 
from developed nations to India which started in the late 1990s has become a 
veritable flood. 
  India now is said to be the back office of many banks, a magnet for 
labor-intensive, tedious programming, and the customer service voice of every 
company from British Airways to Microsoft. It is reported that during the past 
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five years alone, over 100 Information Technology (IT) and scientific 
companies have located their Research & Development (R&D) labs in India. 
These are not routine drudge jobs. High-tech companies are coming to India 
seeking innovators of the future world. Their recruits are young graduates 
fresh from the Indian universities and elite Indian Institutes of Technology 
(IIT). The knowledge revolution is on and some senior scientist and officials 
believe that India can short-cut the established path to industrial development 
and move straight to a knowledge economy. It is observed that India has long 
possessed a strong market-driven economy, private corporations, democratic 
government (the largest democracy in the world), western accounting 
standards, an active stock market, wide-spread English usage, and schools 
strong in computer science and Math. As Sender states, India’s English 
speaking, highly educated workforce has been a source of low-cost technology 
and service labor. 
(22) China’s growth is strong, but it is based on the rapid expansion of sectors of 
its economy that are already well developed. That can work for a while, but it 
also adds to China’s internal imbalances. The last time around when 
investment rate spiked from 35% to 45% of GDP in the early 1990s, the 
outcome was a hard landing. The risk of another – economically painful and 
socio-politically destabilizing - hard landing is still high. China’s existing 
growth model looks to be running up against real limits, both internally and 
globally. Sustaining growth will require reorienting China’s economy – and 
relying, at least on while, on rapid expansion of domestic consumption to 
sustain growth. In the contemporary world, both India and China are fast 
growing economies. Now, the bilateral trade and investments are growing 
between the two countries indicating the presence of vast potential for 
growth. China is emerging as a critical link in the manufacturing chain while 
India’s potential for knowledge based services and manufacturing is 
recognized. In labor-intensive products, both countries are competitive. China 
has agreed to provide non-discriminatory treatment to all WTO members, 
elimination of duel pricing between domestic and export products, price 
controls, elimination of export subsidies on farm products, reduction in tariff 
duties and removal of non-tariff barriers to name but a few. China’s joining 
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of the WTO has coincided with rapid rise of Indo- China bilateral trade. The 
two-way trade grew over 25 per cent per annum. Indian exports to China 
increased by 26 per cent and imports from China increased by 24 per cent 
during 2000─2004 periods. 
(23) Major change in product composition of China’s exports to India occurred in 
2003 with the entry of large number of electric and electronic products. 
However, the product concentration remained stable during 1996─2003. The 
analysis reveals that an increase in Chinese import demand, product 
diversification and influence of competitiveness has contributed to rise in 
Indian exports to China. When all the products exported from India are taken, 
the competitive factor emerges as most important with 50 per cent changes in 
India’s exports. Similarly, for China, increase in competitiveness is a major 
factor and it is followed by the demand factors. India showed a comparative 
advantage over its competitors in the Chinese market in certain items of 
textiles, leather products, chemicals, engineering and granite. Advance and 
medium technology products dominate Chinese export basket to India. Trade 
margins are relatively high for large number of products imported from 
China, particularly electrical and electronic products. China has diversified its 
exports to India. An increasing number of companies are sourcing input 
supplies from China. This is due to lower prices, acceptable quality and 
prompt delivery. 
(24) China incurred 46 percent of its import expenditures on machinery and 
transport equipment. The corresponding expenditure by India was only 19 
percent. This reinforces the point made earlier: for its needs, India is far more 
specialized in the capital goods industries than China. The difference between 
India and China looks even more impressive when we consider the absolute 
levels of their expenditures on the SITC 7 imports: $253 billion by China 
versus just $22 billion by India. 
(25) Foreign direct investment (FDI) is also an area where India appears to lag 
behind China. In 2006, China attracted 10 times more FDI than India owing 
to its more liberalized policies for foreign investors. Moreover, the Chinese 
economy is growing faster and its infrastructure is better. Although strict 
protection policies remain in place in selected sectors in China, such as 
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automobiles, India’s restrictive labour laws and limits affecting foreign shares 
in ownership restrain foreign investment in general. In particular, India’s 
inadequate infrastructure development makes it very difficult for 
multinational companies to ship products in and out of the country, and even 
within the country. China is certainly a star performer in attracting FDI, but 
India did not perform commensurately badly, given the large disparity in 
performance. China accounts for 5% of world GDP and India for about 2%, 
at current exchange rates. As bigger economies normally attract more 
investment, China currently tends to be the preferred destination for foreign 
investors. But in terms of FDI percentage of GDP, China’s figure is less 
stunning–only two and a half times that of India. 
(26) The statistics suggest that the productivity of FDI in India is higher than that 
in China. This suggestions, through it needs detailed statistical verification 
at the disaggregate level of sectors of industry, provides yet another 
expansion for the observed differences in volume of FDI in the two 
countries. It is that India may not require as large a volume of FDI as China 
harbors. India attracts now may not be adequate for generating a 10 percent 
rate of growth aspired for by India’s planners but the optimum level of FDI 
the country needs may not be much higher than the present level of inflows 
of FDI. In the meantime Indian exports are now facing the direct, short –term 
prospect of being more competitive in the marketed vis-a vis Chinese goods. 
This is primarily because of increasing the cost of manufacturing in China. 
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